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Abstract
In this essay I will ask if getting married and 
remaining married are rational things for a reflective 
person to do. 1 will limit my discussion to marriage 
within the western tradition. Most people in this 
tradition marry at some point in their lives. When they 
do, they are usually thought to be doing something 
worthwhile. Yet all too many marriages end in 
disappointment and divorce. So is it rational for us to 
choose to bind ourselves to another person in perpetuity 
in this way?
To answer this question, I will begin by examining 
the sociobiological thesis which claims that human beings 
are gene-governed to pair bond. If this is correct, it 
might be thought that it explains the practice of 
marriage. However 1 will show that one implication of 
sociobiology is that, given this thesis, monogamous 
marriage goes against our natural inclinations; while 
pair bonding may be natural to us, exclusive pair bonding 
for life is not.
1 will go on to discuss the fact that monogamous 
heterosexual marriage is part of the traditional mores in 
western, Christian societies. The main reasons given in 
the past to support this tradition are that marriage 
provides a safe framework in which a couple's sexual 
needs can be met? it is the best setting for the 
procreation and rearing of children; and it provides 
couples with residential and economic advantages which 
are not open to non-marrieds. I show that there are good 
arguments for thinking that these reasons do not apply 
with quite the same force^ ay. So we are still faced 
with our question: is it ;r#^^al for a couple to choose 
to marry?
There is, however, a more positive side to my 
account. For 1 will point out that even today when a 
couple choose to marry they believe that their marriage
will be a good one and thereby both of them will lead 
happy lives. I will then identify some of the conditions 
which are necessary for the concept of 'a good marriage' 
to apply to a relationship and which are presumably 
conditions which guide most people's decisions in this 
matter. I will argue, firstly, that to be in a good 
marriage the couple must have strong affectional bonds, 
they must regard each other as best friends and enjoy an 
appropriate level of intimacy with one another. Next, 
they must want to share important segments of their lives 
with one another? and, most importantly, they must wish 
to demonstrate their commitment to each other by publicly 
making legally binding vows. 1 will go on to show that 
generally we think that a very important (yet contingent) 
feature that is likely to be a by-product of a marriage, 
where all of these conditions are met, is a distinctive 
form of happiness.
However some writers believe that marriage does not 
bring happiness. 1 will investigate de Beauvoir's claim 
along these lines, to the effect that it is not merely 
irrational but that it is not morally right for a woman 
to marry. In a nutshell, the reasons she gives for 
claiming this are, firstly, that such a relationship 
necessarily entails the subordination of one spouse to 
the other - usually the woman to her husband. Secondly, 
a spouse (usually the woman) who remains at home to do 
the housework and childrearing foregoes transcendence, 
i.e. the growth of herself as a person. Thirdly, the 
sexual relationship between a husband and wife cannot be 
satisfactory since in marriage sex is a duty and thereby 
all sexual spontaneity must be lost.
It might be supposed that most present day marriages 
do not encounter the kinds of problems that de Beauvoir 
identifies? after all she was writing 50 years ago. 
However I show firstly that the substance of de 
Beauvoir's attack on marriage is philosophical. Given 
what we know about human nature, she argues, the 
institution of marriage will always contain these
irremediable flaws. I will also show that most recent 
attacks on marriage by other feminists are simply 
footnotes to de Beauvoir's seminal work. Alongside this,
I will offer a range of empirical data to show that the 
conventions and practices she criticized then, remain in 
essence the same flaws that we find in marriage today.
In response to these condemnations of traditional 
marriage I will argue against de Beauvoir that it is 
possible to have a marital relationship in which neither 
spouse dominates the other. I will identify and discuss 
a democratic (egalitarian) form of relationship based 
upon a mutual respect the partners have for each other in 
a good marriage. I will then show that as de Beauvoir 
contends, any person whose life is exclusively confined 
to housework and childrearing will not find
transcendence. However I will argue that in a good 
marriage there is no reason for a person to have his or 
her life so confined. Lastly, I will argue against de 
Beauvoir that there are no a priori reasons for sex in 
marriage to be bad or unsatisfactory.
From the discussion above it will be seen that the 
striking feature of this thesis is an account of 'a good 
marriage' which presumably reflective individuals have in 
X/ mind when the^ choose to marry. In addition to the
( conditions already noted, this concept entails
importantly that within the relationship both partners
, = ; , imust enjoy a sense of their own autonomy? secondly that 
they define themselves through their creative projects? 
and thirdly they have satisfactory sexual experiences 
within the marriage. I will go on to point out that a
further important necessary condition for a good marriage 
is that the outlook of a person upon marrying needs to be 
transformed. I will argue that if these conditions are 
met a couple are behaving rationally (and morally) by 
getting married or remaining married. However, a less 
welcome result is that given my account, many couples 
have bad marriages.
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A PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION OF MARRIAGE 
Introduction
The overwhelming majority of British people get 
married and a large part of their adult life is spent in 
the setting of marriage. Some marry once, others marry 
two or even three times. Clearly, whatever the duration 
or style of their marital relationship, they participate 
in a very popular and pervasive tradition. (I will 
confine ray discussion to marriage within western 
Christian culture.^)
Upon getting married, all couples formally assent to 
the legal marriage contract. By signing this contract, 
among other things they agree to engage in an exclusive 
sexual relationship with each other; they agree to 
support any children which may result from their union? 
and they agree to mutually support each other in a shared 
life together. Moreover there is a lot of empirical 
evidence to show that even nowadays by far the majority 
of married people expect to remain faithful to their 
spouse throughout their married life? they expect to 
perform the traditional duties of a father and mother in 
the nurture of their children? and they expect to follow 
the traditional division of labour within their marriage 
(although some devise their own distinctive kind of 
relationship)
Most people probably do not give much thought to the 
rationality of what they are doing when they get married. ' rThere are many reasons for this. We are creatures of 
passion, for one thing. Many of our decisions in this 
context derive from emotion or sentiment rather from 
reason. For another, we are often less actors than 
reactors in this matter. We let ourselves be unduly 
influenced by others, or by the traditional expectations 
of the society in which we have been raised. In my 
thesis I will ask if getting married and remaining
I
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married is a rational thing for a person to do. My
general argument will be that it is only indisputably 
rational if one's marriage meets certain conditions? 
those conditions necessary for what I will call 'a good 
marriage'.
It might be doubted that a philosophical discussion 
could establish what is to count as 'a good marriage'. 
For one thing, my opponent might say, people will always 
differ from each other in their beliefs about what makes 
a marriage good or bad. Moreover this seems to be
primarily an empirical matter whereas philosophical 
analysis is usually considered to be an a priori
undertaking, the search for necessary and sufficient 
conditions which determine the correct application of a 
concept or meaning of a term? (although this is not its 
only task of course) . So how can a philosophical 
investigation illuminate such an issue?
I hope to show that an account of many of the 
important necessary conditions of 'a good marriage' can 
be given. I will do this by bringing together two 
seemingly incompatible sets of conditions. These are, on 
the one hand, a set of assumptions about the worthwhile 
nature of marriage that we find in our normative 
tradition, like 'being in a loving relationship with a 
close friend or soulmate' , or of 'sharing a joint 
identity with someone we love'. On the other hand, there 
are a set of assumptions which are thought to be 
necessary for a person to live a satisfactory life, like 
'having a strong sense of their own autonomy' and of 
'experiencing personal growth' and of 'having 
satisfactory sexual relationships' which seem to be
antithetical to the normative tradition, I will argue 
however that all the above disparate conditions are 
necessary for 'a good marriage'.
It might be objected also that even if they have a 
good marriage, there is bound to be disagreement about 
whether or not getting married or remaining married is a
■ill
rational thing for a couple to do. Following de Beauvoir 
(1988), many feminists insist that it is quite 
irrational, particularly for a woman, to marry. They 
maintain that in such a relationship the woman must lose 
her freedom. This point (and many others) is equally 
relevant to men as well when they marry. This loss of 
freedom has at least two aspects to it. Firstly, when 
they are married, their new mutual obligations - e.g. 
being the main breadwinner or the housewife - entail a 
limit to the kind of freedom each is likely to have 
previously enjoyed as a single person. Before they can 
do many of the things they might want to do, they have to 
consider the perhaps different preferences, wants and 
interests of another individual as well as their own. 
There is a second more serious restriction on freedom. 
De Beauvoir (1988:483) claims, in any marriage a 
dominant/subordinate power relationship is unavoidable. 
This in turn usually means that the wife will be 
dominated by her husband (though in some cases she may 
try to dominate him). This unsatisfactory power 
relationship is manifest in the traditional marriage, 
where the husband is regarded as the head of the house. 
When there are major decisions to be made, it is expected 
that he will be the final authority. In which case, his 
wife is no longer responsible for her own choices? her 
husband determines many of the important aspects of her 
everyday life. Why would a rational person opt for this 
kind of constraint on her autonomy?
De Beauvoir and other writers also add that in such 
a relationship a woman must sacrifice her opportunity for 
intellectual or aesthetic growth. For as a wife she will 
have certain demarcated gender roles. She is expected to 
do the shopping, cooking and cleaning; if and when they 
have children, as their mother, she must take the (major) 
responsibility for them. Even if both partners are in 
paid employment outside the home, she is expected to be 
the primary caretaker of the children. As a result, in
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such a relationship a woman sacrifices her intellectual 
and creative development to the tiresome routine of 
married life. We need to ask, once again, would a 
rational person opt for this kind of deprivation?
A last set of problems to which de Beauvoir and 
other feminists draw our attention concerns the sexual 
relationship within marriage. Marriage begins with the 
wedding ceremony. In this ceremony, the bride and groom 
make a solemn, public and legally binding vow to give
exclusive sexual rights to their partner for as long as 
they live. We seem to think that the pledge 'to forsake 
all others' is of greater importance than many of the 
other promises we give or receive in the marriage vows. 
Marriage, then, is deemed to be an exclusive, lifelong 
sexual commitment. The problem is that very often we 
find that this does not work out. For one reason, it is 
unlikely that the original, spontaneous thrill of the sex 
act will last. But once the initial enthusiasm has worn 
off, wouldn't it be more rational for each of them to try 
to recapture sexual excitement with other partners and 
then the whole exhilarating process could take place 
again? Rather than make vows to live together in a 
monotonous sexual marital relationship, why shouldn't a 
rational person try to enjoy as many brief and thrilling 
love affairs as possible?
I need to make one last introductory remark. It 
might be objected that nowadays things are nothing like 
as bad for married women as they used to be at the time 
de Beauvoir was writing. Conventions and rules 
concerning housework, mothering, and the like, are far 
less demanding both in their extent and in the firmness 
with which they are enforced. Nevertheless, I will 
mention a variety of empirical data which suggests that 
many roles and conventions of the traditional kind still 
do remain. Although they do not force married women to 
submit to the authority of their husbands, they still 
create an asymmetry of status, power and dependence
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between most married couples.
The above are some of the more important problems 
that I will be discussing in this essay. In response to 
them, I suggested earlier that in a good marriage the 
difficulties we have noted, do not arise. Hence we 
cannot decide one way or another about the rationality of 
marriage until we have made an attempt to work out a 
substantial theory of 'a good marriage'. I will now 
outline the structure of my essay in more detail.
In Chapter One I will consider a sociobiological 
account of pair bonding in which it is claimed that 
lasting monogamy is natural for human beings and that 
traditional family values are in our genes. The 
sociobiological thesis also purports to identify the 
underlying causes of our falling in love, our choice of 
a partner, and of our sustaining the love relationship. 
In a nutshell, they claim that due to our long 
evolutionary history as hunter-gatherers our feelings of 
love are innately directed ('gene-governed') towards 
someone with whom we are likely to successfully reproduce 
our genes. I hope to show that one implication of this 
thesis - especially for men but also for women - is that 
on the sociobiologist's account, while pair bonding is 
natural, exclusive pair bonding for life is not. Our 
natures appear to incline us towards having indefinitely 
many sexual relationships. If this is the case, the 
theory seems to imply a repudiation of the institution of 
monogamous marriage.
In Chapter Two, I look at a different explanation of 
marriage, namely, the claim that marriage is part of our 
social conditioning. From early childhood we are made 
aware that marriage plays a major role in the lives of 
most men and women. Furthermore we are persuaded that 
when a couple marry they are doing something worthwhile? 
and we think that those who have a long and happy 
marriage have something really worth having. I consider 
three important claims that are commonly used to justify
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the worthwhile nature of marriage. Firstly, it provides 
the framework in which a couple's sexual needs can be 
legitimately met. Secondly, it is the best setting for 
the procreation and rearing of children. Thirdly, it 
provides the spouses with many economic and residential 
advantages. I will argue that for many reasons, nowadays 
most of these claims no longer have the same force that 
they might have had in the past. So we will need other 
arguments to support the (alleged) value of marriage in 
present times. Are there any good reasons which apply 
today for getting married, or are there good reasons by 
virtue of which we should still regard marriage as 
worthwhile?
In Chapter Three, I argue that there are certain 
general conditions - like having a close friend, or a 
soulmate, or being in a relationship with someone we love 
and with whom we wish to forge a joint identity - which 
even today count as good reasons for the decision to 
marry? moreover I claim that these conditions need to be 
met in a relationship if it is to count as a good 
marriage. At the same time, I note that such 
requirements could also be met in a long-term pair 
bonding relationship between non-marrieds. I go on to 
discuss two further conditions - a legal commitment to 
another person and a type of happiness within marriage - 
which are distinctive to the marital relationship and 
which are part and parcel of the idea of a good marriage.
In Chapter Four, I outline the three major 
indictments directed at marriage (as we have discussed it 
thus far). Firstly, de Beauvoir's claim that in 
marriage, one or other of the couple - in a traditional 
marriage it is the woman - must lose their autonomy due 
to the subordinate power relationship they must have with 
their spouse. Secondly, the claim that a woman must 
sacrifice her intellectual and creative development due 
to her role of housewife and mother in the marital home. 
Thirdly, the claim that bad sexual experiences are an
ï
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inevitable feature of married life. In the light of 
this, de Beauvoir thinks that it is not only irrational 
but immoral for a woman to marry. For the woman who 
marries not only elects to be oppressed, non-creative and 
sexually frustrated herself, she reinforces an 
institution that for these same reasons oppresses all 
women.
In Chapter Five, I investigate the power 
relationship in traditional marriages in which the 
husband is 'head of the household' and his wife is 
subordinate to him. As the head of the household, we 
noted, the husband will expect to be ultimately 
responsible for the major decisions that affect both of
them, like where they will live, the kind of lifestyle 
they will have, and so on. The question I ask in this 
chapter is: does marriage entail a relationship like
this? And if it doesn't, should we - as some 
philosophers maintain - want a relationship like this? 
I argue that a quite different, more equitable link 
between husband and wife is possible and is needed for a 
good marriage.
In Chapter Six, I consider the claim that being a 
housewife and a mother - or at least having the 
responsibility for the housework and the children - are 
stereotypical gender roles that a woman, rather than a 
man, must perform in marriage. I ask which of our gender 
roles in marriage, if any, are necessary? More 
importantly, if they have to be a wife's or husband's 
function, what exactly is wrong with such roles? 
Secondly, I discuss the claim that no matter how equal 
she is with her partner, being a mother and housewife 
impairs a married woman's intellectual growth, her 
creative projects - her transcendence. I argue for a 
married woman to enjoy a sense of intellectual or 
creative growth will depend importantly on her not 
regarding herself exclusively (or even mainly) as a wife 
and mother. I argue that this too is a feature of a good
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marriage.
In Chapter Seven, I deal with the claim that the 
sexual relationship between a married couple must change 
from (what begins as) an erotic relationship - a 
'spontaneous thrilling event' - into an insipid,
passionless one; and the view that a satisfactory sexual 
relationship can only be achieved with a series of 
different sexual partners. If this is so, the 
requirement of fidelity in marriage is bound to result in 
sexual discontent. However I show that this is not a 
price that a married person must pay. I investigate also 
the other feminist indictment of sex within marriage, 
namely, that it gives the husband a legal right to have 
sexual intercourse with his wife. This seems to legally 
entitle him to sexually harass and (until recently in 
Britain anyway) even to rape his wife. I argue that this 
is not merely most people's idea of a bad sexual 
relationship, it is antithetical to the idea of a good 
marriage.
In Chapter Eight, drawing on some of the conclusions 
from our earlier discussion, I argue that for a married 
relationship to be regarded as 'a good marriage' further 
conditions (other than those put forward in Chapter 
Three) need to be met? we need a sense of autonomy and 
personal growth within the relationship. Furthermore, 
for a good marriage, an often overlooked condition is 
required which relates to the transformation of outlook 
of the person who is married. Lastly, I argue that 
insofar as they meet these conditions in their marital 
relationship both partners are behaving perfectly 
rationally and morally by getting married and remaining 
married. The problems associated with marriage nowadays 
lie in the gap between the ideal and the practice.
Chapter One
Is monogamy natural?
À man and a woman may fall in love. They both may 
think that their partner is the 'one and only' mate for 
them; they may make deep and personal commitments to one 
another. And they may decide to get married. But what 
is the basis for their reciprocal attraction in the first 
place? Why do they fall in love with one particular 
person rather than another? And why should they expect 
to remain loving each other in marriage 'till death do us 
part'?
Some philosophers suggest that an adequate answer to 
these questions can be given along sociobiological lines.^ 
According to this theory, human beings are a pair bonding 
species, lasting monogamy is natural for us and certain 
family values are in our genes. If this is the case, we 
seem to have an explanation of some of the practices 
concerning love and marriage which a person, rational or 
otherwise, cannot avoid. In this chapter however, I hope 
to show that lasting monogamy is not implied by the 
sociobiological thesis. On the contrary, an implication 
of this theory is that our natures incline us to 
indefinitely many such relationships. Furthermore I will 
show that there is a problem with the sociobiologist's 
view of love in a pair bond. I will argue that this 
approach cannot account for the complexity of our 
experiences of love or the value we place on certain 
aspects of this emotion. I will begin by making a few 
general remarks concerning the sociobiological account.
Sociobiological account of love
Sociobiologists believe that important forms of 
behaviour are inherited through the genes, (much like the 
way one inherits eye colour or hair texture ). ^ The reason 
for such behaviour having a genetic link is simply that
il
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it has proved to be advantageous for a species' survival 
throughout evolution. For example, in an environment 
with many predators an animal who was vigilant and agile 
stood a better chance of surviving than one who was slow 
and sluggish. Over a long period of evolutionary time 
such forms of behaviour then become genetically encoded 
in the population of a species since they contribute to 
their fitness and s u r v i v a l T h e  same reasoning is 
applied to human beings and their complex social 
behaviour.
Sociobiologists maintain that the behaviour of human
beings cannot be adequately understood in isolation from
other species.We are one social species among many in
the evolutionary range. As Wilson (1978:32) writes:
The heart of the genetic hypothesis is the proposition...that the traits of human nature were adaptive during the time that the human species evolved and that genes consequently spread through the population that predisposed their carriers to develop those traits
It is postulated that our intelligence, interests, 
emotions and species-specific patterns of social 
interaction are all the evolutionary residue of the 
success of homo sapiens in the pre-historic hunter- 
gathering adaptation.® In effect, modern human beings 
carry essentially the same genetic heritage as early 
human beings Once we recognize this we must also 
accept, firstly, that like any organism our genes are the 
important causal factor behind most of our natural 
drives, capacities, attitudes, and other behaviour and 
secondly, that natural selection operates over human 
beings as it does over all living things.
Of course no sociobiologist wants to claim that our 
genes determine every fleeting thought that we happen to 
have or every action we perform. The DNA does not 
contain sufficient information for that. The genes have 
to act by proxy (so to speak); they lay down the basic 
appetites and desires within us which prompt us to choose 
and act in this or in that way. Nor do most
sociobiologists want to argue that the desires and 
promptings laid down by our genes are all powerful. We 
are evolutionarily equipped with a useful ability to 
override even the most urgent drives. Thus a hunger 
striker can override one of his most basic and vital 
drives, the desire for food; whilst watching a play, a 
theatre-goer can remain silent and motionless even though 
feeling cramped and restraining herself from coughing; or 
a husband may be moved by his sexual drive to have an 
extra-marital affair but nonetheless resolve not to 
stray. At the same time, however, the sociobiologist 
could point out that it is statistically highly 
improbable that a person will starve himself to death and 
that it is very likely that the theatre-goer will be 
irked by the very strong urge to cough and that the 
incidence of male infidelity is very high. While they 
may not be omnipotent, our natural drives and desires 
appear to be very powerful.
The second important point we noted concerned 
natural selection. According to the sociobiologist, we 
must accept that in human beings (as in all animal life) 
through natural selection, genes which are advantageous 
for reproductive success are carried into the next 
generation. To summarize the process: we start with a 
population that has a particular distribution of genes in 
which children will have a greater genetic resemblance to 
their parents than to other individuals. Generally the 
offspring who then survive and reproduce will be those 
who are more effective in gaining access to critical 
resources - food, shelter, clean water, etc. As a result 
of this differential survival, the genetic structure of 
the population will change over time and the individuals 
within it will be better adapted. Particular genes 
survive because the behaviour (or characteristics) 
produced by them is advantageous to the individual and 
enables it to compete successfully.® Those who have the 
maximal conditions for reproductive success in the
original population are likely to be better represented 
than those who have not.
Sociobiologists go on to claim that - as in all 
other animals - the drive to transmit our genes into the 
next generation is an ultimate goal of the behaviour of 
human beings.® It may be that some individuals override 
this drive but again, this is not statistically 
significant. The vast majority of human beings behave in 
this way; they have a natural drive to pass on their 
genes into the next generation. It follows also that 
like all living things, we have a natural drive to behave 
in ways which are required to obtain the reproductive 
advantage necessary for the desired goal; we act so that 
we will attract a mate who is likely to maximize the 
genetic fitness of our offspring.
Once again, this does not mean that every act is 
directly pursued with this end in mind. For example, we 
drink when we are thirsty, we sleep when we are tired; 
quenching our thirst and sleeping do not seem to 
contribute directly to our obtaining reproductive 
advantage. However most sociobiologists would maintain 
that states like thirst or tiredness are the proximate 
causes of behaviour, not an ultimate cause of it. They 'would say that we drink and sleep to maintain
physiological homeostasis, for this in turn contributes
to our genetic fitness.^® The adaptive significance of
behaviour, thus, should be understood in terms of
ultimate, not proximate causes. Or to put the point in
a different way: proximate causes are the immediate
elements which are generally responsible for a particular
response. They should be understood and explained,
nonetheless, in terms of reproductive advantage. As
Barash (1982:28-29) writes:
...ultimate causes are the evolutionary elements which bestow selective advantage on particular proximate mechanisms.
The more simple an organism, the bigger the role of 
the ultimate cause, i.e. the transmission of genes to the
.1
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next generation; the more complex an organism, the larger 
the part played by proximate causes. Thus it is assumed, 
quite reasonably, that ultimate causes played a more 
dominant and direct role in the (presumably) less complex 
conduct and lifestyles of our ancestors. In the distant 
hunter-gathering past, individuals would have been more 
likely to have acted directly in a way that would 
maximize their genetic fitness - to transmit their genes 
into the future - whether or not they were aware of the 
actual consequences of their sexual behaviour. As a 
result, the number of pregnancies a woman had would have 
been much higher throughout this period. But without the 
aid of modern medicine and sanitation, the population 
would have been kept in check by high rates of 
miscarriage, infant mortality, and so on. Like other 
living things, every natural thought, feeling or action 
of our human ancestors was connected in some way to his 
or her gaining the reproductive advantage necessary to 
successfully transmit his or her genes into the next 
generation. Thus feelings of lust, no less than the sex 
organs, are with us today because they aided reproduction 
directly. Similarly our every shifting attitude towards 
a mate or prospective mate - warmth, trust, suspicion, 
iciness, revulsion - is best explained in terms of the 
potency of natural selection that remains in us today
I
because in the past they led to behaviours that helped
■fispread our genes. At the very least, the otherwise 
inexplicable thoughts and feelings we have are best 
understood in these terms.
Even if we believe that our actions are causally 
determined in the way proposed, one of the many
objections that might be raised is that surely the 
development of any organism depends upon nurture as well 
as nature. It depends, for instance, upon when and where 
we were born. Thus a quite general but significant 
determining factor of our sexual behaviour is the fact 
that we are born and raised at a given point in history.
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We are not, for instance, reared in 200 BC without the 
influences of film, television, books, magazines, and 
reliable methods of contraception. Had we been, how we 
think, behave, and the attitudes we have to members of 
the opposite gender would have been significantly 
different. Further, even if people are born at the same 
point in time, their behaviour varies significantly due 
to the particular geographical and cultural circumstances 
in which they are born. Different cultures have quite 
different attitudes towards gender relationships. These 
are part of the traditions and customs which people 
absorb from their early social environment; parents 
transmit such beliefs and attitudes to their children as 
do other individuals (teachers, religious figures, role 
models, peers). As a result, there can be no doubt that 
our adult beliefs, attitudes and conduct are 
significantly influenced by them. The point is: our
social institutions and customs can significantly affect 
our behaviour towards one another.
If this is correct then genes alone do not appear to 
ultimately determine all types of behaviour. There must 
be at least an interplay between our genes and our social 
environment. The general point can be made in a 
different way. If the sociobiologist is correct and 
genes ultimately govern all of our behaviour, wouldn't we 
expect to find a conformity in the traditions and 
behaviour of all people, irrespective of their culture? 
But we do not appear to find this. So how is 'the 
(unconscious) drive to transmit our genes' an ultimate 
cause of our beliefs and conduct?
Wilson's answer (1978:18) to this question is:
Each person is molded by an interaction of his environment, especially his cultural environment, with the genes that affect social behavior.
We all have the same hard-wired, evolutionary selected, 
environmentally stable, ultimate drives. We noted that 
'maintaining physiological homeostasis' (nutrition.
a
warmth, sleep, etc.)/ 'attracting mates who are likely to 
maximize genetic fitness', are examples of these. In 
service of these ultimate drives, we have very many more 
environmentally labile, proximate drives. As a result, 
there can be diverse cultures without there being 
underlying genetic differences. Each culture gives 
expression to the same fundamental human drives but in 
different ways. On the other hand, a practice that runs 
directly counter to what is wired into us by our genes is 
unlikely to last or to be widely adopted. A prehistoric 
forebear who lacked feelings of lust, for example, would 
have been discarded by natural selection.
Thus we can distinguish between the universal 
genetic hard-wire and the variety of ways in which this 
can be expressed. Or to make the point in a different 
way: our basic genetic structure places definite limits 
on the range of possible human cultures there can be. As 
Lumsden and Wilson (1981:13) write:
...genetic natural selection operates in sucha way as to keep culture on a leash.
If this is correct then differences, even wide 
differences, in the attitudes and behaviour of people in 
different societies are quite compatible with the 
sociobiologist's theory. At the same time, all behaviour 
has its ultimate cause in the genetic structure.
Let us now turn to the way these general aspects of 
sociobiological theory apply to the questions concerning 
love and marriage that we noted at the start of the 
chapter. Sociobiologists maintain that we have a natural 
tendency to become physically and emotionally attached to 
just one other individual, or to use their phrase, we 
'pair bond'. Pair bonding is a congenital pre­
disposition in most primates; most animals bond and some 
animals bond for life. It has endured over evolutionary 
time because it is a relationship that is favourable to 
successful reproduction. Thus like other animals, human 
beings pair bond for the purposes of reproduction.^'*
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However unlike females of most other primate species who 
are only sexually active at the time of ovulation, female 
homo sapiens are continuously sexually responsive. It is 
this constant openness to a sexual relationship that 
sustains the pair bond in human beings; frequent sex, 
Wilson (1978:140-141) claims, is the main tool by which 
the human pair bond is maintained. It keeps the male 
attracted to the female.
Surely, we want to respond, usually human beings do
not have sexual intercourse - or even frequent sex
(whether or not they are in a long-term pair bond) -
merely in order to have diversity in reproduction. Among
other things, we do it for pleasure 1 However the
sociobiologist can deal with this. Because of the
pleasure to be obtained from sexual activity, they would
respond, human beings are keen to indulge in it. This
enhances reproductive success in two ways ; frequent sex
is likely to lead to successful mating, and it sustains
the pair bond which, as we shall see, is needed for the
rearing of children. A great many of the particular
pleasures found in human sexual activity, e.g. kissing,
fondling, are to be thought of as reinforcers that
evolution (if we may personify it) has given us to
facilitate pair bonding. Such pleasures ensure the
success of the pair bond. Wilson (1978:140) explains the
connection succinctly:
...most of the pleasures of human sex constitute primary reinforcers to facilitate bonding.
This seems to give us a clue for the causal 
explanation to our earlier query. The phenomenon of 
'falling in love' - where, as we noted, it appears that 
two people of the opposite gender meet and are 
inexplicably drawn to each other - might be accounted for 
along sociobiological lines. When we talk about two 
people experiencing an inexplicable attraction for each 
other, or of 'sexual chemistry' or of 'animal magnetism' 
which pulls them together (as if they have no will of
their own) , we can begin to explain this attraction in 
terras of the instinctive response of each of the couple 
to find someone with whom they can transmit their genes 
into the next generation.
But if this is all there is to it, why not mix our
genes as early as possible with someone closely related
to us? After all, in almost all families there are other
males or females. Why not transmit our genes with them?
Wilson's response (1978:198) is that
...a correct application of evolutionary theory also favours diversity in the gene pool as a cardinal value.
Why should we naturally mix our genes with someone 
unrelated to us? The sociobiologist suggests that it is 
a device which encourages diversity or 'out-breeding'
It forces children to leave their own family structure in 
search of a mate. This results in a richer variety in 
their progeny's gene pool; and the more diverse the 
combination of genes, the more genetically fit he or she 
is likely to be. On the other hand, the mating of close 
kin typically produces children that are substantially 
less genetically fit. Inbreeding results in a higher 
proportion of homozygous genes which are manifest in 
certain inherited diseases.^
Why this rather than that partner
The next question we need to ask is: why do we fall 
in love (or transmit our genes) with this particular 
individual rather than that and why do we sustain the 
love relationship with them? The sociobiologist 
maintains that we are (somehow) aware that our 
reproductive success depends largely on our choice of a 
partner.This is to say, the brains of both males and 
females are gene-governed to look for partners that are 
most likely to provide them with offspring who will 
ensure the survival of their g e n e s . H o w  do they do 
this?
It seems that the genders are quite different in
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this regard. It is claimed that there are two selection 
strategies which the female naturally adopts, those of 
'he-man' and 'domestic bliss'.She has a gene-governed 
urge to find certain physical traits in advance of 
committing herself sexually to a male, for she needs to 
join her genes with those of a male who will strengthen 
her chances for reproductive success. Thus she 
instinctively adopts the 'he-man' strategy. When she 
seeks a mate for 'qualitative fertilization'^® she looks 
for a robust, clever mate whose genes may bode well for 
the offspring's robustness and cleverness. This is to 
say, she will be sexually and emotionally drawn towards 
a good-looking male who is markedly above average 
intelligence; a mate who will enhance her offspring's 
chance to reach maturity and then for the offspring in 
turn to achieve reproductive success.
The other strategy that a female naturally adopts is 
'domestic b l i s s S h e  instinctively tries to find a 
mate who will be faithful and persevering in advance of 
committing herself sexually to him. The explanation of 
this is that human females (as with all of the larger 
primates) have limited opportunities for reproducing and
'their biology is such that the reproductive process is 
long and physically arduous. She has to undergo a long 
confinement in order to give birth and then the newly 
born infant is totally dependent on her for food, 
shelter, clothing, for many more years. So she needs to 
attract a male who is most likely to cooperate in 
parental care until their offspring reaches maturity; a 
mate who will contribute food, clothing and shelter as 
well as assist in the rearing of the child.Ideally he 
will also be someone with the (economic) means to provide 
protection and material comfort for herself and their 
offspring. Thus she will be attracted to a (usually
-older) male who has power or social status. Women, then, 
have two instinctive strategies; they naturally are 
attracted to a mate who is sexually robust and
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intelligent, and to one with wealth and status.
It might be objected that the appeal of rich or
powerful men might have been a natural tendency in the
past but would lose its strength as more and more women
enter the professional workforce and can better afford to
base their marital decisions on something other than a
man's income or status. But, according to the
sociobiologist, we are dealing with deep-rooted causes,
not merely conscious calculations. To stress this
important point; out of the few million years that human
beings have existed, 99% of this time has been spent in
hunter-gathering societies.As Wilson (1978:34) writes:
...most of the genetic evolution of human social behaviour occurred over the five million years prior to civilization, when the species consisted of sparse, relatively immobile populations of hunter-gatherers.
This long period of existing in a hunter-gathering way of 
life has firmly established certain behaviours in the 
gene pool. As a result, a modern woman has a gene- 
governed urge to choose a powerful male (etc.), the genes 
for which have been naturally selected because they are 
conducive to the successful rearing of children who will 
themselves later mate.
Of course a modern woman can be aware that she is 
driven to look for such features in a mate. She can be 
aware of her drive to find a robust mate with 'good' 
genes and that she seeks a male who will assist her in 
the process of childbearing and rearing. In which case 
her conscious calculations coincide with her natural 
drives; the innate programme is accompanied by a 
conscious overlay. But although she can decide what to 
do about such urges and drives, the latter do not 
themselves form part of her conscious decision.^ '*
One implication of the above account that has been 
overlooked by many sociobiologists concerns the
monogamous marital relationship.
We are told that women naturally seek a mate who is a
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'he-man' and who is most likely to provide 'domestic
bliss'. But what if she can not find one man who has
both features? It goes without argument that this will
be the probable outcome for most women. There are not
that many rich yet physically robust men around I One
solution would be to trick a wealthy, devoted and
generous - but not especially muscular - mate into
raising the offspring of another mate who has the latter
(robust) quality. As Ridley (1994:236) suggests:
. . .deep in the mind of a modern woman is the same basic hunter-gatherer calculator...strive to acquire a provider husband who will invest food and care in their children; strive to find a lover who can give those children first-class genes.
She would only need to attract the muscular mate around 
ovulation, when she is most likely to get pregnant. But 
she would need to deceive the affluent mate into 
believing that he is the father of her offspring. 
Alternatively if she were to pair bond with an 
impoverished he-man, she might extract the goods and 
services she naturally desires from a wealthy paramour 
during the infertile part of her monthly cycle, in 
exchange for his fruitless sexual conquest. Another 
problem she might have to face occurs when the 'he-man' 
she marries, due to either familiarity or lack of 
exercise, becomes less of the man that he was 
Presumably to satisfy her natural impulses she should 
seek a new unfamiliar, robust mate.
I am suggesting that these would be rational 
strategies for a woman to adopt, given her natural drives 
and the shortage of males that meet the desired criteria. 
On the other hand, if she does not adopt tactics 
something like the ones I am proposing, it would seem 
that her natural impulses will be frustrated. She would 
be acting in ways which conflict with the kind of 
behaviour directed by her genes. But no matter how she 
deals with the problem, the implications of both of her
natural urges seem to auger badly for the type of
%
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exclusive pair bond that we find in a monogamous marriage 
relationship. I will return to this point shortly.
The causal explanation for a male's choice of the 
particular object of love is different. His instinctive 
drive also is to find a mate with physical attributes 
which indicate fertility; a female with whom he can 
successfully transmit his genes into the next generation. 
In a nutshell, he naturally seeks youth and beauty in a 
mate. Youth and beauty in a female, it appears, equals 
fertility. Because he cannot know her age (and thus her 
potential for fertility) directly, he must infer it from 
her physical appearance. So he naturally looks for, as 
Ridley (1994:285) writes:
...unblemished skin, full lips, clear eyes,upright breasts, narrow waist, slender legs...
He will realize, presumably, that to make himself 
attractive to such a female, as well as being in a robust 
physical condition, he needs wealth and social status. 
The more fit and socially successful he can be, the more 
likely he is to be desired by youthful, beautiful,
fertile females. (So the ultimate cause of the wealth
and power that men seek so ardently, it appears, is their 
own genetic proliferation.)
The account thus far makes it puzzling why those
individuals who are not good-looking, or otherwise
eligible, pair bond at all. However there is an 
abundance of commonplace evidence that suggests there is 
something we can do about this. We are persuaded, for 
instance, by numerous features in magazines, that to be 
sexually attractive there are certain requirements that 
men and women need to meet and, further, that there are 
things that we can do in order to improve ourselves in 
this matter. Men are encouraged to wear designer 
clothes, have high-performance cars or access to a 
penthouse in the city centre; whereas women are urged, in 
particular, to emphasize their good bodily attributes in 
order to look as sexually alluring as they can.^ ® Young
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women especially are under enormous pressure to fit in 
with this perpetual beauty competition; to judge and 
criticize their own bodies from the outside (as it were), 
presumably in the way they think that men will see them. 
However it is evident also that the general opinion as to 
what constitutes a sexually attractive female depends 
upon the fashions of the time. Let it suffice to say 
that during the 1960s, the paradigm of female 
attractiveness seems to have been thin and waif-1 ike,on 
the other hand, in the 1990s, the sexually attractive 
woman is the one who has 'toned curves'.^® Her body 
should be well-made and firm.
It seems to many critics of such fashions that women 
should not be constantly looked at and assessed in these 
sexual terras. For instance, Souhami (1986:126) writes 
scathingly:
Advertisements continually make women aware of their alleged imperfections, then offer to sell them solutions to their supposed problems through slimming foods, skin creams, shampoos, deodorants, and so on.
However if this sexual aspect of our conduct is so much 
under the influence of our biology, then it is difficult 
to see how women (or men) can avoid behaving like this. 
If youth, beauty and fertility are natural 
desiderata when a man looks for a mate, as the 
sociobiologist maintains, there seem to be more unwelcome 
implications for the monogamous marital relationship 
which many sociobiologists overlook. Unlike a female, 
who regardless of how many sexual partners she has, can 
(speaking generally) have only one offspring a year, a 
male can reproduce at any time if he has access to a 
fertile female. Thus from the perspective of his maximal 
reproductive success, one would have thought that it is 
to his advantage to impregnate as many youthful and 
fertile females as he can. Each new mate would offer him 
a chance of projecting his genes into the future. This 
suggests he would have a natural inclination for a
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relationship quite different to monogamous pair bonding. 
For if a male's (unconscious) drive is to successfully 
reproduce his genes, surely he should try to do so with 
as many young females as possible. To put the point 
succinctly: while pair bonding may be natural for a male, 
exclusive pair bonding for life, is not. And what is 
more, if a male is prudent he will endeavour to have his 
offspring reared by other males.
There is however another side to this coin. He has 
to guard against being put in the position of raising 
another male's offspring. There is no future for the 
genes of a male who showers time and energy on children 
who are not his own. To avoid his raising children that 
are not his own, the male needs to have exclusive sexual 
rights with one mate, so that he knows he is investing 
his energies in the upbringing of his own genes. Maybe 
this explains why men (we are told) naturally prefer 
women with hour-glass figures? slim waists are usually an 
indicator that the female is not pregnant and that she is 
fertile.®® This may explain also why a male might 
continue with the pair bond long after the initial sexual 
attraction has subsided. If he were to seek a new sexual 
partner, this could lead him to withdraw or dilute his 
investment in the offspring with his original mate. It 
could jeopardize the successful survival of his genes.
We might think then that the male's stake in his 
reproductive decisions is different but no less weighty 
to that of the female's.^® Our biological differences 
mean that when the male is unfaithful to his mate, the 
most the latter has to lose is her financial (material) 
security whereas if the female is unfaithful (without 
telling her mate) and a child results from the 
relationship, the male commits all of his energy and 
financial resources, not to ensure the survival of his 
own genes, but someone e l s e ' s . I n  which case we might 
think that the male has a vested interest in supporting 
the exclusive pair bond.
M
polygynous impulse in men.
y
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However another unwelcome implication of this 
account needs to be noted. On the sociobiologist view, 
a man instinctively wants to reproduce his genes. To do 
this, he does not need to have an exclusive relationship 
with one female - a monogamous pair bond. His nature 
would be better served, if he were to have lots of sexual 
partners. The problem, as we noted, is how can he do 
this and maintain the progeny of his original pair bond? 
The answer is obvious. He does not need to abandon the
children from his first partner to satisfy his natural
impulse for different sexual partners. While he is 
enjoying other sexual relationships, he could stay near 
the existing offspring and keep giving them his support. 
Alternatively, it would seem to be more in keeping with 
his natural inclination that he should have a polygynous 
marital relationship, or multiple wives. This would seem 
to meet both of his natural desiderata. And some
sociobiologists agree that polygyny is more in keeping 
with his natural impulses.®®
To make matters worse, there is considerable
empirical evidence to support the idea that there is a 
significant polygynous impulse in males.®® There are many 
cultures in which men have a number of wives.®“^ However
today in such cultures it seems that polygyny is an 
option for only the most affluent; those men who can 
afford the expenditure associated with marriage to many 
wives. On the other hand, in societies where polygyny is 
illegal, it might be claimed that the polygynous impulse 
will find other outlets, such as in several acts of 
adultery. If he can avoid discovery, the unfaithful 
husband can maintain his investment with his children 
whilst enjoying other sexual partners. Alternatively, 
the many instances of serial marriages we find today 
might be seen as another form in which the polygynous 
impulse is manifest? the ever increasing number of 
divorces may be explained in large measure to the natural
»
...[as] opening the door to justifying the
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So we might conclude that on the sociobiologist's ;account, lifelong monogamous pair bonding is not natural 
or necessary, especially for males. In contrast, due to 
her limited opportunities for reproducing, a female needs 
to be more selective about choosing her mate; she needs 
to have a permanent relationship with a male who will 
provide for her and protect her. In return she needs to 
offer him exclusive use of her sexuality and perform 
nurturing and other domestic services for him. Thus we 
might assume that according to sociobiological theory, 
females have a stronger genetic interest in a durable 
relationship with one sexual partner than do males. But 
even in her case, while pair bonding may be thought to be 
natural, it is not clear that this means an exclusive 
pair bond for life.
■ 'I want to end this section by highlighting one
further implication of the sociobiologist's account which
applies to both male and female choice of partners. This
concerns some of the gender roles we find operating in
most (western) marriages and that operate in society
generally. A commonly held view, what I will call the
traditional view of marriage, is that men and women
should have different functions in marriage and that each
should avoid the character and activity which is the
proper preserve of the other. This requires, as
Radcliffe Richards (1986:185) puts it:
...a sensitive division of labour for the good of all, with each individual being encouraged to contribute whatever is most suitable for them to give.
It is maintained that women, for instance, should be the 
primary caretakers of any children. After all, she is 
the one who gets pregnant, carries the fetus until birth 
and only she can breast-feed the infant.
Most feminist critics take exception to this 
traditionalist argument. They see it, as Rogan (1978:85) 
writes :
i
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oppression of one group by another on the basis of biological inferiority.
However according to most sociobiologists, women are 
naturally predisposed to act in nurturant ways towards 
their families and to have special feelings towards the 
young.Bearing and nurturing children, gathering plant
Î
foods, etc., have been the tasks of women over long 
stretches of evolutionary time.®® Their minds, it could 
be argued, have been hard-wired in such a way as to suit 
gender roles such as these. In other words, women have 
a natural biological advantage over men when it comes to
:nurturant behaviour; they are congenitally pre-disposed 
to behave in this way. As Rossi (1977:24) writes, women 
possess
...a biologically based potential for heightened maternal investment in the child... that exceeds the potential for investment by men in fatherhood.
In other words, it seems that sociobiology provides 
scientific collateral for the traditional assignment of 
some of the more obvious gender roles we find in 
monogamous marriage.®^
Problems with the sociobiological account
In response to the account above I want to begin by 
making two different observations. Firstly, we are able 
to resist our natural urges. Our sexual desires and 
related drives may be instinctive but we do not need to 
be the slave to our passions or instincts. Some place in 
such an account must be given to our ability to reason
and to make choices of a rational nature.®® We can, after 
all, choose to lead an examined life, subjecting our 
thoughts and feelings to moral scrutiny and adjusting our 
behaviour accordingly. So our behaviour within (or 
outside of) marriage in matters concerning sex cannot be 
accounted for as being something wholly independent of 
our will and over which we have no control. We can 
inhibit our natural impulses, for instance, for the sake
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of our marriage. Thus I might have a strong sexual 
desire for a robust, young and clever prospective 
paramour but I can choose to behave in ways different 
from my natural urges.
This brings me to my second point: the natural urges 
we have are not necessarily morally good. The 
sociobiologist seems to think that from facts (if they 
are facts) about the nature of human beings as biological 
organisms with a specific history, we can draw ethical 
conclusions about how we ought to behave. Let us suppose 
polygamy really is (as a matter of fact) 'natural' and 
monogamy 'unnatural' for both men and women as the 
sociobiologist implies. Very few philosophers would 
think that one can validly argue from this 'fact' (sic) 
to the conclusion that polygamy is morally right or 
monogamy is morally wrong.®® Obviously there are many 
things, like jealousy or hatred, that might be thought to 
be natural but these sentiments are not thereby usually 
thought to be morally right or acceptable. We still have 
to decide whether or not to act on our natural sentiments 
and these decisions call upon values; in this way, reason 
can check our passions. Similarly, facts about the 
genetic basis of pair bonding - even facts which show 
that our drives and emotions reflect the evolutionary 
adaptations that have enabled human beings to survive - 
do not bridge the gap between fact and value. Although 
it may be factually true that pair bonding has an 
inexorable biological basis, this fact does not entail 
the prescription 'so we ought to pair bond'. It might be 
natural to (unconsciously) want to transmit our genes but 
this does not mean that this is a good thing to do or 
that men and women morally ought to do so. Facts of this 
kind cannot compel us to rationally accept any value or 
conclusion about what we ought to do. If this point is 
not conceded, moreover, there is a danger that people 
will react to the findings of sociobiology by 
surrendering to their natural impulses, as if what is in
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our genes are beyond the reach of self-control. They may 
even conveniently believe that what is 'natural' is 
'morally good'. However some of our natural urges are, 
quite reasonably, thought to be bad.
Following on from the last point, we might try to 
inhibit what are thought to be morally unacceptable 
natural inclinations in this context by, say, placing 
severe restrictions on things like extra-marital sexual 
activity, or by punishing infidelity or legally 
prohibiting divorce. On the other hand, we might do more 
to inculcate at home and in schools the belief that 
household duties in the family should be shared more 
equally. Wilson (1978:21) cautions, however, that if we 
implement reforms which go radically against our 
biological tendencies, there may well be costs which we 
cannot measure. For instance, even though Wilson thinks 
that there is a genetic basis for much of the male/female 
division of labour in the nuclear family, he concedes 
that we could change this by training and other forms of 
gender stereotyping, which deliberately set out to erase 
some of the existing differences between males and
females. With suitable training, for instance, fathers
could become the primary, if not the sole caretaker of 
the newborn infant.
However there could be a price to pay for any
attempt to set our culture against our nature in this
way. In the first place, it costs at least the time and
the energy required to inculcate and enforce the
preferred moral standard, which runs counter to our
inherited tendencies. More importantly, long-term
defection from our biological motivators can only produce
an ultimate dissatisfaction of spirit, which in turn
could eventually lead to social instability and
significant losses in genetic fitness. Eventually there
may be an even greater cost as Wilson (1978:21) warns:
Personalities would quickly dissolve, relationships disintegrate, and reproduction cease.
i
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In short, behaviour that has taken millions of years to 
evolve cannot be completely changed to meet one or other 
morally preferred blueprint, without risking extensive 
damage. Let us put this problem to one side for the 
moment.
It seems that we have found a very general answer to 
our question: why do we have a sexual relationship with 
this rather than that person? According to the 
sociobiologist, whatever their conscious motives may be, 
the underlying thoughts and feelings of a woman when she 
chooses, is to look for physical robustness and devotion 
in a mate and a man naturally desires youth and beauty in Ïa woman. Without such an account, we are left with a 
conceptually deficient view that for no apparent reason, 
love simply strikes. But there is a further implication 
of the thesis that we should note. Given the condition 
above it seems reasonable to conclude that most men and 
women could be successfully matched with a vast number of 
different partners. This point will be unwelcome to the 
widely held view that when it comes to marriage there is 
one person for whom each of us is 'made', there is 'one 
and only one correct choice '.As we shall see this is 
one way in which many traditionalists justify the life­
long, exclusive, marital commitment (see p.71).
It may well be objected that the implication we have 
drawn - that we could be successfully matched with 
indefinitely many partners - shows that the 
sociobiological account is deficient. Surely there must 
be more to the causal nexus for our 'choices' (sic) in 
this context. Don't we need to take account, for 
instance, of the fact that people are usually 
reciprocally attracted to someone from the same ethnic or 
social group as themselves or with the same religious 
ties?^ Often we find someone sexually attractive due to 
their values or interests, particularly when these are 
similar to our own. Many empirical studies highlight 
this aspect of sexual attractiveness. They suggest that
g22
the discovery of this type of similarity in another 
confirms one's own sense of worth and the validity of
one's own world view. Also don't we need to take account 
of the fact that most societies have a class-structure 
and as a result, the person with whom we pair bond is 
importantly determined by our social class, occupation or 
education? The daughter of a dustman is likely to have 
a different circle of friends and love relationships to 
the daughter of a banker. The point is: there tends to 
be similarity of manner and outlook between people 
belonging to the same ethnic, religious group, social 
class, etc., and these factors play a major role in 
determining with whom individuals pair bond.
I think that Wilson et al might admit this. The so- 
called ultimate cause of our behaviour is concealed 
beneath a whole range of other significant societal 
variables. In this way, they would remind us that our 
nature is controlled only by evolutionary tendencies, not 
by immutable laws. But this is a weaker thesis. It 
seems that we would need to dig beneath a very wide range 
of surface (or proximate) causes to confirm the claim 
concerning the ultimate cause of our behaviour in this 
context.
However it does nonetheless seem to me to be 
plausible to maintain that a significant set of 
behaviours are caused in the way postulated by the 
sociobiologist. Along these lines, for instance, we 
might ask a young childless wife who finds her husband 
intolerably insensitive, why the insensitivity was not so 
oppressive a year ago before he lost his job and before 
she met the kindly, affluent bachelor who seems to be 
flirting with her. We might ask the middle-aged office 
worker if his wife really is duller and more nagging than 
she was twenty years ago, or maybe his tolerance of her 
nagging has dropped now that she is fifty and has no 
reproductive future. Added to this, the promotion that 
he has recently achieved, which has already drawn
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admiring glances from younger women at work, may be part 
of the total picture. Similarly we might understand some 
of our nebulous, fluctuating perceptions about our mate - 
feelings of warmth, passion, suspicion, loathing - as 
manifestations of our (rather absurd) natural urge for 
genetic proliferation. In other words, the factors that 
the sociobiologist emphasizes provide a very general 
direction to a person's sexual feelings, preferences, 
desires.
Love and sociobiology
A more significant difficulty we might raise against 
the sociobiologist's thesis is that even if we were to 
regard it as going some way to providing a plausible 
answer to the earlier queries concerning our desires for 
a partner in a pair bond, it does not explain where love 
fits into the picture. Indeed, I will argue shortly that 
it does not account for the complexity of our experience 
of love at all or the value we give to some forms of 
love.
Love is a real and important element in human
experience; for many (especially nowadays) it is the
raison d'etre of marriage. On the other hand, the pair
bond as we have discussed it, is for begetting and
rearing children. What has love got to do with this?
Are we to say, as Midgley (1979:286) says:
Essentially...the root of human pair bonding is the need to procreate. This is the underlying explanation of emotional feelings such as love. '‘®
In other words, the explanation of the capacity for love 
is that it too is genetically determined. It too is 
rooted in the need to procreate successfully. The 
question presents itself: could an empirical explanation 
of a sociobiological kind provide us with a satisfactory 
account of love?
Harlow (1974) suggests that it can. He (1974:viii- 
ix) maintains that we find the same sentiment in other
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primates, where the capacity to love develops within a
regular and predetermined framework. We all begin with
an instinctive need for contact; Harlow (1974:x)
suggests, this is the primary factor for affection in the
mother/infant relationship. In his experiments, baby
rhesus monkeys were given a choice of surrogate mothers,
one made of soft material which provided no nourishment,
the other made of wire which provided milk. Almost
always the infant monkeys opted for the former. Harlow
(1974:28) concludes from this:
It is clearly the incentive of contact comfort that binds the infant affectionately to the mother.
In a normal environment, an infant will, during a 
sensitive period of its development, form a deep and 
lasting attachment to its mother. On the other hand, 
Harlow (1974:95) discovered that monkeys brought up 
without 'contact comfort' were emotionally disturbed 
'their ability to bond in later relationships was 
damaged'. He inferred from this that since they were not 
loved in their earliest stage as infants, they were 
unable to love as adults. Harlow (1974:3) claims that we 
can extrapolate these results to human beings. Just as 
his rhesus monkeys both display and need affection of 
this kind, we too in early infancy need contact and to 
receive and show affection.If children are deprived of 
love at this critical stage they will grow up emotionally 
disturbed, unable to form stable sexual relations and 
they may possibly be psychopathic.
It will be objected that Harlow's analogy between 
the love which an infant rhesus monkey appears to exhibit 
for a fluffy object and the relationship found between a 
human baby and its mother, is false. One obvious 
condition that is missing from Harlow's account is the 
fact that a human baby is responding to the love given by 
its mother. This typically involves more than her 
providing 'contact comfort'. The appropriate comparison 
would seem to be between the human and rhesus monkey
I
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mothers (not between the human mother and the fluffy 
object). Presumably in the Harlow experiment the fluffy 
substitute mother did not compensate for the lack of care 
and affection provided by the rhesus monkey mother. But 
even the analogy between a rhesus monkey and human mother 
looks suspect. In the latter case, we value such love 
since we believe the sentiment is positively endorsed 
from the mother's rational personality. This includes 
such things as the pleasure the mother shows at the 
child's presence, her encouragement and appreciation of 
the child as it begins to develop certain skills, like 
its first words. More importantly, even in early 
infancy, mother-love of this kind is distinguished by 
feelings of affection and appreciation of the child 
simply for its own sake. This is a feeling. But it is 
a feeling which can be identified by its function. It is 
a feeling by which the mother recognizes the child's 
worth and affirms the child's developing sense of its own 
worth as a person. We may suppose that few, if any, of 
these qualities are present in a rhesus monkey mother and
:as a result it seems reasonable to believe that the love 
relationship between human beings even at this age, will 
be accordingly different.
More importantly, we need to know how the 'love'
(sic) which an infant rhesus monkey exhibits is supposed 
to relate to the heterosexual love enjoyed between adult 
human beings. Harlow has an answer to this. He (1974:1- 
2) identifies five affectional systems through which, he 
claims, we normally progress; they are tendencies by 
which the capacity to love normally develops in people.
These are: maternal love, infant love, peer love,
heterosexual love, and paternal love. For a developed 
capacity to love we need to progress from stage to 
stage. If each stage is not successfully passed
through, problems will result in adult life because the 
basis for future affectional development is thwarted. He 
goes on to claim that one of the three components which
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constitute the heterosexual stage of the affectional
system is romantic love. Of this stage in the system
Harlow (1974:69-70) writes:
[it involves]...a sequence of postural potentialities, elicited by external stimuli and leading to the complex interbody positioning which adult coital behavior requires; a flow of gonadal [hormones] which indirectly and directly facilitate heterosexual interactions beginning at puberty...
In a manner not dissimilar to Harlow, Wilson (1978:139) 
maintains:
Sexual love...can be reasonably based on enabling mechanisms in the physiology of the brain that have been programmed to some extent through the genetic hardening...
This presents a number of important problems. By 
identifying love in these terms, firstly, the 
sociobiologist conflates love with sex. This is to say, 
Harlow and Wilson attempt to account for love in terms of 
'the innate and inexorable drive to maximize reproductive 
success'. But we might quite reasonably insist that our 
understanding both of heterosexual 'love' and of 
heterosexual 'sex' is that these two phenomena are quite 
different, as a brief comparison of the two will show.
In the first place, there are things to be said 
about sex that do not apply to love and vice v e r s a . F o r  
instance, no overt bodily changes need occur where one 
person loves another. On the other hand, various overt 
changes necessarily take place in a person's body during 
the sex act. Regarded in this light, sex can be mainly 
a matter of a release of physical tension. And if all 
one wants is a physical release (or this kind of 
pleasure) the particular person with whom one is having 
sex seems to be unimportant. The sex drive can be 
directed towards any object that will satisfy it. On the 
other hand, love is almost always directed towards a 
specific person. Another contrast between the two is 
that the sex act is usually an intense and short-lived 
episode whereas love (in the sense in which we shall be
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discussing it) generally develops slowly and typically 
belongs to a long-term, if not permanent, exclusive 
relationship between two persons. Another point to note 
is that we can sexually desire an indefinite number of 
other persons whereas generally we only love deeply a few 
times in our lives. And as we noted earlier, from the 
viewpoint of sex to choose an exclusive (monogamous) 
relationship would seem to be a sacrifice whereas we 
would usually say that where a couple are in love it is 
not. Lastly, sex, not love, is needed for procreation; 
the former, not the latter, is fundamental for the 
transmission of one's genes. Just from these brief 
considerations it seems reasonable to conclude that while 
there could be one or an admixture of motives behind an 
act of sexual intercourse, love need have played no part 
in it.
More importantly, it might be objected that by 
reducing love to the sexual act, sociobiologists 
dehumanize it. Sexual intimacy can be rooted in love, of 
course, whereas, on the account above, any display of 
loving behaviour might seem to amount to nothing more 
than going through the motions (of loving the other 
person) to obtain sexual gratification. As such, there 
need be little trust, friendship, empathy, etc., between 
the couple. Each party need only exist for the other as 
an object to be enjoyed and discarded once sexual 
satisfaction is attained. If this was all there is to 
love - sex with no interpersonal relationship - as we 
shall see, it could well lead to intense feelings of 
loneliness.
This brings us to a more general problem with the 
reduction of heterosexual love to sex. Love is a far 
more complex emotion than the sociobiologist's account of 
it suggests. In the first place, the love we feel for 
another person might be a manifestation of the kind of 
love often referred to as eros. Eros is usually 
understood to be a state in which one's personality is
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dominated by strong sexual and romantic feelings for the
beloved. At first blush we might think that the sexual
drive (by which we seek to transmit our genes) is eros.
However while sex and eros are both based on strong
erotic feelings, eros is more than just sexual activity
and conversely, as Lewis (1977:85) points out: 'Sexuality
may operate without Eros...'*? As we have just noted, for
the sociobiologist, sexual intercourse is performed
mainly in order to procreate or merely for pleasure
whereas with eros the lover is in love with a particular
person, the person he or she sexually desires.*®
To add to the complexity there are a variety of ways
in which love of this kind is manifest. At one extreme,
spoken of particularly in glossy magazines, films,
television, novels, popular songs, etc., the emotion
seems to be so excessive to the point of being all-
consuming. Sleep, hunger, and the common concerns of
everyday life seem to be replaced by this passion. Its
peaks of joy are incomparable, its depths of despair are
bottomless. As Luhmann (1986:26) writes:
...one is subjected to something (irrational), something unalterable and for which one is unaccountable.
When a person is 'in love' with another in this way, he 
has recurrent thoughts about her. He regards his beloved 
as the most important person in his life. He focuses 
only on her and most other things that he might have 
thought about, are put to one side. It usually involves 
also emotions and feelings of intense excitement, 
probably because the lovers are new to each other. For 
many people, being 'in love' is a very intense emotion. 
It seems to take over the whole person.
When they are in love in this way, it is claimed 
that a person's emotions, feelings, or senses are 
heightened.*® This supposedly causes them to experience 
life more vibrantly or intensely. The flower seems to 
smell more sweetly, the landscape is more colourful.®® As 
a result of this heightened experience, moreover, it is
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suggested also that each of the lovers learns more about
themselves.®^ Presumably they gain an improved
understanding of themselves by being made aware of their
own hitherto hidden qualities, due to the responses of
their beloved.
Each lover may well think the other exemplifies
everything that they desire in their lives and they
suppress any differences that could come between them.
Mundane disagreements will be overlooked (like his
tendency to wear colours that clash or her choice of
strong perfume). We are inclined also to invest the
other person with certain interesting, attractive or
lovable qualities.®^ We are inclined to recognize in them
- or anyway, endow them with - the attributes that we
deem to be the most worthwhile a person can have; like
kindness or strength of character. Often we see the
beloved as having a surfeit of such good qualities.
Beliefs of this kind are often expressed in highly
idealistic terms.®® We not only think that the beloved
has such qualities but that he has potential skills or
talents that we can help him to realize and thereby
perhaps help him to realize 'himself'. To see the
potentialities in the beloved, one needs to have, as
Goldberg (1983:38-39) writes:
.,.trust...not just in the existence and value and strength of certain potentialities...but also in one's own need, capacity and commitment to appreciate those potentialities...
Alternatively, in projecting good qualities onto the
beloved it seems that we unconsciously hope that we will
nurture these qualities in our partner.®*
In some cases the person in whom she is investing
these attractive or lovable qualities does not in fact
have any of the qualities in question. Such a lover is,
as Babbitt (1955:178) suggests:
... in love not with a particular person but with [her] own dreams.
In which case, as it need not be a true reflection of the
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beloved's actual qualities, character traits or any other 
feature about him, it would not seem to matter who the 
particular individual is for whom the lover feels erotic 
love. Perhaps any person will do!
At another extreme, erotic love seems to be for the 
game of love itself rather than for the love object. In 
the kind of case I have in mind, the lover may take pride 
in engaging in several relationships at one and the same 
time. The point seems to be to get herself as sexually 
involved as possible while carefully avoiding entangling 
commitments or emotional dependence herself. It seems 
plausible to suggest that at least this emotional state 
may be consonant with the sociobiological account of sex 
in pair bonding.
However eros is still more complex than this. 
Something needs to be said, for instance, about its more 
egoistical forms where this is the kind of love that is 
for love's sake. If we were to be in this state, there 
is nothing we have to believe about the object of our 
love. We can love even when the object of our love does 
not exist. Perhaps the lover is only in love with 
herself. According to Freud (1963:360-362), self-love of 
this kind is possible but it is a psychiatric disorder - 
narcissism. On the other hand, we might interpret 'love 
for love's sake' to be the case where the lover is in 
love with the idea of being in love rather than loving 
another individual. There need be no objects only a 
subject; the lover does not need to move beyond her own 
ego.
It might be objected that the concept of love is 
attenuated when applied to such cases. This can be seen 
if we consider briefly some of the logical properties 
usually predicated of the love relationship. For 
instance, adult love is usually considered to be a non­
reflexive relation. But if there are some who love only 
themselves, it is reflexive; i.e. it holds between the 
individual and herself. Further we usually consider the
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adult love relationship as being symmetrical; X loves Y 
and y loves X, or in cases where the love is not 
returned, the relationship is asymmetric; X loves y but 
y does not love X. However a relationship where there is 
no objective basis for love, is neither symmetric nor 
asymmetric. It is non-symmetric. This points to the 
unusual nature of love that lacks an objective basis. 
However I do not want to argue that each of these 
alternatives are not possible states of a person who 
claims to be in love. No doubt there are some cases 
where there is no other person at all, and in other cases 
there is no objective basis for the traits one so admires 
in the character of the beloved. Erotic love of this 
kind seems to be possible. The point I want to stress is 
the difficulty of seeing how erotic love of the types 
discussed could be adequately explained in terms of 
behaviour based upon the drive to transmit one's genes in 
acts of sexual intercourse.
In contrast to the cases above, some love can be 
companionate (philia). This mode of love is rooted in 
long-term friendship. The usual grounds for it occur 
when a couple are long-established friends or if they 
discover that they have some common interest, goal, or 
vision.®® Sometimes it gradually takes on romantic 
overtones.
However philia is not usually so much an emotional
state as an attitude; the love we have for the other
person is shown by our attitudes towards them. This is
to say, philia or companionate love is more usually
manifest in the settled behaviour between a loving
couple, or in the kindly manner of their actions towards
each other. Of philia, Lewis (1977:72) writes:
This love, free from instinct, free from all duties but those which love has freely assumed...is eminently spiritual.
Philia is stable, relatively non-demanding, committed and 
trusting. Lovers in this mode can disagree or even fight 
with one another without threatening the relationship.
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and long separations can be survived easily. It (philia) 
does not seem to depend on the particular attributes or 
qualities of the beloved. According to Lewis (1977:121) 
most people have some personality traits that are 
unpleasant or ignoble. Where feelings of philia are 
present, however, the lover may know about such traits in 
the character of the beloved but the love felt or given 
will not diminish because of this. For in philia the 
lover may love what is not 'naturally lovable'.®®
Usually a love of this kind also will pass-up 
opportunities for a perhaps more genetically rewarding or 
a sexually more exciting relationship rather than be 
disloyal or abandon her present lover. And sexual 
intimacy - when this is undergone for the sake of the 
beloved - can become an act of philia, rather than an act 
of self-interested pleasure.®? One's own gratification is 
not necessarily the primary goal of sexual intercourse in 
a loving relationship. We do not need always to sexually 
desire the other person, or, if we do desire them, we do 
not need the immediate satisfaction of this desire when 
we engage in sexual intercourse. Let me use a well-worn 
analogy. We can spend a lot of time and considerable 
energy preparing a meal that can be shared and enjoyed 
with those whom we care about. The purpose of the meal 
need not be to satisfy hunger; often this assumes a 
secondary role. It can be to celebrate our friendship, 
or to share the friend's success, failure, and so on. In 
much the same way, the satisfaction of one's sexual 
desire is often not as important as the shared intimacy. 
In such instances, we may be showing our care and concern 
for the welfare of the other person; the lover is made 
happy by making the beloved happy. In other words, the 
motivation behind a particular act of sexual intercourse 
can be philia, not sex. (We will return to the 
discussion of philia in Chapter Three.) For the moment 
it seems reasonable to suppose that eros and philia can 
co-exist; a couple may love each other in both modes,®®
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However I am unable to see how a couple who share love of 
this kind can be readily assimilated to the 
sociobiological account of the matter at all.
In addition to the above, there is a style of love 
known as agape. 'Agape' is usually understood to mean a 
love which can be shown to any human being; the 
disinterested love of one's neighbour. To love someone 
in this way is to value that person for their own sake as 
well as wishing to benefit that person or to advance 
their welfare. If it applies to one's beloved, this is 
because he is human, not because he is one's beloved. 
So, at first blush, agape is not likely to be overly 
present in a personal relationship. As Lewis (1977:117) 
writes this mode of love:
...is wholly disinterested and desires what issimply best for the beloved.
If it is shown to one's partner it is kind, caring, and 
sensitive to his needs in a self-effacing way that 
requires nothing in return. However agape can be a 
correcting factor in personal relationships.®® We can 
take steps to help our beloved, for example, because we 
are aware of their predicament (qua human being). Once 
again, love of this kind is usually manifest in the 
attitudes we have towards the other person rather than by 
an emotional state.
For the moment let it suffice to stress that once 
again I am unable to see how a couple who love in this 
way can be covered by the sociobiological account of the 
matter. Rather than being compatible with the natural 
drives and feelings described by the sociobiologist, 
agape seems antithetical to them. Moreover, it seems to 
be due to qualities found in agape and philia that we 
value the love relationship we find in marriage. It 
might be objected that these feelings are not completely 
unconnected with the transmission of genes. For example, 
their tendency to be associated with pair bonding might 
be explained in terms of the useful function they serve
!
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in keeping parents together and thereby increasing the 
chance that their children survive to have children 
themselves.However this does not explain why a 
reflective person might value love of these kinds and the 
sociobiologist could not address this question.
Before I close this part of the discussion, there is 
a more promising way in which we might try to interpret 
the sociobiological use of 'love'. This would be to 
identify it with the kind of pragmatic love that takes 
practical matters into account as a guide to sexual 
involvement. The latter would include a careful 
evaluation of one's partner's good and bad points, 'Is he 
physically robust, powerful and wealthy?' or more 
practically, 'Will he handle the household finances 
satisfactorily, repair the car, be able to deal with 
aggressive salesmen, etc.?' If this is love, it is the 
opposite of eros (romantic love) in that it is rational, 
practical, fully aware of the alternatives, and not 
especially intense. Unlike eros, if a person loves in 
this way, it is unlikely that this would be an intense 
commitment to the other person. Love of this kind would 
be regarded as renegotiable if conditions change. It is 
quite lacking in the qualities of love that are usually 
thought to be the basis of the modern marital 
relationship. However a sexual relationship of the kind 
suggested by the sociobiologist could be compatible with 
love (if it is love) of this kind.
In most heterosexual love relationships we will no 
doubt experience an admixture of some or most of these 
different forms of love, or we may adopt different mixes 
at different times within the same relationship. (These 
are only some examples of the kinds of love we experience 
in a pair bond with which the sociobiologist would have 
difficulty; see pp.83-84). What this discussion suggests 
however is that love in the human pair bond is complex 
and that it can be of a form quite different from that 
suggested by sociobiology. Or at the least, I hope I
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have said enough to show that the concept of love we 
employ in a marital relationship can involve something 
over and above the sociobiologist account of it. There 
is usually more to it than just being driven by a flow of 
passion, of which we are - so to speak - the passive 
source.
The last problem I want to discuss raised by the
■Ïsociobiological account concerns the reasons that one 
would give for loving one's partner. We have seen that 
a man may be attracted by a woman's beauty or displays of 
care and concern for him. He may believe, further, that 
with such qualities she will make a good mother for his 
children. On the other hand, a woman might be attracted 
to a man because she sees that he has a robust physique, 
or that he wants to do things for her or wants to spend 
his time with her and she may assume that this is 
evidence of significant affinities between them. Thus 
she may make a conscious choice to pursue the 
relationship. But if a woman might say that she loves a 
man because of this or that character trait, wouldn't 
this mean that she is committed to loving anyone who has 
these traits?®^ Moreover if she discovers another man who 
has them in greater abundance presumably the reasonable 
thing for her to do - if we could choose in such matters 
- would be to transfer her love to this other person. If 
she says she loves Y due to his gentleness and if Z comes 
along and she finds that not only is he gentle but that 
he has this quality (so to speak) in more abundance then 
why would she love Y rather than Zl Another point we 
need to bear in mind is that we can value specific 
character traits of a person but this does not 
necessarily mean that we love them, or that we love other 
aspects of their character. Or if we do love them, this 
would be an odd sort of love because it would seem to 
imply that we only love a part and not the whole person.
Might we say then that what a woman loves in a man 
is a particular combination of qualities that her beloved
'
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has? Unfortunately this does not get us very far. It 
just adds to the difficulty of the earlier response to 
the question; what does the lover love? The earlier 
answer was 'his particular qualities'. Now the answer is 
'the combination of these qualities'. This falls prey to 
the same objection. If it is a combination of traits, 
someone may come along with a better set of the same 
combination.
A further reason why it does not do to say that we 
love someone because of a specific quality or combination 
of qualities is that this would seem to mean that he is 
only loved for as long as he retains these qualities. 
What if he loses them? Will he no longer be loved? And 
if he is still loved, why? It might be objected also 
that this seems to make the mixture of a person's 
qualities measurable and quantative. It is as if, of the 
various combinations of qualities a person has, one 
person could have more or less of the combination than 
another. Now while it might make sense to say of one 
quality, e.g. a robust physique, Y is better than Z, 
surely we cannot claim this of the indefinitely extended 
and uniquely different combination of qualities each 
individual has.
If this is correct and we cannot account for our 
choice due to beliefs we have concerning our partner's 
qualities, might we say that we love them for their own 
sake? In other words, one does not need to know which 
qualities one loves in order to love the other person; 
one loves that person for themself alone. I think this 
is the correct answer. Our love generally directs itself 
towards persons rather than their attributes 
(sociobiological or otherwise). A particular trait or 
combination of traits may have been the cause of the 
initial attraction. But at some point in the 
relationship, our love is given to the beloved for the 
unique person he is, and not to an isolated trait or 
class of traits. Our love develops and is focused on the
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other, qua person. To put this point in a different way: 
even if a person could be analyzed into the sum of his or 
her parts, it is his or her particular totality that we 
normally love, not a balance sheet of positive and 
negative qualities. If all of this is correct, it would 
then serve to excuse the typical inability we have in 
saying which qualities in one's beloved constitute the 
grounds for our loving them. It is not just that one 
lacks the skills needed to explain what it is one loves 
in the nature of the other person, one loves them because 
they are the very complex person they are.
Unfortunately, however, the proposal is not as 
perspicuous as it might at first seem. We do not justify 
why in a marriage, a spouse X is expected to continue her 
relationship with spouse Y by responding 'Because of the 
sort of person Y is'. The answer appears to beg the 
question. Further if the beloved becomes a 'different 
person' say, due to Alzheimer's disease, if we continue 
with the relationship it is probably out of loyalty to 
the person he once was; to the shared history and 
memories of better times. We do not necessarily have to 
love the person he is. Our choice to continue with the 
relationship could be based upon the person 'he was' or 
used to be.
It might be objected that the above discussion is 
too voluntaristic and rationalistic. One could love 
someone without saying that this is because of the sort 
of person he is; and even if there are reasons (which one 
might be able to give) one cannot choose whether or not 
to love someone on the basis of them, for we cannot 
choose to love them or not. For the moment let it 
suffice to say that one can choose whether or not to 
start or to continue with a loving relationship and 
reasons of this kind - one loves them due to the person 
they are - might be a sufficient explanation of why we 
have so decided.
Conclusion
I
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marnage ?
In this chapter we have discussed the view that 
long-term pair bonding is natural. Human beings are a 
pair bonding species. However the discussion has been 
primarily about sex in such a relationship, not about 
marriage. At the moment, it is difficult to see where 
marriage fits into the picture. On the one hand, if we 
were to understand the sociobiologist to be saying that 
monogamous marriage is natural for us (i.e. an exclusive 
pair bond for life is natural) we might wonder why we go 
through all of the complications of making this a legally 
binding relationship. Why should a couple be required to 
make a public and legally binding promise to love each 
other 'for as long as they both shall live'? Why not 
simply pair bond for life? On the other hand, if we are 
not naturally monogamous - and this is an implication we 
drew in the earlier discussion (particularly for males) - 
then monogamous marriage seems to fly in the face of our 
natural inclinations. If it is not natural for us to 
sustain the exclusive pair bond, why should we want to
bind ourselves to another person with vows and a legal
'contract of the kind we find in monogamous heterosexual
:'A
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Chapter Two
Arguments for the marriage tradition
Monogamous heterosexual marriage is part of the 
prevailing mores in western (Christian) societies. From 
early childhood we are made aware of the fact that 
marriage plays a large, if not major role, in the lives 
of most men and women. We are encouraged to think that 
it is the best setting for a long-term heterosexual pair 
bond; it is the relationship traditionally accepted as 
being most appropriate for adults who love each other and 
desire to secure their love. We are persuaded that, once 
married, both of the spouses sexual needs will be met 
within this relationship.^ It is supposed also to be the 
best setting for the procreation and rearing of children; 
their parents need to be married for the children to 
enjoy a secure family life.* Moreover the traditional 
type of marriage gives each of the partners economic and 
residential advantages, it is supposed to meet certain of 
their religious convictions, and to serve a number of 
other important social functions,* In assessing marriage 
as an institution in which a rational person might choose 
to - or choose not to - participate, we need to consider 
if these alleged advantages really do apply today. (Let 
me stress again I will confine my discussion to the main 
characteristics of marriage within western Christian 
culture.“)
Normative traditions
We are born into a world in which there are existing 
rules, norms of behaviour, beliefs about the acceptable 
and unacceptable ways in which relationships between 
people ought to be conducted, and so on. From infancy 
onwards we learn such norms - by practice rather than by 
learning a body of theoretical knowledge; they are 
reinforced (either directly or indirectly) by our
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parents, peers, teachers and most other influences on our 
upbringing. In such an environment, for instance, boys 
and girls are usually brought up to conform to 
stereotypical roles. By following the examples of their 
parents and other adults, through watching television, 
reading books, etc., children are presented with a fairly 
consistent picture of the particular types of behaviour 
which are thought to be appropriate to men, and those 
which are appropriate to women. Of course, the norms in 
our society change and are changing all of the time. 
However, speaking generally, at present we may say that 
things such as mending appliances, cleaning the car, 
mowing the lawn, are deemed to be mainly male activities, 
whereas doing the housework, the shopping, looking after 
the baby, are typically thought to be part of the female 
domain. There are also different typical attitudes and 
mannerisms that are expected. For instance (until 
recently) crude and loud behaviour on the part of a man 
was acceptable ('he is just being manly') but not when 
such behaviour was displayed by a woman; they were 
usually expected to be less assertive, quiet, and even 
submissive. Of course there are many notable exceptions 
to these norms both at the individual and the group 
level. Nevertheless they indicate the way in which 
behaviour and attitudes between the genders are expected 
to vary.
Many of our unreflectively held moral beliefs - 
'tell the truth', 'keep your promises', 'do your fair 
share of work in a joint enterprise', 'be loyal to your 
family and friends' - are acquired from our early social 
environment. Usually these beliefs are not stated 
explicitly. It is not a matter of understanding their 
rationale. We are not taught why they are the required 
conduct or why they are right or wrong. We are told 
simply that we must conform to such practices, for they 
are norms of behaviour which are generally accepted and 
practised. If an individual fails to comply with them.
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they can suffer social condemnation and ostracism. On 
the other hand, they are also empowering practices, in 
that it is thought that by acting in accordance with 
them, members of the society are more likely to live 
happy and contented lives.
On most occasions most of us unreflectively conform 
to the existing practices in which we were raised. The 
tradition informs our day-to-day view of things. Very 
often this delineates important aspects of the character 
of individuals who belong to the same tradition. They 
are united due to their shared attitudes, behaviour, 
moral outlook or a common world view. As a result there 
are many ways in which we can recognize them as belonging 
to the same tradition. We see it in their behaviour and 
gestures; for instance, the way they greet each other. 
We see it also in their rituals and ceremonies, the way 
that important occasions like birth, death, and marriage, 
are commemorated. There is, this is to say, a 'common 
wisdom' of the proper way to respond to particular events 
in life.® These in turn create a sense of belonging. 
They enable members of a tradition to recognize and be at 
ease with each other. Similarly, most people have wants, 
hopes, plans that accord with the established practices; 
they have goals that are traditionally accepted as 
legitimate goals and they adopt the customary means to 
achieve these goals. Hence the mores may be said to 
shape how we think about many things, and it is manifest 
in many different aspects of our behaviour.
There can be no doubt, also, that the normative 
tradition in which we are raised strongly influences (if 
not determines) many of our choices and actions. So that 
though we may seem to be choosing and acting voluntarily, 
often the choices we do make are due to the factors which 
have influenced our development. Or more cautiously, we 
might say that the tradition often provides the framework 
in which we make our choices; it determines which of the 
several alternatives we may select. And, moreover, this
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framework is something beyond our control.
Opposed to the overly deterministic tone of this 
account, it might be asked: what about those who
deliberately choose not to participate in a given norm or 
custom? Most individuals can and do think critically 
about at least some aspects of the tradition in which 
they have been raised; they can and do make choices which 
are opposed to their received norms or values, and they 
can act accordingly. However, it could be pointed out 
that such an opposition usually arises in a situation 
where the expectations of individuals are disappointed by 
a generally accepted tradition; it is thought to be 
failing them, or breaking down. But whatever the cause 
may be, the most strident critics of a tradition cannot 
live completely outside of it. If they did, there would 
be nothing for them to criticize since they would be 
ignorant of what the tradition expects them to do.® Or to 
put the point in another way: they can only recognize a 
problem as a 'problem' because they are aware of the 
tradition. Thus it seems plausible to argue once again, 
that the latter determines their range of choices, some 
of which they reject. All of this implies that we cannot 
be wholly indifferent to the mores within which we are 
brought up, or in which we live and operate. We are all 
creatures of our social environment. For most of us, who 
live our lives within the established framework however, 
the society is morally untroubled. And since most people 
in a society, although they conform to it, are not aware 
of its existence, we might say (figuratively) that the 
mores has achieved its purpose.
Monogamous heterosexual marriage, we noted, is part
.of the prevailing mores of western (Christian) societies.
It is one of the most important and pervasive features of 
our tradition.’ Our understanding of the relationships 
between people, the stereotypical roles of both men and 
women and of what is considered right and wrong conduct 
for them, owes a lot to this institution.® It is
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important to emphasize that many of the more obvious 
features of the traditional marriage still persist today 
and are built into our beliefs and expectations. They 
are reinforced in films, on television soap operas, in a 
wide range of literature - from the books of a literate 
minority to popular women's magazines - in popular songs, 
and either implicitly or explicitly in a vast number of 
other things. All of these influences say much the same 
thing.
Firstly, (and speaking generally) when a couple 
decide to get married they are doing something 
worthwhile. We approve of most features of this kind of 
relationship. We think - perhaps wrongly - that when a 
couple get married, they have intentionally undertaken 
something valuable; they have done something we regard as 
good and as a result their lives should be changed for 
the better. Similarly, we think that those who have a 
long and happy marriage have something really worth 
having.
At the same time, however, we think that marriage is 
a choice (among alternatives) for those couples who 
desire this. They can marry or not. Also they can 
choose to become unmarried; divorce is tolerated more 
than it was a generation or so ago.® It is thought by 
most people to be an acceptable solution to severe 
marital difficulties.^' The high incidence of divorce, 
however, seems to reflect disappointment with a 
particular marital partner not with the institution of 
marriage i t s e l f . F o r  despite the options to married 
life that are open to them, the vast majority of people 
choose to marry at some time in their lives; few eligible 
adults decline the opportunity altogether,^*
There are a number of other ways to support the 
claim that 'getting married' and 'being married' are 
generally thought to be worthwhile. In the former case, 
a simple way this approval can be seen is in the custom 
of congratulating the couple when they marry. It would
It
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be strange if whenever anyone gets married we expressed 
our sorrow, or we thought that this would mean that their 
lives will be changed for the worse. Generally we think 
that for two people to get married, is something worth 
their doing. On the other hand, in the case of 'being 
married', one way our general approval is manifest is in 
our attitude nowadays towards the increasing number of 
divorces.^* Although, as we noted, divorce is no longer 
attended by the sense of moral shame and disapproval that 
used to accompany it, nonetheless divorce is often 
presented in a manner that suggests that the rise in the 
divorce rate is a social problem.^ '* But it is a problem 
only if there is something wrong with the breakdown of a 
marriage. If a couple divorce, we still feel that 
something distressing has happened to them. This is not 
just because of the unhappiness to the former partners 
that usually accompanies the divorce but is also due to 
the breakdown of something that we deem to be of value.
Marriage is, in these senses, a commendatory term.""® 
There are, of course, more neutral ways of using the 
term. A social scientist, for instance, might describe 
the marriage relationships of a community without 
implicitly or explicitly approving of the institution. 
Nevertheless the implication is that a community who has 
marriage as a part of their mores, considers that it 
involves something desirable. For them, like us, 
'marriage' is a commendatory term in that it implies that 
the institution is deemed to be worthwhile both by those 
who are married and by the society at large.
Although generally we think that marriage is 
worthwhile, this does not mean that everyone about to get 
married, or the marriages of all of the people we know, 
can be regarded in this light. We might think, for 
instance, that X and Y should not be getting married, 
they are too young, they are not compatible, and so on. 
similarly we speak of X and Y having 'a poor marriage' 
when we think that a good institution is being spoiled.
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or we may talk of them having 'a bad marriage' when we 
think that much of what is going on in the relationship 
is destructive. We even say, figuratively, of a 
particular relationship that 'the couple do not have a 
marriage at all'. But these are exceptions that prove 
the rule. This is to say, we would not condemn such 
conduct or bemoan the relationship unless we thought that 
such things can and should be improved. We may say 'X 
and y have a bad marriage' in virtue of the belief that 
marriage is something worthwhile and there is an 
implication that we have in mind some conditions that 
together make it worthwhile. To put the point in a 
different way: we have an idea of some of the conditions 
required for a relationship to be a good marriage and it 
is the latter that is thought to be really worthwhile.
When I say that generally we think that marriage is 
worthwhile, it might be asked; worthwhile for what? The 
question suggests that 'worthwhile' is a relational 
notion, and that what is regarded as being worthwhile is 
relative to some further end. It is only when we know 
what the latter is that we can identify what it is about 
marriage that makes it worthwhile. For the moment, I 
hope it will suffice to say that if the relationship is 
regarded in this way - i.e. as being worthwhile to 
achieve a further end - then this is because it is 
thought to contribute significantly to the overall 
happiness of the couple's lives. We think that they will 
live or have lived more rewarding lives as a result of 
this relationship, or at the least that they would have 
fared less well without it.
An alternative answer to the question above would be 
that the relationship just is worthwhile in itself. 
Marriage itself is of intrinsic value. At first blush, 
this answer seems unsatisfactory if only for the reason 
that the claim is contested. As we shall see in Chapter 
Four, several writers claim that the institution (itself) 
is anything but worthwhile. When a claim about the
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ssself-evident value of a thing or institution is denied, 
the key assumption (of its self-evidence) is forfeit. 
However there might be certain conditions conceptually
connected to the relationship of marriage that are 
uncontroversially worthwhile.
The marriage contract
I claimed earlier that many aspects of the tradition 
still influence our beliefs, attitudes, and decisions 
about marriage today. One obvious feature is the belief 
that long-term heterosexual relationships need to be 
strengthened and sustained by a legal contract. This I 
take to be a necessary and sufficient condition for a 
relationship counting as a marriage: there must be a
legal (or in some cultures a quasi-legal) contract that 
is agreed to by both of the partners in the relationship.
With this contract in view, the law is required, for 
instance, to ensure that the couple are of an age at 
which they are able to cope with marriage. Every State 
has a minimum age for marriage without parental consent 
and most have a lower age at which young people are not 
permitted to marry even if they have parental consent.
The law's intervention here is quite reasonable; a 
minimum standard of personal competence is required by 
any legal contract, including marriage. A person must be 
of a sufficient intellectual capacity and emotional 
stability to know what he or she is doing. This is one 
good reason why children are prohibited from marrying. 
Moreover, the burdens of marriage are thought to be too
: V ',heavy for a young person to bear. There is ample 
empirical evidence to support this view. Couples who 
marry in their teens, for example, are almost twice as 
likely to divorce as couples who are older.
Secondly, the law is thought to be needed to prevent 
a couple from marrying when they are in a close kinship 
relation.^’ For instance, the law in Scotland prohibits 
women from marrying their father or their grandfather.
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their son or their grandson, whether this is by a blood 
relationship or by adoption. They may not marry their 
brother - full, half, or step - or their uncle or nephew. 
Males are prohibited from marrying the equivalent female
relatives.^® Presumably the original justification of 
these prohibitions was the fear of the consequences of 
incest. Every culture has rules prohibiting incest. It 
is often suggested that such rules have a genetic 
function.^® As we noted, the richer the variety of the 
infant's gene pool, the less likely he or she is to 
manifest certain inherited diseases. Further, we noted 
that incest restraints force young people to leave the 
family in search of a mate. This results in the cross­
bonding of families and in cultural cross-fertilization 
which enhances the gene pool. However prohibitions 
against incestuous relationships are far older than our 
understanding of the laws of genetic inheritance so this 
explanation would not account for the origin of the ban.
Besides while genetic considerations may apply to 
consanguineous relations, some of the persons prohibited 
from marrying one another - adopted brothers, ex-fathers- 
in-law - have no blood-ties whatsoever.
To justify the prohibition of a young person 
marrying someone who is a close adult relative, however, 
it could be pointed out that within a family, young 
people are vulnerable to adult sexual exploitation. At 
the same time, adults within a family are usually 
responsible (and held to be responsible) for the 
protection and support of immature young family members.
In the light of this, strong sanctions are needed to 
protect children from sexual exploitation in familial 
relationships. Thus it seems reasonable to argue, for 
instance, that because of the value placed on trust and 
support of children by adults in such contexts, the 
former ought to be excluded from the arena of sexual
■competition for the latter. (For parallel reasons, the 
ethical code of, for instance, the medical profession
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prohibits doctors from taking sexual advantage of those 
in their charge.)
À third legal condition which has to be satisfied 
before they marry, is that neither party may already be 
in the state of matrimony.** In western culture, marriage 
is a monogamous relationship. There are severe penalties 
for those who commit bigamy. From the evidence to hand, 
this offence is usually the result of someone not 
bothering to get a divorce from their estranged spouse 
before remarrying.** Although in some cases, a person 
(usually a man) maintains separate wives and families in 
different places, neither of whom know about the other.** 
A number of quite general reasons might justify this 
prohibition and the punishment given for its 
transgression. One reason is that usually the joint 
ownership of property, money and related matters are part 
of the marital arrangement between the couple. If it 
turns out that one of them has been lying about their 
personal circumstances unbeknown to the other, then this 
is likely to cause considerable harm to the financial 
interests of the innocent party. More importantly, in 
the marriage contract both pledge 'to forsake all others' 
in an exclusive, lifelong relationship. Both partners 
assume that the other is telling the truth about the 
details he or she has given about themselves and that 
they can be relied upon and trusted in this regard. If 
it is discovered that one of them has lied and is already 
married, this is most likely to result in a major crisis 
in the life of the other, due to the violated trust and 
thwarted expectations. Considerations like the above, 
give rational support to the legal prohibition and 
punishment of bigamy.**
Presumably the marriage contract (itself) is thought 
to be needed to protect the interests of both parties 
once they are in a long-term pair bond. It (the 
contract) establishes certain legal rights and duties 
between a husband and a wife? rights and duties with
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reference to the person with whom the marriage is 
contracted and against the world. By the latter I mean 
that the couple are legally entitled to particular types 
of behaviour from other people, in relation to 
themselves. Also they can expect certain types of 
behaviour from each other that other people cannot claim. 
Otherwise the contract itself (in western societies 
anyway) is quite unlike most legal contracts. It cannot 
be amended, or parts omitted to suit the preferences of 
the couple concerned. Its provisions are largely 
unwritten. Its penalties are unspecified. Prospective 
spouses, moreover, are not usually informed of the terms 
of the contract. As a result many of its implications 
will be unknown to most of the contracting parties. At 
the same time, by assenting to the marital contract the 
couple publicly accept certain formal obligations for the 
rest of their lives. In most cases, no doubt they do so 
unreflectively. They are simply conforming to the 
existing social/legal practices in which they have been 
raised. It seems reasonable to speculate that some 
individuals would not agree to the contract if they were 
fully aware of the body of reciprocal obligations that 
the law and judicial decisions have established, to which 
they commit themselves.*®
Of main interest to us in this essay are the 
following three legal requirements. Firstly, the couple 
are legally obliged to engage in an exclusive sexual 
relationship. This condition is assumed to be necessary 
and to follow from their having been granted a marriage 
licence. Both of the partners' sexual needs, moreover, 
are expected to be met within the marriage. Also the 
marriage contract commits both of them to a monogamous 
relationship. They contract to give exclusive sexual 
rights to each other for as long as they both live.
Just as pervasive as the legal contract in this 
context, are the informal norms and customs which are 
powerful exerters of pressures upon the marriage
I
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partners. The nature and extent of the pressure differs 
among social groups. But as we noted, there is a 
(traditional) range of attitudes, values and conduct into 
which we are all socialised from infancy, that influence 
us to behave in the preferred ways when we are married. 
Again they are fixed habits of thought and patterns of 
feeling rather than arguments; they may not occupy the 
forefront of our minds when we think and act but they 
appear to limit and guide the alternatives that present 
themselves to us in marriage. In this regard having 
sexual affairs outside of marriage is still generally 
considered to be morally wrong.
A second legal requirement central to the marriage 
contract concerns children. The couple are legally 
expected to support any children which may result from 
their union. Various laws associated with the marital 
contract stipulate the rights and duties that the couple 
undertake, if and when they have children.*® Further, the 
norms or customs in this context are very pervasive: the 
mother, as we will see, is still deemed to be primarily 
responsible for their children's well-being, while the 
father is still expected to go out to work to earn the 
money to keep them all.
A third requirement I wish to highlight is the legal 
obligation for the couple to establish and maintain a 
shared household.*’ In the tradition, we noted, the 
husband is expected to be the main breadwinner and to 
provide for the material needs of his wife and family.*® 
Possibly as a result of this, he is considered to be the 
head of the matrimonial household, by law as well as by 
custom. His wife takes on his name and status and within 
limits is subject to his authority. On the other hand, 
also in this tradition, the wife is expected to perform 
certain services, such as taking the main responsibility 
for doing the shopping, cooking and cleaning.*®
Let us look at some of the arguments which may be 
used to persuade a rational person of the value of these
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legal and social requirements.
The sexual justification for the traditional marriage
We noted that one important condition for which the 
marriage contract was required, concerned the sexual 
relationship between a couple. In the past anyway, a 
couple were expected to refrain from sexual intercourse 
prior to marriage and they were and are required nowadays 
both legally and morally to engage in an exclusive sexual 
relationship with each other upon getting married. And 
there seems to be good grounds for all of these 
constraints.
Consider, first, the traditional requirement that 
sexual intercourse should not take place before marriage. 
In the recent past, there was a strong norm in the mores 
that one should be faithful - in advance so to speak - to 
one's prospective spouse by 'saving oneself' sexually for 
them alone. This was especially the expectation for 
women. The convention (until recently anyway) was that 
it is immoral for a full sexual relationship to occur 
between two people who are not married. It did not 
matter whether they did so with every intention of 
marrying at a later stage. When the couple vowed to be 
faithful this was considered to be a confirmation of 
their past chaste sexual conduct. And there were laws 
that tried to guarantee this norm. For example, if a man 
asked for a woman's hand in marriage but then before the 
wedding reneged on the engagement, he could be sued for 
breach of promise. One of the supporting reasons seems 
to have been that (despite the social prohibition) the 
would-be groom might have taken sexual liberties with his 
bride-to-be. If he broke off his engagement she would 
have to return to the marriage market 'sullied' since she 
might no longer be a virgin.
In support of the traditional view also it was 
recognized that women (particularly teenage girls) could 
make a disastrous mistake by having sexual intercourse
;,V
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before marriage. Sex before marriage sometimes involved 
deception and exploitation by one or the other partner, 
usually the man of the woman, for his own sexual 
gratification.*® A typical case seems to have been where 
a man, in order to get a woman to have sexual intercourse 
with him, would dishonestly tell her that he loves her or 
that he intends to marry her, and as a result of this,
she would surrender herself sexually to him. More ?■importantly, a single act of sexual intercourse could 
result in the female becoming pregnant, which could in 
turn lead to misery due to the unwanted pregnancy.
Single motherhood placed a great burden on a young woman 
and her child; as well as the strong social stigma 
associated with this state, many young women had a 
precarious financial existence.
I should add that in the past, methods of 
contraception were either unavailable or quite 
unreliable. So contraception was not a dependable way of 
avoiding unwanted pregnancy. It might be countered that 
this was a problem in the past; nowadays techniques of 
birth control have reached new levels of efficiency so 
that sexual intercourse may take place with little 
likelihood of pregnancy. And since with readily 
available and safe contraception, a woman can avoid 
becoming pregnant, if sexual intercourse is entered into 
responsibly by both partners, surely this is no longer a 
good reason why it should not occur premaritally.
However it could be pointed out that despite the 
availability of reliable contraceptives, in recent times 
the number of premarital pregnancies have increased.** No 
doubt the causes for this increase are complex. Any list 
of contributing factors would have to include a variety 
of social conditions, like the fact that the media is 
filled with representations of casual sex, which in turn 
could result in a casual attitude towards contraception.
Another contributing cause might be the fact that 
abortion is legally permitted and in most western
I
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countries is quite easily obtained. Given such factors, 
together with the normal conditions of adolescence (lack 
of maturity and responsibility, peer pressure to engage 
in sexual intercourse, etc.) it is little wonder that 
premarital pregnancies abound.
However there is a stronger a priori line of
argument which attempts to show why premarital sex is
wrong. Young unmarried people must lack the appropriate
level of responsibility for a satisfactory sexual
relationship. Scruton (1996) tries to give philosophical
support for this view.** Firstly, he (1996:84) claims
that our sexual development cannot be separated from our
development as persons. Thus how we learn to deal with
our sexuality when we are young is crucial to the kind of
persons we become as adults. Our beliefs and attitudes
concerning sex contribute, for good or bad, to our adult
sense of self-worth and dignity. From this, Scruton
(1996:85) goes on to claim that only an upbringing in
which one abstains from sexual intercourse will yield the
desired level of self-worth and dignity. On the other
hand, if the preferred kind of attitude is not developed,
sex is likely to be regarded as being a merely physical
act, which in turn may lead us to use our bodies
indiscriminately to satisfy our sexual needs whenever
they arise. With this in mind, Scruton (1996:84) writes:
The child [ought to] regard his body as sacred, and as subject to pollution by misperception or misuse.
In other words, to engage in sexual intercourse when we 
are immature could lead to a lack of respect for our own 
bodies (and by extension, a lack of respect for 
ourselves).
From this perspective, sexual intercourse ought only 
to be experienced by mature, well-adjusted persons. For 
only in such cases is it likely that all aspects of the 
individual's 'personhood' will be involved - the right or 
appropriate emotions, thoughts, desires. In this way
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Scruton (1996:87) claims:
...the self and its responsibility [ought to be] involved and indissolubly linked to the pleasures and passions of the body.
In short, a person's whole being needs to be involved i
when sexual intercourse occurs. Furthermore only when
the act is experienced in this way, is a person likely
also to see his or her sexual partner as a complete
personality - not just an object to be used for their own i
gratification - and this in turn implies respect for
one's partner. Thus to engage in acceptable sexual
relationships requires firstly, that we have the I
appropriate level of maturity to engage our whole
personality in the act and, secondly, that we genuinely
care for and respect the other person; we do not merely
desire their body. And for these reasons, Scruton
(1996:85) writes, we ought to impede the sexual impulse
...until such a time as it may attach itself to the inter-personal project...of union with another person...
For so long as the two conditions are not met, we ought 
not to have sexual intercourse.
At first blush, we might think that there is 
something in the claim that the sexual act needs to be 
integrated into the wider emotional and intellectual life 
of a person. But this does not lead to the conclusion 
that sexual activity ought only to occur within marriage.
I
All that is necessary is that a would-be lover has not 
only sexual desire for the other person but genuine 
feelings of affection for them. So on Scruton's account 
there seems to be no reason why couples - cohabiting 
couples, long-term lovers - in whom the appropriate 
affection as well as passion is present, should not have 
sexual intercourse.
But Scruton (1996:85) goes on to claim that when we 
consider the changeableness of human desire, how men - 
and to a certain extent women - are prone to philander,
#
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in order to prove that we genuinely care for and respect 
our sexual partner, we need also added guarantees of 
sincerity and fidelity. And only marriage can provide 
these guarantees. Hence a mature couple who are in a 
long-term pair bond should not have intercourse because 
they will lack the trust and reliance that can only be 
found in matrimony. If these arguments seem to be 
familiar it is perhaps because many of us were 
traditionally brought up to value chastity for reasons 
not dissimilar to those above.
Of course Scruton's confident assertions contain a 
number of assumptions that could be contested. It might 
be counter-asserted, for instance, that sex does not need 
to be taken so seriously. Amongst other things, it can 
be a means by which we express our love. On the other 
hand, it can be argued that amongst consenting adults 
there is no good reason nowadays why sexual activity 
should not be engaged in simply for pleasure, it may be 
just the desire to have contact with another person's 
body and the pleasure which is derived therefrom. If it
is enjoyable and safe and no-one else gets hurt, why not 
do it?
Further, why should an unmarried person be obliged 
to involve herself in the moral soul-searching about sex 
that Scruton requires, as opposed to any other aspect of 
her life? She might say: 'No doubt sexual relationships 
are very important to some people and need to be an 
interpersonal project for them but if others think 
differently, who is to say they should not?' Even if it 
could be shown that loving sex within a marriage is 
better - more pleasurable or fulfilling than loveless sex 
(which as we will see, is forcefully denied) - what is 
the moral significance of the difference? If both 
partners are consenting adults who take the necessary 
precautions against pregnancy and disease, and no-one 
else gets hurt, it is unclear why a non-married couple 
should not engage in sex for pleasure if they choose.
: ; i ï ïÎÏ
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À corollary of this counter-claim is that just 
because some (or even many) young couples behave 
irresponsibly prior to marriage by having casual or 
unprotected sex and this results in unwanted pregnancies, 
this should not be a sufficient reason to require that 
all non-married couples should be obliged to restrict 
their sex lives to intercourse within marriage. The 
solution lies in education and easy access to birth 
control, not in harsh prohibitions. In which case, on 
this argument non-marrieds have no obvious obligation to 
remain chaste; or what seems to be even worse, to get 
married in order to have sex.
For there is another side to the counter-claim 
against Scruton. As we shall see, a good sexual 
relationship is considered to be one of the important 
bases for a good marriage (see pp.226-233). But this 
seems to be a sound reason why people should see they are 
sexually compatible with one another before they commit 
themselves in marriage. On the other hand, surely young 
people should not enter marriage - as many of them seem 
to have done in the past - merely to satisfy their 
growing desire to have sexual intercourse with each 
other.** Erotic love whilst it may be intense does not 
always develop into the sort of love which is necessary
for a couple if they are to achieve a good marriage. For
such reasons, it might be claimed that the restrictive 
social attitude towards unmarried people having sexual 
intercourse is not justified.
Lastly, we have noted the claim that if sex is not
discouraged before marriage, this will increase the
possibility of deception and exploitation by one or the 
other partner (to strive to have intercourse simply for 
his or her own sexual gratification). But while it may 
be true that people can suffer in such ways in sexual 
relationships before or outside of marriage, surely it is 
equally true that the same or similar things can happen 
inside marriage. Just because sex is safely confined to
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marriage and hedged-around with legal and social 
safeguards, this does not mean that sex will be morally 
unproblematic in the marital setting.
Let us briefly turn to a second legal aspect 
concerned with the set of reciprocal sexual obligations 
which apply as a result of marriage. As we noted, both 
of the partners sexual needs are expected to be met 
within the marriage. To this end, it is thought that 
husbands and wives should be sexually available to one 
another and be responsive to each other's reasonable 
sexual approaches. (What is held to be 'reasonable' is 
beyond the scope of this chapter.) However some measure 
of sexual intercourse is expected and this expectation is 
reinforced as a legal right of each spouse. Thus to 
refuse to engage in sexual intercourse from the beginning 
of the marriage is grounds for annulment (both according 
to Canon Law as well as Civil Law). In effect, to marry 
and then to deny sex is considered fraudulent; if one of 
them refuses to meet this expectation, they have deceived 
the frustrated partner. Withholding sex for too long a 
period at a later stage in the marriage is also seen as 
a serious breach of their legal contract. It is possible 
to sue for divorce on the grounds of 'unreasonable 
behaviour '.
However we might question the entitlement of a law 
that requires each to be sexually available to the other 
within the marriage. Despite her disinclination or 
aversion to the sexual act with her husband, at some 
times in the marriage a wife is required by law to be 
sexually available to him. A worrying implication of 
this is that it seems to make rape impossible in 
marriage. For a husband can always defend his demand for 
sexual intercourse with his reluctant wife in terms of 
his legal entitlement. Let it suffice to say for the 
moment that rape can be a particularly offensive form of 
marital violence. Most of us would go on to say that 
rather than being a justified legal requirement, changes
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in the law are required to permit charges to be brought 
by wives in such instances, just as they can in cases of 
other forms of abuse (see pp.243-246).
This brings us to the third aspect of sex which 
seems in the past to have been used to justify the 
marriage contract. It concerns the pledge in the 
marriage vow 'to forsake all others'. Husbands and wives 
commit themselves to confine their sexual activities to 
the marriage; they contract to abstain from sexual 
relationships outside of their marriage.*® There are many 
reasons for this. For the moment we might try to find 
rational support for the demand for fidelity merely in 
the fact that adultery is an obvious breach of the 
contract; a violation of an aspect of the contract to 
which, it seems quite reasonable to believe, both 
partners have knowingly and willingly consented. Their 
marriage contract was a plain sign to each of them - and 
to the rest of the world - of their acceptance of the 
requirement of sexual fidelity.
But this response begs the question: for we want to 
know if a promise of sexual exclusivity should be a 
matter for a legal contract in the first place. This is 
to say, we might question if the law should have an 
interest in this aspect of the sexual behaviour of the 
married couple? At first blush, it might seem to be 
merely a relic of our legal/cultural history when, as I 
suggested, the concern seems to have been that any acts 
of sexual intercourse could result in an unwanted 
pregnancy. But it seems difficult to justify the 
contract in these terms in modern times when sexual 
intercourse - outside of marriage - can be safely engaged 
in and need not lead to conception. But clearly there is 
more to the demand for exclusivity than this. (We will 
discuss this in detail in pp.247-258.)
The marriage contract is needed for children
A related matter which is used to justify the
■f
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marriage contract, we noted, concerns reproduction.^® The 
contract stipulates certain rights and duties the couple 
accept, if and when they have children. Not all 
marriages produce children of course - and not all 
children are born within marriage - but at some point in 
marriage nearly every couple will decide whether or not 
they will try to have children. (Usually their decision 
on this matter is revealed by their adopting methods of 
contraception in order to avoid having children.) If 
they do have them, the care and upbringing of their 
children becomes a central element in the laws relating 
to their marriage and thereby is used to justify the need 
for a contract.
Earlier we questioned if the law should be entitled 
to regulate the private lives of individuals (in their 
sexual relationship). It seems that here we find a good 
reason for it doing so. For it was suggested in Chapter 
One that women are naturally inclined to attachment and 
dependence on men during their childbearing years; and at 
the same time, men are naturally inclined to engage in 
many sexual affairs. As a result, at least prior to 
effective contraception, they could go around fathering 
children with no accompanying commitment to their 
partner's or to their offspring's support. So at least 
some form of legal requirement seems to be justified as 
a response to this 'natural state of things'. The law is 
needed to tie men down to the job of protecting, helping 
and maintaining their wives and families, during their 
progeny's infancy and the woman's childbearing years. 
Hence it might seem that the traditional marriage 
contract can be defended by an argument based upon the 
advantages for women and children.
However what the argument above more exactly 
suggests is that laws relating to the rearing of children 
need to be binding on fathers by virtue of their being 
parents, not on men and women by virtue of their being 
married. We need the law to ensure that men - married or
■ i
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single - should be subject to legal penalties and social 
disapproval if they are found not to have fully accepted 
the responsibility of fathering a child. In other words, 
given the concern is for the protection of women and 
children, we need laws to make sure that they are as 
materially secure as possible if men try to avoid these 
responsibilities.^^ But there is another side to this 
coin. If the law is required to protect women and their 
children - i.e. to make sure that fathers help and 
maintain their families - we would not seem to need laws 
binding women to men (as we find in the present marriage 
contract) since - if this aspect of the sociobiological 
thesis is correct - a woman, being vulnerable and 
dependent during this period, would need and want to keep 
the relationship going with the father of her children.
However, we find in the sociobiological account also 
a possible justification for men wanting to tie women 
down to a legal contract, (in a way that is different 
from the reasons why women might want to tie men down). 
Men need a legal contract in order to control their mate 
- who, if the sociobiologist is correct, are by nature 
mildly philanderous - so that they (men) can identify 
their children as their own, which women, unconstrained, 
cannot be relied upon to allow them to do. Women, by 
virtue of the nature of pregnancy and childbirth, are 
able to identify their own offspring and to commit 
themselves to them, knowing the infant to be their own. 
Men are not. To put the point differently; in Hume's 
(1911:268) words.
... in order to induce the men to...undergo cheerfully all the fatigues and expenses, to which [marriage] subjects them, they must believe that the children are their own...
In other words, this aspect of the marriage contract can 
be defended by an argument based on the advantages for 
men. They need to be certain of their paternity so that
■v'-they are sure it is indeed their progeny in whom they are
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investing their time and resources and, in some cases, 
who will inherit their wealth.^® A legal contract with 
their mate might be thought to be taking steps in this
,direction.
This seems also to be a plausible candidate for the 
exclusivity clause in the contract which is aimed at 
limiting sexual relationships to one's marital partner.
It seems to be justified due to the unacceptable 
consequences that might result for either partner when 
pregnancies occur from non-marital sexual affairs.
Further, it might be argued that we need to commit 
ourselves legally, in particular, since the cooperation 
of both partners is required when having and raising 
children. On these grounds alone, we might think that 
there are good reasons for the State still setting a 
legal framework for the monogamous long-term pair bond.
The law is needed to ensure that both the father and the 
mother take the responsibilities of parenthood 
seriously.^
However we do not need to marry to take seriously 
the responsibilities of parenthood. Nowadays single 
parent families are commonplace and most of them seem 
well able to cope. The well-being of children might be 
equally well provided for by a group of women or men.
There is of course no a priori reason why this should not 
be so. And even if such parenthood is regarded as 
undesirable, it could be argued that all that this 
discussion has shown is that we need laws which govern 
the responsibilities of adults by virtue of their being 
parents, not by virtue of their being married. Moreover, 
if the State is concerned with the best interests of 
children, surely it could and should grant all children 
as many rights as is necessary for their interests to be 
met, quite independently of the marital status of their 
parents.
One last point could be added to those above. The 
arguments in this context for marriage will not justify
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the legal contract for either party when the couple do 
not have children or when their grown-up children have 
left the family home. If they marry only for the sake of 
their children there would be no obvious ground for their 
living together after the children have left home. And 
there would be little point of marriage on these grounds 
for couples who choose not to have a child at all.
Let us now consider the third argument I mentioned 
in favour of a marital contract.
Financial and domestic justifications for marriage
A quite different justification for the marriage 
contract concerns the fact that in most long-term pair 
bonds, increasingly complex financial and property 
arrangements develop. When a man and a woman live 
together they typically acquire a common dwelling, 
household furniture, a family car, and have many other 
common financial interests. It seems mutually beneficial 
to preserve the financial interests and property 
entitlements of both parties in a legal contract. The 
marriage contract serves in this way. It gives each of 
the partners an economic and residential guarantee that 
both of them will keep to their (mutual) financial and 
domestic commitments.
However even if provisions relating to financial and 
domestic arrangements are thought to be desirable, it 
could be argued that a more specifically financial or 
property agreement - than we find in the present marriage 
contract - is needed to meet these assorted desiderata. 
For example, if we really are concerned about the 
protection of both parties' financial and property 
interests in an unprejudiced way, presumably, in such an 
agreement we would try to arrange for the protection of 
the weaker party's interests (usually the wife's 
interests). We might, for instance, try to make the 
financially weaker of the two stronger by giving them 
extra powers to defend themselves in the event of a
■ '■ " I ls
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breakdown of the pair bond. Alternatively we might try
to lessen the powers of the financially stronger; or at
least make rules to prevent them getting richer as a
result of the breakdown. As Radcliffe Richards
(1994:370) writes:
...you would...want to make sure that [women] were left as well off as possible whenever men did try to evade their responsibilities...
What these brief considerations indicate, if they are 
correct, is that a financial or property contract is 
needed rather than the more wide-ranging marriage 
contract.
There are many (other) provisions in the laws 
relating to the marriage contract which reinforce this 
practical aspect of the relationship. The State, for 
instance, legally obliges married couples to live 
together. Temporary separations - due to war, employment 
or illness - are accepted but it is expected that in 
normal situations the husband and wife will live 
together. Refusal by one partner to do this for a long 
period of time (when they could do so) is usually 
interpreted as desertion and is a reason for concluding 
that the marriage has broken-down irretrievably.^"
Over and above merely living together, a husband is 
held responsible for providing a suitable home for his 
wife and family. Presumably by 'a suitable home' is 
meant accommodation of their own, if the husband is 
financially able to provide it. We seem to think also 
that the home should reflect the husband's financial and 
social status. If he insists they live in a squalid 
apartment when he has the financial resources to provide 
better housing for them, this too is grounds for the wife 
to feel aggrieved (mental cruelty) and is a reason for 
concluding that the marriage has broken-down. Further, 
a wife has a right to be the sole mistress of the home.**^
If a husband placed his mistress there, this would be 
treated as a breach of the marriage contract. (Similar
3
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prohibitions would apply mutatis mutandis if a woman 
tried to introduce her lover into the home.)
But we might protest that married people might 
choose to live in an open sexual relationship.'*^ And so 
we might question if this is the proper business of the 
law. Of course it is the law's business only if one of 
the partners decides to make it so by objecting to this 
arrangement. Social pressures of this kind can be 
formidable. However, like Mill (1975:71) we might insist 
that the only purpose for which the law or social 
pressures
...can be rightfully exercised over a member of a civilized community against his will, is to prevent harm to others.
As fear of pregnancy has been removed by reliable 
contraception, women in such an open relationship no 
longer need legal protection against unwanted 
pregnancies; men no longer need to fear having to raise 
another man's child. So on the face of things, if they 
both agree to such a relationship, we may question if the 
law or society is entitled to try to regulate private 
lives in this way.
There are other marital and domestic advantages for 
men and women to be gained beyond those I have suggested 
so far. For instance, living on her own a woman might 
feel incompetent to handle the maintenance of her home, 
plumbing and electricity repairs, aggressive sales 
people, etc. On the other hand, since most housework in 
the traditional marriage is done by a woman, a man might 
choose marriage rather than put himself in a situation 
where his workload is almost doubled. And even if both 
partners feel competent to deal with every domestic 
aspect of living alone, the prospect of dealing with them 
all by themselves may seem overwhelming. However, in 
such cases a long-term pair bond would seem to meet the 
practical needs of the individuals involved just as well. 
It is absurd to suggest that someone who seeks assistance
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with his or her domestic concerns will find this only in 
marriage.
In this section we have considered some of the 
reasons which support the legal requirements and social 
pressures which are given to justify the traditional 
marriage contract. There are of course many other such 
provisions which we have not discussed. I have argued 
that if a contract is needed to protect both partners in 
a long-term pair bond, it could be directed at more 
specific constraints on a married couple's sexual, 
reproductive, financial and domestic conduct, rather than 
the provisions which the present ubiquitous marital 
contract provides.
Traditional marriage and the well-ordered society
In an attempt to justify the marriage contract, 
something needs to be said about the value to the wider 
society of this relationship. When a man and a woman 
decide to marry, the decision may seem to them to be one 
that concerns only themselves or their immediate 
relatives and friends; so also does the decision about 
whether or not to have a child, to rent or to buy a 
house, to move from one district to another, or to stay 
together or to separate - all of these must seem to the 
couple to be decisions having consequences primarily for 
themselves. Yet at the same time, marriage and divorce 
rates increase or decrease, the population explodes or 
shrinks, houses and school buildings multiply or decline, 
the economy booms or falters; in other words, the 
cumulative effects of the decisions made by couples 
shape, for better or for worse, the whole of society. 
Thus it could be argued that society too has an interest 
in maintaining the on-going marital tradition. It is not 
surprising then that we find that not only through the 
law but also due to many other practical pressures, norms 
and customs, society generally exerts a clear pro­
marriage influence. Speaking generally, marriage is
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regarded as necessary for a stable well-ordered society.
A good discussion in support of this view - that 
marriages are needed for a stable well-ordered society - 
would need a logically and empirically sound argument 
setting out what such social norms and pressures might 
be; then we would need to consider counterfactuals about 
the sorts of things which might occur if the monogamous 
marital contract were to cease or did not exist within 
it, (and there would need to be evidence in support of 
this, not just an absence of evidence for the opposite 
view). However we can avoid some unnecessary exposition 
by considering those aspects of Rawls' (1972) account of 
a stable, well-ordered society which tend to show how the 
latter has an interest in fostering the traditional 
marital relationship. (Presumably factors like those 
discussed also reinforce the general belief people have 
concerning the worthwhile nature of marriage as an 
institution.)
On Rawls' account of the matter, a well-ordered 
society would seem to have an interest in preserving and 
encouraging marriage; or a well-ordered society is more 
likely to be achieved or preserved where monogamous 
marriage is the practice. This claim can be supported by 
a number of considerations we have not yet covered. 
Firstly, we noted that monogamous marriage regulates 
sexual behaviour and this has clear advantages for a 
well-ordered society. It is the traditional acceptable 
outlet for what we saw is a very strong biological force 
which rises up inside individuals and needs to be 
controlled.'*® Marriage is (and is expected to be) the 
usual relationship in which sexual activity occurs, if 
only because so many people are married for the major 
part of their lives. When people marry, moreover, they 
do not expect to have to compete with others for their 
spouse's sexual favours. They expect to be the only one 
in their partner's sexual life. When there is a more-or- 
less permanent coupling of people, as there is due to the
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traditional marriage, this means that sexual competition i
for members of the opposite gender, jealousies,
resentments, and the friction to which all of this can
give rise, will almost certainly be reduced. Thus it
seems reasonable to claim that it is in the interests of
the smooth running of society - to avoid constant i
jealousy and sexual competition - that people's sexual
needs are and ought to be mainly satisfied within the f
marital relationship.
Secondly, in the marriage contract, a spouse
promises to be sexually faithful. If he or she then
indulges in extra-marital sexual activity this will
probably hurt his or her partner, and perhaps other
members of their family, friends and a s s o c i a t e s .^ This
aspect of marriage too fits in with what Rawls has to say
about a well-ordered society. He (1972:347) writes:
In a well-ordered society...when its members give promises there is a reciprocal recognition of their intention to put themselves under an obligation and a shared rational belief that this obligation is honoured.
Rawls claims not merely that we should keep our promises 
but that a well-ordered society will have promise keeping 
institutions; one facet of which (presumably) is fidelity 
in marriage. In other words, in a very practical way 
marriage reinforces the practice of promise-keeping which 
is necessary to a well-ordered society. (But only if we 
overlook the very many cases where the promise in 
question is broken.)
Thirdly, we have seen that monogamous marriage is 
thought to be the institution best-suited to the rearing 
of children. If this is so, this is of interest to 
society generally, for at least two reasons. Firstly, as 
we noted, infants are vulnerable, they are unable to 
perform the most basic tasks for themselves. In most 
cases within marriage, both the father and mother are 
glad to take on the new responsibilities for another 
member of the family; they are more than willing to meet
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the child's need for security, nourishment, and so on. 
This is to say, insofar as a well-ordered society has an 
interest in the protection and well-being of children (as 
future citizens) living within it, it could be argued 
that a married couple, rather than other agencies in 
society, can best provide the necessary protective 
environment for them.
Again following Rawls (1972:107), for a society to 
be well-ordered, there needs to be adequate provision for 
the training and socialization of children. As they grow 
up, they need to be controlled and trained if they are to 
develop into socially well-adjusted adults. It could be 
argued that marriage provides an effective way of meeting 
the above. In the marital setting, for instance, the 
child shares the same name as its parents, the same home, 
the same neighbourhood, the same collective reputation, 
the same intricate 'private culture' of its parents' 
making. Usually the child shares the same sources of 
pleasure and the same areas of conflict; the same 
vagaries of fortune, the same losses and griefs as its 
parents. Also children are usually taught the
appropriate (socially approved) norms, values and modes 
of behaviour within this relationship; for instance, the 
qualities of kindliness and sympathy, of cooperation and 
forbearance, of tolerance, justice and impartiality, of 
generous concern for the freedom or the fulfilment of 
others.*5 In short, it is claimed that this is the 
setting within which the child's basic experience of day- 
to-day values is most likely to occur. Children trained 
in the preferred social values are necessary, Rawls 
(1972:491-494) writes, for them to become motivated to 
become citizens of a well-ordered society. In this way, 
the married couple, it is thought, are best-suited to fit 
the next generation for life in the society.
Clearly where children are reared by their parents, 
the latter will have a strong influence on them. But 
this is not to argue that this ought to be so. We need
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to know at least if the influence is good or bad for the 
children. We should not overlook the fact, for instance, 
that instead of learning kindness and sympathy from their 
parents, children might learn mainly indifference and 
cruelty; instead of cooperation and tolerance, they might 
learn egotism and antagonism; instead of tolerance, 
dogmatism and obstinacy; instead of concern for others, 
the ability to dominate the other (whether by overt 
bullying or in psychologically more subtle ways).'*^  Along 
similar lines, it could be argued that if children are 
subjected to gratuitous violence and other forms of abuse 
by their mother and father, there would be strong 
arguments for the removal of children from such parents-
A fourth value of the marriage to the wider society 
is that a married couple play a central role in the 
economic life of a well-ordered society.*® In this 
regard, a married couple may be thought of in terms of a 
basic consuming unit (rather than a producing one). They 
need houses, cars, a host of gadgets and services all of 
which, presumably, helps to keep an economy flourishing. 
From a societal point of view, this is to say, married 
couples are important elements (probably the most 
important decision-makers) in the private sector economy.
Once again, it could be pointed out that nowadays 
there are many kinds of relationships that could equally 
well serve as the important economic unit. In present 
times, there is a wide diversity in bonding and family 
patterns; ranging from same sex pair bonds, to one parent 
families, cohabiting partners with (and without) 
children, and so on. Surely each would operate just as 
well as a basic consuming unit. Further, given these 
patterns of diversity, the idea of forcing the population 
into a single type of relationship - the 'traditional 
marital unit' - for economic purposes (or for the 
purposes of a stable and well-ordered society) would 
require a level of social engineering which most of us 
would find distasteful and would want to resist.
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The Church's justification of traditional marriage
Such a sketch would not be satisfactory if something 
was not added concerning the influence of the Church in 
supporting the traditional marriage. Like most
religions, Christianity has an interest in maintaining 
the institution of marriage. In the past, it has largely 
shaped family life through its control of marriage and it 
still has very considerable sway today.*® In short, the 
laws and the mores of society have been reinforced by the 
religious s y s t e m . I  will highlight just two of the 
arguments for marriage given by the church that we have 
not discussed so far.
One argument is that marriage alone provides the 
structure in which the couple can foster their mutual 
love and companionship. The authorities in the Anglican 
Church (An Anglican Prayer Book 1988:458) put the matter 
thus :
...in marriage alone, sex and affection findtheir true and lasting expression in anindissoluble relationship.
Once married, a couple have the best relationship in 
which to love each other. Furthermore, it seems they 
have a religious duty to do so (to love each other). We 
might question both assertions. Firstly, merely to 
assert that only in marriage can sex and affection find 
their true expression, is to beg an important question. 
We will see shortly that non-married couples, living in 
a long-term love bond, forcefully deny this. So we need 
independent arguments to show why this is so (if it is). 
Secondly, it is difficult to see how love can be a duty 
in the marital relationship when, perhaps for reasons for 
which neither of the couple are to blame, their mutual
love has ceased. In other words, is a duty to love one's
marriage partner coherent?®^ (We will take this up also 
in the next chapter.)
A second claim given by the church about marriage is 
that it (marriage) is a sacrament ordained by God; as
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such, it is a supposedly unbreakable bond between
spouses. Pope Leo XIII (quoted in Fletcher 1973:39)
stated the matter as follows;
...in Christian marriage the contract isinseparable from the sacrament, and for thisreason the contract cannot be true and legitimate without being a sacrament as well
It is claimed (in Christian doctrine) that God blesses 
each conventional marital bond and actively looks after 
it. It is well-known that one consequence the Catholic 
Church draws from this belief - that marriage is a 
sacrament in its own right, constituting an indissoluble 
union - is that divorce is wrong. And even in other 
denominations of the church, it is not surprising that - 
particularly in the past - divorce was difficult to 
obtain and shameful to acknowledge. But why should 
anyone believe that when two people marry, God blesses 
their union?
It might be comforting to believe this. Choosing a 
mate and settling down to the routine of married life is 
not always done without regrets. Presumably it helps if 
one believes that one's union is blessed in heaven. 
Furthermore having married this particular person, the 
idea that 'in God's eyes' he or she is the only one for 
you, sets the relationship apart from others that one 
might have had. For if God (omniscient and all loving) 
has joined one together, one's relationship must be 
unique and irreplaceable.
However this seems to overlook the fact that the 
latter will happen - the relationship will become unique 
and irreplaceable - without one needing to suppose that 
it must be due to God's benign intervention. For after 
they marry, a couple inevitably develop a joint history, 
a series of meaningful shared commitments and 
experiences, that in time will make their relationship 
seem to be unique and irreplaceable. The claim that 'in 
God's eyes' one's marital partner is 'the only one for
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you' also would need to answer the point we made earlier 
- in our discussion of the implications of sociobiology - 
that we could be successfully matched with indefinitely 
many partners. Although 'the one and only' claim is 
still rhetorically influential, as we have seen from our 
discussion of sociobiology (p.21) the evidence seems to 
be weighted against it.
Conclusion
I hope that enough has been said in this chapter to 
show that society, the State and the church regard 
marriage as worthwhile. The State has built a framework 
of legal requirements and judicial decisions in order to 
protect this institution. However, we have seen that it 
is doubtful that a reflective person should accept some 
or all of these requirements. There are arguments which 
show why society generally, and the church in particular, 
support the tradition of marriage, and the parameters of 
conduct that are required by the tradition. But once 
again, many of these claims are not supported by good 
reasons. So the question remains; what possible reasons 
could anyone have nowadays for deciding to marry? Or to 
put the question in another way: why do we regard this 
decision as worthwhile?
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Chapter Three
Some necessary conditions for a good marriage
We noted earlier how it is generally thought that 
when a couple decide to marry, they are doing something 
worthwhile and that as a result of this decision - if 
they have a good marriage - their lives will be changed 
for the better. For we noted also how those who have a 
good marriage are thought to have something really worth 
having. The problem with these claims is that whilst 
they may be correct, they are very general; they do not 
tell us, firstly, what conditions need to be met for a 
marital relationship to be regarded as 'a good marriage', 
and secondly, what it is about a good marriage that is so 
worthwhile. In this chapter, I want to ask what reason - 
or reasons, for most of the things we believe, we believe 
for more than one reason - could be given to support 
these generally held beliefs.
Clearly different people might give a wide range of 
sometimes conflicting reasons which they regard as 
important if a marriage is to be thought of as good. 
Some people might regard things like mutual sexual 
satisfaction, or having children, or having a home and 
family of one's own as important; others might see self­
development, intensity of experience, or even honour, as 
vital elements of a good marriage/* This does not mean, 
however, that there are not some general criteria to 
which nearly everyone would agree. In this chapter I 
will identify the more important of them; for instance, 
a good marriage must meet the desire most individuals 
have for a close friend, or for a soulmate, or the love 
we feel for our partners must flourish in this type of 
relationship. For many, the requirement goes beyond the 
latter. The hope seems to be that where their love is 
fully reciprocated, this will integrate and (somehow) 
'merge' both of them. There are conditions, in other
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words, which most of us would accept to be important 
necessary conditions for the idea of a good marriage to 
apply and in the absence of which, we would find it 
difficult to understand why someone should regard a 
particular marriage to be worth having. However, we will 
see that all of these factors are just as relevant to 
long-term non-marital cohabitation as they are to a good 
marriage, so we will need to consider also if there is 
anything over and above factors which can be found in
■-■j.long-term cohabitation which make a good marital 
relationship more rewarding. I will suggest two: the 
kind of commitment we find in marriage and the belief 
that marriage will bring the couple a distinct form of 
happiness.
Close friends
Firstly, people marry and remain married because 
they hope to find in this relationship a close friend.
Of course, close friendship is not something that can 
only be achieved in marriage. Nonetheless one of the 
reasons that is given to explain the decision to marry or 
to remain married is that close friendship is a condition 
that will be met in a good marital tie.^ So what does the 
notion of 'close friendship' involve?
At its most basic, this might be seen simply in 
terms of a need to overcome feelings of isolation or 
separateness.® It is commonly assumed that most 
unattached people experience a sense of isolation, of 
being separate from others, and they do not like this.
There appears to be a need in all of us to overcome these 
feelings. As Fromm (1985:15) writes:
The deepest need of man... is the need to overcome his separateness, to leave the prison of his aloneness.*
In a close friendship with a member of the opposite sex 
(that we find in a good marriage) we meet this need/® I 
can think of no a priori reason why this should be so. 
It could have been the case that most of us are able to
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achieve mental equilibrium in casual relationships with 
others, or in isolation from one another. However we do 
not. And we have considered an explanation of the 
evolutionary kind as to why this might be so. If as 
adults we are gene-governed to pair bond then we will be 
unhappy in circumstances where this condition goes unmet 
for a long period of time.
The desire for a close friend, however, is different 
from simply not wanting to be alone. It is not just a 
wish to remedy something lacking in one's life; it is 
rather the desire for a positive experience. So what 
does this positive notion of 'friendship' involve? 
Elizabeth Telfer's (1971) analysis of the relationship is 
informative and I shall make use of her account. She 
(1971:224) identifies three necessary conditions of 
friendship: 'reciprocal services, mutual contact and
joint pursuits'.
The first condition, Telfer (1971:223) suggests, is 
that a couple who are friends will want to do things for 
each other. She (IJbid) writes:
; :...there is a certain type of activity which all friends, qua friends, engage in: theperforming of services of all kinds for some other person.
This claim is not wholly satisfactory. Obviously if 
one's friend is far away, due to employment perhaps, or 
if one's spouse is a permanent invalid, a reciprocal 
performing of services will not be possible. However we 
can modify the condition to 'a willingness to do things 
for each other'. A close friend must be willing to help 
her partner and to feel able to ask him to do things for 
her - the usual things, like collecting her library 
books, visiting her ailing mother, and unusual things, 
like loaning something to her that he values - and he 
must feel able to make the same demands of her. To put 
this point differently: to be close friends entails a 
willingness to perform such services for each other; we 
would not understand the use of the concept if neither
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was ever willing to do so. Incidentally, it seems 
empirically true to say also that this arrangement cannot 
be too one-sided. If we put ourselves too much into our 
friend's debt, the relationship becomes unequal. This 
can put a strain on any kind of friendship. If, say, a 
wife is always doing things for her husband and she 
receives no reciprocal service, she might well resent 
this - which is not conducive to the continuing |
friendship (or in turn to our idea of a good marriage).
While 'a willingness to perform services for each 
other' may be necessary, obviously it is not a sufficient 
condition of friendship. Reciprocity of this kind is a 
common occurrence in all sorts of everyday relationships.
As Telfer (1971:223) points out, I may regularly do some 
shopping for the old woman next door while she looks 
after my child, or I may often help a colleague by 
lending him a book and vice versa. This sort of quid pro 
quo activity need not mean that we are friends. It need 
not be done out of friendship at all but out of duty, or 
it may be a matter merely of one conforming to the 
accepted social or work practice. More importantly, 
friendship based only on this condition suggests it is 
founded on mutual usefulness whereas it would not make 
sense to ask of most friendships; how useful are you to 
one another?®
A second condition Telfer (1971:225) suggests that 
needs to be met for the couple to be friends is that they 
desire, at least on some occasions, to be in one 
another's company and derive pleasure from this. They 
may desire to be with each other because they want to 
pursue projects with one another; or it might be due to 
their shared past history; 'We were playmates as 
children.' Or it may be because of their similar way of 
thinking. This is akin to Kant's (1991:216) view that to 
be friends the couple need to share the same intellectual 
and moral principles; their desire to be together may be 
due to a similar moral seriousness and shared moral
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purpose.? An association with another person which meets 
this condition, however, may still not be one of 
friendship, for it is compatible with relations we may 
have with non-friends. Sometimes we might desire the 
company of someone whom we know to be a scoundrel - and 
whom we do not consider to be a friend at all.®
In addition to the above, a third condition of
■ :friendship Telfer (1971:222) suggests is that there must 
be mutually satisfying, shared activities. Whatever it 
is they want to do with their lives, the couple are 
expected to want to do at least some of the important 
things together.® They may go to the theatre or on 
holiday together; they may pursue joint hobbies, start a 
business together, and so on. These activities are 
supposed to be enjoyed all the more because they are 
carried out with each other. On the other hand, if most 
of the things they do are enjoyed only by one of them 
then we think that an important element of friendship is 
lacking for the bored partner.
There is still something important missing, however, 
from the account above. It is not enough that our friend 
does a service for us, wants to spend his time with us 
and likes to do things with us, we expect all of this to 
be motivated by the fact that he or she values us.
'Valuing us' is not simply a flow of feelings in which, 
so to speak, the owner is passive. It has an active 
side. It is manifest in the attitude he has towards us, 
positively endorsed by his behaviour towards us. He 
shows this not merely in giving or doing things but, for 
instance, in his goodwill towards us, by his showing 
pleasure at our presence, or by giving us support and 
encouragement as we attempt to realize our own projects.
The point is: if the activities above are to be regarded 
as acts of friendship this is because we believe that our 
friend values us or that he feels a selfless concern for 
us.^ ° On the other hand, if X believes that Y has an 
ulterior motive for some assistance he has given her -
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for instance, if she believes that it was really done for 
his self-interest or his own profit - then it would be a 
mistake to regard this as an act of friendship. His
motives or intentions must be those of a friend.
We can make the point in another way. If they are 
friends, each must feel and show a genuine and
significant level of care and concern for the other's 
welfare. We can see this more clearly when we 
distinguish between 'caring for' which involves emotions, 
motives and attitudes, and 'taking care of' which
involves effective action and sometimes may not be 
motivated by care. When we 'take care' of someone, if we 
nurse them, for example, we may do so from motives other 
than caring for them, such as the financial reward this 
brings. In contrast, the notion of 'caring for' with 
which we are concerned follows from the idea of valuing 
the other person. This sentiment may be demonstrated in
-any number of ways. For instance, we can be moved by 
each other's happiness. If X's friend, Y, feels pleased, 
then X can feel pleased for him. If F's pleasure is the 
result of an action of another party, Z, X can warm 
towards Z and Z's action. She will approve of what Z has 
done. On the other hand, if her friend Y suffers, X will 
feel distress for him. If the suffering is caused 
non-accidentally by another party, Z, she may well feel 
hostile towards Z or Z's actions. We think that she 
should morally disapprove of what Z has done.
There can be no doubt that married couples, even in 
a good marriage, differ in the way they value or show 
their care and concern for each other. There are times, 
no doubt, when this sentiment may be lacking or 
inhibited. One may be so wrapped up with one's own 
problems that one may overlook one's partner's distress.
However if this were always to be the case - if one or 
both of them never cared or felt genuine concern for the 
happiness or well-being of the other - we would seriously i
doubt that they had a close friendship, to say nothing of
;y-
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a good marriage.
:A question which arises now is: is friendship so
analysed a sufficient account of the kind of friendship 
we suppose to exist in a good marriage? Clearly, it is 
not. Firstly, our friendships, on Telfer's account,
could be many and short-lived. I may well enjoy 
reciprocal services, mutual contact and joint pursuits 
with someone for only a short while, when our paths 
happen to run in the same direction. As a result, we 
often leave behind the close friends of our childhood or 
youth, only to find others as we embark on new paths or 
careers. In contrast, a close friendship in marriage is 
expected to be lifelong.
Secondly, friendship, on Telfer's account, could be 
an open relationship, one would not be overly restricted 
by it in the kinds of relations one could have with 
others. In contrast, the friendship associated with 
marriage is exclusive. Thus if a close friend tells me 
that he is in love with someone and they plan to start a 
new life together, it is very likely that I will be happy 
for both of them and supportive of their relationship.
On the other hand, if my husband tells me that he is in 
love with someone else, or that he intends to start a new 
life with her, I would expect to be grief-stricken,
desolate and resentful towards him and his new
relationship.
Thirdly, the kind of emotions, attitudes, and 
affection one expects to have for a friend also differ 
from those which one expects to feel for one's marital 
partner in a good marriage. We are supposed to feel 
affection for the former, we are supposed to love the 
latter. What this indicates is that the character of the 
relationship is in part a matter of the kind of emotion 
it involves; the affection which is felt for a friend or 
the love felt for the beloved is in part an explanation 
of the differences in these relationships. This does not 
mean that friendship in any of its forms can be
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understood simply as the immediate and spontaneous 
expression of an emotion; rather than transitory 
feelings, it is more a matter of a distinctive kind of 
emotional commitment. So that I may be angry with my 
friend (or with my husband) at a given time yet still 
recognize that the underlying relationship demands of me 
a certain kind of affection (or love) for him.
Fourthly, and more importantly, friendship, on 
Telfer's account, need not lead the friends to want to 
share confidences and intimacies - to be with someone in 
whom they can 'ground their being',or with whom they 
can be a soulmate. This is a feature which we typically 
expect to find in the ideal type of marital relationship. 
I will say more about this shortly.
Â fifth difference between close friendship as 
described by Telfer and friendship in (a good) marriage 
does not concern the quality of the relationship so much 
as the type of commitment that accompanies it but which 
could well affect the nature of the friendship. in 
marriage, but not in non-marital friendship, love is tied 
with vows of commitment. This is not to deny that 
commitment to one's close friend is part of what is 
involved in this relationship. For instance, I expect to 
stand by my friend in his adversity just because he is my 
friend; and if I did not, I would not be a 'true friend'. 
Someone who did not understand this commitment would have 
failed to understand what is involved by this 
relationship and the kind of affection it involves. 
However in the case of marriage, as we shall see shortly, 
we have the additional complication of a formal contract, 
to secure our commitment to our friend in perpetuity.
Let us now look at some of these other aspects of 
friendship in marriage.
Soulmates
'A soulmate' is an uncommon and rather prosaic term. 
However it describes fairly accurately the kind of close
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relationship most people regard as necessary to a good 
marital relationship. As in friendship, it requires that 
the couple desire to do things for each other, to be in 
one another's company, to derive pleasure from doing 
things together, and that there will be care and concern 
shown for each other. But these are minimal conditions 
of being a soulmate.
At the core of the desire for a soulmate is the 
need, which most human beings seem to have, to share 
their deepest thoughts and to express their innermost 
feelings with another person. As Troupp (1994:37) 
writes :
...we need a secure base... someone we can trust, who will be there for us...
As soulmates, a couple must want to share the most 
private parts of their lives with each other.
We can identify at least three types of intimacy in 
this regard, cognitive, emotional and sexual. By 
cognitive intimacy, I mean a full level of information 
about one's partner's life-history. Not only will a 
woman (qua soulmate) want to know the important details 
of her partner's present and past life, she will want to
know what they mean to him. She will want to know most 
of his beliefs, plans, aspirations, moral priorities, his 
typical emotional states or feelings towards other 
persons, or towards different events or circumstances; 
and he will want to know the same kinds of thing about 
her. Further when I say that they will want to know one 
another's life-history and beliefs, this does not mean 
that they expect merely to acquire propositions about 
each other. What is required also is that they have the 
appropriate reactions to the intimacies they share. When 
they are intimate it is not information about thoughts 
and feelings that are shared but the thoughts and 
feelings themselves.^'
As soulmates they will want also to have lowered all 
emotional barriers to each other - which presumably they
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erect against other people - believing that they can 
trust and rely upon one another. They will want to be 
able to unburden themselves of their most intimate 
worries, fears, hopes, fantasies. Thus they will reveal 
things to their soulmate of an emotional nature that they 
would not normally reveal to anyone else (and which we 
think they have the right not to share with anyone at 
all).*® In other words, the idea of a soulmate requires 
the lowering of barriers where, as it were, one reveals 
one's 'true self' to the other; one's social self is 
stripped away.**
For such intimacy to develop, each must trust the
. :other. A soulmate is someone who, we assume, can be
relied upon without fear of censorship, ridicule or
betrayal. As Kant (1991:214) puts the matter, we need to
regard each other as
...one in whom we can confide unreservedly, to whom we can disclose completely all our dispositions and judgements, from whom we can and need hide nothing, to whom we can communicate our whole self.
Anything which a woman confides to her partner must not 
be used against her - neither for gossip or to serve his 
interests at the expense of hers - and vice versa. It is 
expected also that they are not judgemental about the 
intimacies they share; at least the secrets disclosed are 
not expected to adversely alter his opinion of her, nor 
her feelings for him.
The emphasis I have given so far on shared cognitive 
and emotional intimacies still makes this aspect of a 
soulmate more impersonal than one's experience of it 
suggests. What is missing is sexual intimacy. The kind 
of intimacy referred to ranges from hand-holding to 
sexual intercourse. A good marriage is expected to 
provide the framework for this most intimate aspect of 
friendship. Soulmates in a good marriage will want to 
have sexual intercourse with each other. Moreover they 
will hope to enjoy on-going sexual intimacies of an
V
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intense kind, in a way that takes them into the depths of 
their relationship. But this involves more than the 
physical act. For soulmates, sexual activity is a 
manifestation for each of them of certain kinds of 
strongly felt emotion - and for each, of being the object 
of the same kind of emotion. Hence although the
distinctively physical aspect of sex (gratification) is
important, how the physical gratification is obtained,
the fact it is with this particular individual, the
degree of mutuality of the experience, the qualities of
affection and tenderness expressed - all of these factors
go to determine a sense of sexual satisfaction which is
distinctive of their being soulmates. This is not to
say, pace Scruton, that only soulmates can or should have
sex. I suggested earlier that in many other kinds of
relationships one can satisfactorily engage in sexual
intercourse. The point is that in a good marriage the
.couple are expected to have an on-going sexual 
relationship; to the extent that it is lacking, we regard 
the relationship as deficient. This brings us to love.
Being in love
Another important factor which is co-extensive with 
the idea of a good marriage is that a couple love each 
other. We live in a culture in which the mutual love of 
the couple is thought to be a necessary condition for 
those about to marry and of great intrinsic value to an 
established marriage. It is a necessary condition for a 
good marriage. Notice I am not arguing that to be in a 
loving relationship one needs to be married and clearly 
one can be married in a non-loving (marital) 
relationship. But I am claiming that if they do not love 
each other we would deny that the couple have a good 
marriage. As we saw in Chapter One, we are faced with a 
range of contrasting types of love relationships - none 
of which are mutually exclusive - yet at least one of 
which is expected to be present in the good marital
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relationship.^® To see what this might involve we need to 
consider again briefly the difference between being 'in 
love' (eros), companionate love {philia) and the 'wholly 
disinterested love that desires what is best for the 
beloved qua human being' (agape).
In the early days of marriage the partners are 
expected to be 'in love'. We noted some of the feelings 
and emotions associated with this state. Each will have 
recurrent thoughts about their beloved; each is likely to 
regard the other as the most important person in their 
life. Each of them is likely to experience life more 
vibrantly, to feel more complete as a person, and so on. 
However being 'in love' is not usually a long-lasting 
state. Over time, the quality of love almost always 
changes. Once they are married for a relatively short 
period of time, for instance, the love a couple feel for 
one another will begin to lack the excitement of each 
discovering new things about the other. However this 
need not mean that love for the other person diminishes 
but simply that it changes. In a good marriage they will 
share a distinctive kind of love, which is less obsessive 
than being 'in love', namely companionate love.
Among other things, an adequate account of 
companionate love will include the different features of 
close friendship we have noted. Each will desire to be 
with the other person; to share their daily concerns with 
them. This desire is likely to be manifest in the 
pleasure each feels and shows at the other's presence. 
It is manifest in the care and concern they show for each 
other's welfare or when one of them puts the other's 
interests before their own. It is manifest also in the 
way they regard each other as soulmates; the companionate 
lovers will share their deepest thoughts and feelings 
with one another.
It might be objected that the reasons I have given 
for valuing companionate love in a good marriage seem to 
be entirely of a self-interested nature; i.e. wanting a
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close friendship, a soulmate, etc. On the other hand,
companionate love is usually experienced as a non-self-
interested emotion. As B. Russell (1961:86) writes, when
we love in this way, we
...feel the ego of the beloved person as important as own's one ego, and realise the other's feelings and wishes as though they were one's own.
Rather than loving the beloved for self-interested 
reasons, the lover usually regards the needs of the
beloved to be of equal (or even greater) importance than 
her own. She can be caring and sensitive to his needs in 
a self-effacing way that requires little in return. This 
- not self-interest - is a most important ingredient in 
the mixture of reasons that lead us to value companionate 
love in marriage.
I do not regard this emphasis on self-interest to be 
a problem. There is a difference between entering a 
relationship for such reasons and the relationship being 
self-interested. There are a number of explanations for 
this. Firstly, no matter how self-interested the origins 
of our reasons may be, it is very probable that once we 
have started, we are led beyond these motives. For we 
can and do take other matters into account. In other 
words, whilst we may enter into the marriage for self- 
interested reasons, as it progresses, one's own interests 
can take a backseat to those of the relationship. 
Secondly, the important element driving the relationship 
may not be what is good for oneself but what will be good 
for the marriage. In this way I can put the health of 
the relationship before my own needs or preferences. I 
can choose to do things for the sake of my marriage. 
Thirdly, it might be that I put the marriage first for 
'my own sake'. I can say 'I would be happier (myself) if 
I forget myself and get involved with my spouse in our 
relationship.' In which case there does not seem to be 
anything self-contradictory in one's being 'other- 
regarding' for one's own sake.
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Alongside companionate love, in a good marriage we 
expect to find the form of love in which each is 
sensitive to the other's needs qua person, because he or 
she is a human being. In marriage I think this is 
manifest, for instance, in the respect each shows for the 
other's autonomy. As Midgley (1983:95) notes: 'respect
is the backbone of [this kind of] love.' It is shown in 
the worth they accord to each other as persons. At a 
slightly less abstract level, agape is also seen in the 
empathy they show towards one another. We noted earlier 
how in a good marriage each of the partners will want to 
know - and want the other to know - all about themselves, 
not merely their hopes and strengths but also their fears 
and weaknesses. They will want nothing to be held back. 
As a result of this exposure to each other, it is likely 
that they will regard one another with compassion. 
Perhaps this will be based upon a realization that both 
are faced by a range of problems that they probably feel 
in private are too much for them to cope with. It is a 
response to what Vlastos (1962:47) calls their 'human 
worth'.
Obviously, there is more to a loving attitude within 
a good married relationship than this - I will discuss 
some of the other aspects more fully in the pages ahead - 
but those we have noted indicate again some of the 
different kinds of love in question. For the moment, the 
important point for us is that a loving relationship 
along the lines above is regarded as crucial to a good 
marriage-
Finally, I want to emphasize one point in the 
discussion above. I began by saying that I wanted to 
make clear the distinction between being 'in love' on the 
one hand and 'a loving relationship' on the other. I 
realize that most marital relationships will not always 
be just one of these, though one may predominate. The 
quality of the relationship may change in the course of 
time. Love often starts as a variety of feelings and
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emotions. But feelings of this kind are usually short­
lived and unreliable, whereas the kind of love we hope 
for in marriage is one which is long-lasting; in other 
words, companionate love or the disposition to have 
loving thoughts and feelings for our partner.
The desire to merge oneself with another
We noted earlier that related to the ideas of both 
being a soulmate and loving someone in a good marriage is 
the hope (many couples have) that where love and intimacy 
are fully reciprocated, this will integrate and (somehow) 
merge both of them. Often the couple desire, as 
Aristophanes (Plato 1970:132) declares, 'to grow together 
in the embrace ' . This is not to be taken to be merely 
aspiring to a feeling of oneness but rather to a fusion 
of two personalities. As Plato has Aristophanes 
(ijbid:134) say, that which a man really desires is
...to be united and melted together with hisbeloved, and to become one from two (I-
Through their love for each other, it seems that they 
hope that (somehow or other) two distinct beings will 
become one.
At first the idea of merging is logically odd. Two 
human beings cannot literally become one. No matter how 
close a couple are, how much they think and feel alike 
about a wide range of things, they are nevertheless still 
two distinct individuals. Furthermore, even if it were 
possible for two individuals to merge into one, not 
everyone would want this. For one reason, whatever 
'merging' amounts to, if such an expectation were to be 
realized, it would significantly limit each partner's 
autonomy. As Clulow & Mattinson (1989:36) write;
Fusion, like separation, brings the fear oflosing oneself.
However for the moment this is besides the point. We 
need to understand what the idea of 'merging' might 
involve to see if it is an important condition for a good
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marriage. For even though we cannot make literal sense 
of this notion there seems to be a ring of sense about 
it.
To see this, we might begin by noting a point about 
the emotional state of people who are deeply in love. We 
said that most of the emotional and physical barriers 
between them will have disappeared so that there may not 
seem to be any significant demarcation lines. They may 
well believe that nothing could ever come between them. 
We might go further and allow that as this relationship 
grows - as the lovers construct a new life out of mutual 
friends, interests, goals - they become increasingly 
bound up with each other (in soul as well as in body) so 
that they feel as if they have become one. In other 
words, on this interpretation, the language of 'merging' 
might seem to be intelligible due to the intensity of the 
experience of being a soulmate and, perhaps, may be 
understood in these terms.
However 'merging' is used in this way as a metaphor. 
Of course the lovers must know that they are and will 
remain distinct people. They bring into the relationship 
their previous separate experiences, memories? they know 
that in their relationship they each will go off to their 
separate workplace in the morning, etc. But at the same 
time they each experience 'a sense of oneness' with the 
other. By dropping emotional and other barriers, the 
lovers allow each other access to the most intimate 
aspects of themselves. As a result, they may well have 
a strong and deep sense of interdependence. Furthermore 
in these circumstances, they open themselves also to 
quite a significant change in perspective and 
personality. The couple may claim that because of their 
love, and by their sharing important segments of their 
lives with each other, each has become a new person.
But there seems to be problems with this 
interpretation. Solomon, for instance, suggests that 
both must lose their 'own selves' so that they can become
I
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part of a larger whole, which would be some sort of
compilation of the two. He (1990:268-269) adds:
The paradox of love is this, that it presupposes a strong sense of individual autonomy and independence, and then seeks to cancel this by creating a shared identity... this goal is impossible, unachievable, even incomprehensible.
If the lovers were to reach the goal of a shared
identity, Solomon claims, this would necessarily
frustrate their autonomy. They cannot have both. To
this difficulty, we might add Nussbaum's (1991:287) worry
that if the lovers were able to become one:
. . .what they thought they most wanted out of their passionate movement turns out to be a wholeness that would put an end to all movement and passion. A sphere would not have intercourse with anyone...
Solomon is only correct if by 'merging' we mean that 
one or the other were to lose the sense of their own 
identity completely and merely take on the persona of the 
other. However we would not then be talking of merging. 
What would have happened is that the dominant partner 
would have taken over the other's personality. If their 
character is so dominated, moreover, it is not clear that 
they would have anything to give to a shared identity.
if!
A more plausible interpretation of 'merging' is that each 
may have a sense of their own autonomy together with an 
expanding awareness of their shared identity. Each may 
enjoy their separate identity whilst at the same time 
developing a mutual shared identity between them. By 
analogy a jacket and skirt can be regarded as two 
separate items or they might work very well when worn 
together as two aspects of the same suit or outfit.
To see the sense of this we might stress that there 
will be many things that a couple cannot do together; 
thoughts, feelings, events, experiences, which they do 
not share. On my interpretation, even if they share 
large sections of their lives, even if they are willing 
to merge many of their desires and wishes, there will
Love is this process, not a state of union but a never ending conflict of pushing away and pulling together.
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always be moments when their individuality - and with 
this their autonomy - asserts itself. Let us suppose 
that X wants to spend Saturdays shopping in the city, and 
y detests shopping and wants them both to go to a 
football match. In such an inconsequential case, their 
separateness (or individuality) comes to the fore. If 
such occurrences became too frequent, they no doubt would 
wonder if their relationship was going to last; they 
might doubt that they were going to 'make it' as a 
couple. Very often when they find this happening the 
value they place on their relationship pulls them back
■v;-(so to speak), since they determine to give it priority.
It is for this reason however that Solomon (in a 
Sartrean vein) (1990:269) writes:
A love relationship on this account, is a struggle for 
and against merging, i.e. to merge and to retain one's 
freedom. However according to Solomon (like Sartre) this 
constant compromise and struggle is doomed to failure.^'
But it seems that Solomon has failed to take account 
of my sense of 'merging'. On my account, 'merging' does 
not mean that the lovers could no longer have separate 
selves or that they must completely give up their 
autonomy. What 'merging' boils down to is that most 
couples want important segments of their lives to be 
shared with each other and, as a result of this, they 
hope to develop a shared identity. To meet this desire, 
of course, each partner's autonomy will be limited in 
some ways but, presumably, this is not thought of as a 
hardship; or rather, the rewards of the (new) marital 
identity will be thought to more than make up for any 
loss of absolute freedom.
This brings us to Nussbaum's worry that if the 
lovers were to merge they would be complete, so that they 
would have no reason or ability to have sexual 
intercourse. If as I am claiming, a shared identity does
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not rule out a strong sense of oneself as an individual, 
then (on these grounds anyway) I do not see why a couple 
intent on 'merging' should not enjoy a perfectly 
satisfactory sexual relationship. The point is: the
notion of merging is not to be understood in a literal 
way - it is only a metaphor. When a couple share an 
extended period of their lives together inevitably they 
will define themselves (at least in part) in terms of 
their shared relationship.
It might be objected however that the important 
question remains unanswered: 'Why would anyone want to
restrict their autonomy by binding themselves to another 
person in this way?' Why would they want to lose any 
aspect of their own identity in the marital mix? I will 
return to this point later. Of more immediate concern to 
us is that it might be objected that all of the factors 
we have considered so far could be met in any long-term 
pair bonding relationship. We do not need to get married 
or have 'a good marriage' in order to have a close 
friend, soulmate, someone whom we love above all others; 
or even to merge with this other person. This brings us 
to a further quite different justification for the 
marital relationship that we need to consider.
The desire for commitment
Very often, one or both of the couple wishes to 
secure their relationship permanently. Indeed there 
seems to be a correlation in most pair bonds between, on 
the one hand, a willingness to share deep and personal 
intimacies, to merge, etc., and, on the other, the 
willingness of both partners to commit themselves to each 
other and to their relationship.^® But the commitment in 
question is not merely an attitude that the partners are 
expected to have; it is, rather, an action they are 
expected to take. Numerous freely-given declarations of 
love are not thought to be enough. There appears to be 
a limit to how deep most couples will go with each other.
*
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how far they will explore their relationship, if their 
attachment to each other is not secure, if there is 
uncertainty about whether their partner will be there in 
the future.^® We seem to require an act of mutual 
commitment from each partner to the other and to the 
relationship.
It might be pointed out that a couple can commit 
themselves by making private vows or they might make 
public vows to one another but these need not be in the 
form of a legal (marriage) contract. But in western 
mores neither (non-marital) private or public vows would 
carry the same weight or have the same legal or public 
force. In our mores, marriage is the most powerful 
symbol of each partner's commitment. It is an action 
which publicly and legally establishes that both of the 
partners in the relationship are committed to one 
another.
There is an empirical explanation for the desire for 
a publicly made commitment worth our noting. Any long­
term intimate relationship is going to have difficulties. 
There are many differences that a couple inevitably face, 
about spending money, concerning the upbringing of 
children, about their respective careers, about their 
relationships with their extended family and friends, 
etc. No matter how much they love each other, from time 
to time they are going to have tensions and conflicts. 
Contests of wills or differences of value can generate 
hurt and resentment and replace the warm feelings that 
brought the partners together; or pressures from outside 
of the relationship (as well as within it) may sometimes 
get in the way. The conflicts may become so serious or 
numerous that this could lead either of them to terminate 
the relationship if they were merely with a close friend. 
At the same time, we noted that most people want an 
indefinitely long, loving, sexual friendship; they want 
a continuous relationship that endures through sincere, 
but temporary, changes of mood.^° As Midgley (1979:302)
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writes :
Marriage is difficult, . .no long-term commitment is ever always easy and unforced. And no commitment involving more than one person ever suits all parties equally. Yet human nature certainly demands long-term enterprises. We are therefore bound to be frustrated if we cannot finish them, so commitment [in marriage] is necessary.
By binding themselves together in marriage, the couple 
make a permanent commitment to maintain their 
relationship through the bad as well as the good times.
But there is more to the explanation of why 
commitment in marriage is regarded as important. When we 
get married, we noted, we are taken to have decided to do 
so. This decision is a very significant one in our 
lives. Although we can make it in a purely arbitrary way 
- by flipping a mental coin, so to speak - when we make 
the marriage vow, we are understood to have made the 
decision rationally. Do we really want a relationship of 
this kind? Does the relationship with this particular 
person really mean that much to us? In other words, 
before making the marriage vow, we are assumed to have 
thought the decision through carefully. If one does 
decide to marry, one cannot then stand outside of the 
marriage and (as it were) decide whether or not to accept 
the commitments involved; one chooses to accept the 
commitments to one's spouse and to the relationship by 
choosing to marry. In contrast, an unmarried cohabiting 
partner cannot be told that he ought to respect the 
commitments of marriage by being shown that this is a 
constitutive requirement of the marriage vows. If he 
does not choose to participate in the institution, it is 
entirely rational for him to reject the corresponding 
commitments.
Perhaps it will be objected that I have overstated 
the matter. For some people the decision to marry (or to 
remain married) is not an easy one to make. There might 
be, after all, many ways in which this decision can seem
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to be wrong. Or the decision can be right in one way, 
wrong in another. The best reasons of one kind will 
support it while, as we shall see in the next chapter, 
reasons of another kind may well suggest the opposite 
course of action. In cases like this, however, if we 
decide to marry (or to remain married), we are 
nevertheless understood to have decided which course of 
action 'all things considered' is best. The all-things- 
considered judgement is taken to reflect what matters 
most to us; from all of the conflicting reasons, marriage 
is understood to be the direction in which we want to 
take our lives. So let us now consider the commitments 
we choose to accept when we make the (wedding) vow.
When someone marries, they commit themselves to a 
life-long relationship with their partner. Thus the 
groom pledges to '...love her, comfort her, honour and 
protect her, and forsaking all others, be faithful to her 
as long as (they) both shall live'; the bride does 
likewise.When they make their vow, there are a number 
of necessary conditions that are assumed to be met.
First of all, as we noted, it is thought that the 
persons making the vow want to commit themselves to the 
other person in this way (and also that they believe that 
the commitment is desired by the latter). By their 
wanting to make such a commitment, moreover, we usually 
take them to be saying also that they feel a quality of 
love for the other person, of a kind that they do not 
feel for anyone else, and that they value this 
relationship above any other in which they might be 
involved. The idea of wanting to commit themselves in 
marriage, this is to say, implies that marriage to the 
other person matters a great deal to them; it would not 
make sense for a person to want to commit themselves to 
something that they deemed to be valueless or 
inconsequential. By their wanting to marry, they are 
also understood to be saying that they believe the 
marriage relationship provides the best framework within
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which their relationship can flourish. They want the 
marriage relationship to be an important and 
indispensable part of their lives.
A second assumption we make when we give or receive 
the marriage vow is that this expresses one's present 
intentions about one's future behaviour. When the bride 
or groom says 'I promise' (or when they make any of the 
other typical utterances by which vows are made) part of 
what is meant by saying this is that they intend to 
behave in the future in the ways that they say they will.
This, I maintain, is a necessary condition. For let us 
suppose that my opponent says that he does not think that 
the marriage vow conveys the intention to behave in 
certain ways in the future. I would find his use of 
'vow' perplexing. Presumably for him 'the marriage vow'
(sic) would imply something like 'I haven't decided yet 
how I will behave in the future' or that 'I just might 
behave in the desired way' which is to completely 
misunderstand the binding character we are supposed to 
recognize in this vow. If we could not ordinarily assume 
that someone who makes the vow intends keeping it, we 
would not have a practice of vowing at all.
As we noted the commitment we make about our future 
conduct is expected to override the periodic fluctuations 
of feelings that the couple may have for one another. It 
is not that 'I promise to love...as long as I feel able 
to do so' or '...for as long as I am getting something 
out of it'. Indeed the marriage vow explicitly states 
that there may be a downside to the relationship. It 
might become a burden. The couple promise to love 'for 
better or worse, for richer or poorer, in sickness and in 
health...' Their commitment to each other in marriage, 
in other words, obliges them to care for and support each 
other even when they do not feel like doing so. The fact 
that disbenefits do occur, is not a sufficient reason for 
either of them to believe they are relieved of the
'commitment.
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There are plenty of ways of publicly stating an 
intention without making a vow; for example, I may tell 
you 'I propose to do such-and-such'. So how do we 
recognize a vow from the wider set of intentional 
statements? One obvious way is by the utterance ' I 
promise...' By saying this, the speaker emphasizes her 
commitment to do whatever she says she will do. As 
importantly, such a statement (of intention) strengthens 
the listener's assurance that the vower will so behave in 
the future. So a third general assumption we make when 
we give or receive a vow is that the speaker's commitment 
to do what she says she will do, can be recognized by her 
use of a locution like 'I promise'. The phrase 'I 
promise' is not crucial here. The bride (or groom) might 
equally well say 'I do'. Let it suffice to say that it 
is necessary for the speaker to make an utterance bearing 
a similar illocutionary force to '1 promise' for her 
utterance to have the level of commitment we find in an 
avowal.
Finally, by saying 'I promise' the speaker wants it 
to be understood that she can be counted upon to keep her 
word. To vow something to another person is to raise an 
expectation in the mind of the recipient; the promisee 
can count upon the speaker to do something. But more 
than this, we assume that the intention of the speaker is 
to create a relationship of reliance and trust between 
herself and the groom. The implication is that they will 
establish an intimate and trusting alliance with each 
other.
All of this does not mean that we assume that every 
marriage vow is made honestly and it certainly does not 
mean that every marriage vow that is made, is actually 
kept. What it means is that in the absence of any 
Special knowledge to the contrary, the above are the 
assumptions that operate at the time the vow is made. 
Accordingly, if someone getting married were to make a 
lying vow, this trades on the presumption that those who
I
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make the vow want to commit themselves in the ways 
outlined.
It needs to be stressed that when it is understood in 
the light of the conditions above, the marriage vow has 
implications not only for the attitudes, emotions and 
beliefs of the person who makes it but for their actions 
too. By committing themselves in this way, for instance, 
a person must not only believe that doing so is 
worthwhile but this belief must also guide their 
attitudes and actions. To see this, consider the case in 
which a married person's actions do not reflect the 
belief; for instance, a husband who claims he is 
committed to his marriage yet insists on sticking to his 
bachelor lifestyle (e.g. going out with 'the boys' every 
night). If he claims to be committed yet does not allow 
this to influence his conduct at all, this would not only 
raise serious doubts about his putative commitment, it 
would lead us to conclude that he does not in fact value 
his marriage. On the other hand, neither is a person 
committed if he merely acts in a way that we would expect 
from someone who is committed - he scrupulously carries 
out his marital obligations - yet he does not have the 
appropriate emotional attitudes or beliefs. To have the 
appropriate level of commitment, then, the vower must 
meet both the formal conditions, and have the emotional 
attitudes, and perform the relevant actions.
In the light of the kind of commitment that the 
marriage vow requires, it is not surprising that this 
aspect of the relationship is resisted by an increasing 
number of couples who love each other, are soulmates, 
etc., who choose to live together and perhaps to have 
children, and in all respects simulate the married 
relationship yet who refuse to go through the formal 
procedure of marrying one another.
Some say it is the paraphernalia of weddings - the 
stage-managed ceremony, the glittering reception or an 
elaborate honeymoon - that justifies their opposition to
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marriage, rather than a distaste for this commitment. 
But in these cases the wedding celebrations have assumed 
an exaggerated importance and the substance of marriage 
(the serious commitment that is being undertaken) is 
overlooked. Where this is the case, the fault - if it is 
seen as a fault - is not to be found in the idea of 
commitment but in the unwelcome aspects of the consumer- 
oriented society in which we live. The solution to this 
is simple. Steps can be taken by the couple to dispense 
with the theatre of marriage altogether or to find ways 
to highlight the solemn nature of the commitment.
A more challenging objection is where couples assume 
the roles and perform the duties married couples assume 
and perform, yet refuse to commit themselves legally in 
marriage because, they may say, when a couple really love 
one another, such a commitment is unnecessary. They 
argue that the public making of vows before witnesses and 
the concomitant social and legal commitments do not add 
anything to their relationship or change the degree of 
love that they feel for each other. The strength of 
their love binds them together and the added commitment 
required by the legal marriage contract is superfluous. 
'It is just a piece of paper after all.'
There are a number of limitations to this position. 
In the first place as we have noted (p.62), when they 
live together for a long period of time this usually 
gives rise to monetary commitments (like buying a house 
or sharing the rent) which are not outside of the legal 
domain. The law makes equally burdensome provisions for 
individuals in such cohabiting arrangements. If they 
decide to separate, moreover, they might well have 
recourse to the law to help them sort out their affairs. 
Secondly, often such couples want to be treated as if 
they were married: thus they feel qualified to the same 
entitlements from the social services and other legal 
protection enjoyed by a married couple. However if they 
wish to be accorded the same rights and privileges, then
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it is difficult to see what their objection is to the 
formal marriage contract. They might claim, of course, 
to be trying to get the best of both worlds; the 
advantage of sharing living arrangements in a loving 
relationship without a formal contract. But if they 
mirror the lifestyle of a married couple and are subject 
to the equally onerous provisions the law makes, it is 
difficult to see exactly what these advantages are. It
seems to their opponent to come down to a lack of
commitment of one or the other; an unwillingness to give 
themselves unconditionally to the other person in their 
relationship.
But the point might still be pressed that this need 
not be a lack of commitment to each other. The decision 
not to marry might be taken because the couple find the 
idea of a legal marriage contract incoherent. All that 
they regard to be necessary is a legal arrangement to 
deal with the business side of their relationship. We 
will consider this kind of non-marital cohabiting in the 
pages ahead. For the moment let it suffice to say that 
this is to overlook the earlier points we raised: in our 
mores the publicly made marriage vow is the most powerful 
symbol of each partner's commitment to the other; that if 
it is correct that a man and a woman need long-term 
commitments from one another then, at present, only the
marital contract binds them in such a long-term way. It
binds them particularly in those occasions when they are 
engaged in a temporary but substantial conflict with one 
another. In short, we need a secure relationship like 
marriage to bind us through temporary difficulties in a 
cohabiting relationship.
Another kind of objection to the account I have 
given is that the commitment in marriage is not as I have 
described it; for most people, making the marriage vow is 
simply a matter of conforming to social custom or 'a mere 
unquestioning acceptance of a social institution'.^ 
However, I have argued that they choose to bind
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themselves to each other in a personal, social, legal 
(and in some cases religious) commitment. To blame or 
censure someone, for instance, for their lack of 
commitment to their marriage presupposes that they have, 
or could have, chosen freely and rationally to accept the 
commitment at the outset. Thus in order to make a 
commitment of this nature, a person needs a level of 
maturity and rational competence, they need, in advance 
of getting married, to understand what it is they are 
about to choose to do. But if this is the case, this 
rules out a mere unquestioning conformity to the 
conventional practice. In other words, if the objector 
were to carefully consider the implications of the 
marriage contract and understand the seriousness of the 
required commitment then I do not see how he could regard 
this as a meaningless custom. If it is countered that 
this is the way in which most people think of their 
marriage commitment, then what this indicates is the need 
for more effective premarital education-
Let us turn now to a more troublesome objection 
which is directed at the unconditional commitment 'to 
love another person' that the marriage vow requires. It 
is often objected that it is counter-intuitive to think 
that we could rationally make such an important 
commitment with no possibility of rescinding it, when the 
relationship may extend for fifty years or more.^ '* As we 
noted, I make the marriage vow because I believe that I 
will continue to love my spouse. What do I do if I 
subsequently find that I do not, and that there does not 
seem to be any prospect of rekindling this love? An 
important reason why I entered into marriage, whilst 
being strong enough for me to make the commitment then, 
does not now provide a reason for me to persist with it. 
Is it reasonable to expect someone in such a situation to 
remain in the marriage because of the unconditional 
commitment that was made on entering it?
At the heart of the problem is the unease which
!
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surrounds the idea that we can choose to have certain
feelings for our spouse in perpetuity. This aspect of
any relationship, surely, is non-voluntary - it is not
something to which we can choose or commit ourselves. As
Moore (1970:316) writes:
...to love certain people...is a thing which is quite impossible to attain directly by the will. .
Yet, paradoxically, when we get married we promise to 
have certain feelings for our partners that will last 
over the years; a commitment that directly conflicts with 
our commonsense belief that we cannot choose our 
feelings.
One way of dealing with this is simply to insist 
that having made the commitment, I have an obligation to 
keep it irrespective of whether or not the love which 
motivated it in the first place is present; in committing 
myself, I accepted an obligation to fulfil the terms of 
my marriage contract with my spouse whether or not I 
still love him. otherwise (as we are reminded by those 
who enjoy a long-term pair bond but who do not marry) we 
could love the other person but not make this kind of 
commitment to him or her. If this is so, we must not 
confuse 'commitment' with 'love'. I make the commitment 
because I love my spouse but there is no necessary 
connection then between the commitment and love; the 
former continues even if the latter does not.
However it cannot be denied (and needs to be
stressed) that part of the commitment we make in the 
marriage vow is 'to love...till death do us part'. This 
is often taken to say, we vow to sustain our loving
disposition. As it is generally accepted that we cannot 
choose to have or sustain feelings we need to ask if it 
is appropriate (and honest) to vow to do so? Is it 
rational to make such a vow if part of what is involved
in this, rests on a disposition (thoughts and feelings)
which we cannot necessarily preserve?
A more accommodating way of dealing with the problem
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above is to understand the commitment one makes as simply
a statement of one's present intentions. It is not to be
understood as a prediction that I will never change in my
affection for my spouse. Malcolm (1967:81) writes in
support of this interpretation:
...the assertion describes my present attitude towards the statement (the marriage vow),..it does not prophesy what my attitude would be if various things happened.
Why not say that when I made the marriage vow to F, this 
just indicated that my present intention was to do 
something permanently, not that I had a permanent 
intention?^® Thus we seem to be able to hold that my 
commitment to my spouse is binding and still allow that 
circumstances may arise in which I will be justified in 
breaking it.
However this is an unusual interpretation. The 
customary interpretation is that in making the marriage 
vow, one commits oneself unconditionally. An
unconditional commitment is not analogous to a mere 
statement of intention; it seems more like a declaration 
of permanent intention. Added to this, there is a 
general (social, legal) insistence on commitments being 
regarded in this latter way and honoured (up to a point) , 
even if they have been made in error. One's love may 
wane but the absence of love cannot be the sole guide in 
such circumstances. Marriage implies commitment and some 
of the obligations generated by the commitment remain 
even if love no longer endures.
Another possible way out would be to argue that if 
I (or my spouse) change radically over time, I may think 
of myself (or my spouse) as not being the person who made 
the commitment but as a different person. Thus when I 
promised to love exclusively 'till death do us part', I 
may have done so unconditionally but twenty years on I 
may have changed. I am no longer the person who would 
make such a promise at all, or who would make it to this 
particular person. If this were to be accepted.
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presumably, we would have to say that all commitments are 
conditional upon there being no change in the character 
of either party involved. If my (or my partner's) 
feelings, beliefs, character or ideals change, it is 
proper for me to look upon myself or him as someone other 
than the person who made the commitment.
This seems to be a recipe for chaos. Most 
commercial or other contractual transactions are based 
upon promises; services are performed, or things given, 
in the belief that the contracting party will fulfil his 
part of the deal, e.g. the customer will pay for the 
goods or services rendered. If we were to accept the 
proposal above, presumably if there is any change in the 
character, attitudes, beliefs, of either of the 
contracting parties, it does not then matter if they do 
not fulfil their part of the bargain. I think we would 
say that the person who regarded any commitment in the 
way suggested, does not make a commitment at all.
One further way of dealing with the problem is to 
accept that the commitment to love in the wedding vow is 
lifelong but to ask if it is true to say that we cannot 
choose to have feelings of love for our spouse in 
perpetuity? Is it true to say that feelings of love and 
affection within marriage are beyond the bounds of 
rational choice and thus genuine commitment? It is after 
all, generally thought that we are able - or can learn - 
to control certain feelings, e.g. destructive feelings 
like rage and jealousy in marriage, and even how to feel 
differently in circumstances where feelings of this sort 
typically occur. Let us suppose that I am furious 
because my husband fails to greet me. I lose my temper 
in a way that is quite inappropriate and entirely out of 
keeping with the cause. (Perhaps I had a row with a 
colleague at work and this is why I vented my anger on my 
husband.) We would say my anger is irrational. It makes 
sense to say also that I can (and should) control such 
inappropriate emotions or at least that I can reflect on
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my behaviour and in future exchange appropriate for such 
unfitting feelings. For instance, I might train myself 
to feel concern at such uncharacteristic behaviour as his 
failing to greet me. In which case, my feelings would be 
the product of a rational decision.
It seems odd then to suppose that I cannot similarly 
control - and by this I include cultivate - positive, 
rationally appropriate sentiments, such as feelings of 
companionate love - if not the emotions of romantic love 
- for my spouse. Once again my feelings would be the 
product of a rational decision. With a good will and by 
working hard at it, in other words, at any stage in 
marriage, could not one change inappropriate emotional 
feelings, for appropriate loving ones?
Perhaps it will be objected that to speak of this as 
'love' sounds excessively intellectualistic. The trouble 
is that love, as we have described it earlier, is a non- 
rational and spontaneous emotion. It is an immediate and 
automatic feeling. But even if it is true that I could 
not feel love for him in the way described, presumably, 
at any point I can reflect upon my relationship with my 
husband, ask myself what the response of a loving wife 
ought to be, and then decide - as a matter of duty - to 
act or behave accordingly. After all, our usual 
assessment of a situation where someone else attests to 
feelings of love, is in their behaviour. Sometimes we 
take their word for it, but usually we consider the way 
they act. So couldn't it be argued that even if the 
account of unconditional love in perpetuity is suspect, 
a promise always to behave in the appropriate ways of a 
loving spouse is not?^®
However it seems odd to express loving sentiments 
and behave as if one loved one's spouse merely out of 
duty; to say, for instance, 'I love you' to one's spouse 
merely out of duty when there is in fact a lack of 
genuine love for him. The proposal would make feelings 
of affection superfluous to the expression of love.
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Furthermore we would say that someone does not (really
show) love if their heart is not in it; rather, they
feign it. For love not only requires the appropriate
spoken utterances and behaviour; more importantly, it 
requires that this is given in the right spirit. If this 
is correct, I am not obligated merely to express and 
behave appropriately; I am supposed to feel it. The
expressions of love (and other appropriate attitudes and 
behaviour) are usually thought to be a manifestation of 
this feeling. Loving actions are expected to derive from 
and be an expression or evocation of a feeling or
passion, not a matter of duty or decision.
Whether or not it is conceded that we can (and
ought) cultivate an affectionate attitude for our partner 
or that we ought adopt the appropriate affectionate 
behaviour, there will no doubt be some points in every
marriage where one or other of the couple has to decide
whether or not to keep their commitment. Being married 
is not a static event but more like a process and some of 
the features which constitute that process may make it 
unpalatable. We might discover that the person to whom 
we are married is very different from how we first took 
them to be. Alternatively, there are many differences 
that any married couple inevitably have to face
concerning, for instance, children, money, family, or
other relationships, etc. There is bound to be discord 
from time to time. At some point, such difficulties may
intensify to such an extent that one or other of the
couple may find things intolerable and may be unable to 
keep their marital commitment.
If they both wish to end their marriage it seems 
reasonable to argue that this is morally acceptable.^® 
They are free surely to release one another from this 
mutual commitment just as we are free to release each 
other from any other promise. On the other hand, if one 
of the partner's behaviour (but not the other) over a 
long period of time seriously transgresses the marriage
II
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VOWS then the innocent partner is justified in ending the 
commitment. That the commitment has been constantly 
transgressed gives sufficient grounds for the innocent 
party breaking her part of the bargain. The difficult 
case is where the partner who transgresses the vows 
wishes to terminate the commitment but not the innocent 
party. Few of us would say that this is a good thing to 
do. But, as I will suggest shortly, there are worse 
evils than breaking one's commitment. However even here 
there is a need for gentleness and well-intentioned 
support, if only for a time. To stress the point: 
marriage involves a range of commitments to the other ;person and even if love dies, some of the obligations 
generated by the commitment remain.
However things may not be quite as gloomy as the 
discussion of commitment seems to suggest. In the first 
place, the idea of a good marriage entails that both 
partners actually wish to secure their relationship 
(fully understanding the implications that this 
commitment involves). They actually want to be committed 
to their partner and to their relationship. Secondly, 
there is one other aspect of the notion of commitment 
that is often overlooked, namely, that marriage requires 
a transformation of many aspects of each of the couple's 
lives. But before we can discuss the breadth of the 
required transformation we need to investigate fully the 
ideas of autonomy, se If-development and good sex. I will 
return to this aspect of commitment in Chapter Eight.
We must turn now to a reason of a more general 
nature that needs to be considered for marrying someone 
as opposed to living with them, namely, the widely held 
belief that marriage brings happiness. Someone might 
well justify their decision to marry (or to remain 
married) with the reason that this will bring them a 
special kind of happiness. In the next section I will 
examine what this claim might involve.
%
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Happiness
'Happiness' is not a simple notion. In ordinary 
discourse, we speak of a person having 'a happy 
temperament' or of their being 'happy-go-lucky', by which 
we mean that they have a cheerful or sunny disposition 
which is, presumably, with them from day-to-day
throughout the years; we speak of someone 'feeling happy' 
or of their 'being in a happy mood' meaning by this that 
they find things agreeable (even sometimes when the 
things in question are bad) ; we speak of them as being 
'happy with their lot' or of their 'leading a happy life' 
meaning that they are pleased or contented with the way 
things generally are working out in their life.
When we refer to happiness in the context of 
marriage, as well as the senses noted above, there are 
other possible uses of the term. For instance, we may 
offer someone advice like 'To be happy in marriage one 
needs to compromise. ' A person may not be too happy with 
her married life and the prescription offers a way to 
improve it. Presumably in giving such advice we are 
usually referring to their day-to-day attitude or state 
of mind; to suggest that she needs to compromise might 
not mean that she will need to sacrifice anything in 
particular but just that she needs to change her attitude 
to the relationship. On the other hand, it could mean 
that something she wants (to be happy in her marriage) 
cannot be achieved without sacrificing other things, like 
close ties with other men, or spending all of her income 
on herself; so the compromise in question may require her 
to forsake certain things.
If we were to compile a list of factors, like 
compromise, which are considered to be conducive to 
happiness within a marriage, we might include such things 
as being a close friend or soulmate to one's partner, 
being in a committed relationship with them, sharing 
important segments of one's life with them or (as we 
shall see) of gaining a sense of autonomy due to this
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relationship, and so on. On the other hand, we might 
include in the list things like financial security, or 
material comforts within the home, or having healthy 
children, and so forth. The above are sources of 
happiness within a marriage and the latter might result 
from some or all of them being met. Furthermore, 
presumably if happiness does result from each or any of 
these things it will be somewhat different in each case; 
for whatever such states have in common which leads us to 
talk of happiness in relation to them, it does not seem 
that the happiness in question can be fully characterised 
without reference to the state in question. Thus someone 
might say 'I am happy because I realize that on marrying 
me my husband showed everyone that he loves me.' Perhaps 
we can see this point more clearly if we consider the 
kind of reasons people give for the unhappiness they feel 
when their marriage breaks down or ends. 'My life has 
become meaningless, it lacks any point since my husband 
left me.'
However we might desire some of the things listed 
above for their own sake and not as a means to happiness. 
For instance, even where autonomy seems to give rise to 
anxiety and unhappiness for a woman in marriage, we might 
advise her that such anxieties and unhappiness should be 
accepted or overcome rather than curbing her sense of 
independence. On the other hand, sometimes the 
straightest route to happiness is to forego one's 
autonomy. This suggests that autonomy is one thing and 
that happiness is another, and that one cannot always 
have them both. Or to make the point in a different way, 
a single woman may realize that her close friendship with 
a married man is inimical to her own happiness. She may 
realize this but nonetheless choose to continue with the 
affair. However one could choose to pursue any of the 
other items listed for their own sake, when one believes 
that doing so will not bring one happiness.
When we refer to happiness within marriage I take it
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to mean something like someone is pleased with the way 
the important aspects of their married life - close 
friendship, soulmate - are going. However this is not 
the same as a feeling of pleasure that one has towards 
specific items or in specific situations - like the 
pleasure of eating, or reading a good passage in a book, 
or of having a sexual experience - where we may talk of 
the pleasure lasting a few moments and then ceasing. It 
would be strange to talk of happiness in this way. For 
the latter is usually not short-lived and subject to 
change at a moment's notice (in the way that most 
pleasurable experiences are). More importantly, a person 
may have many such pleasurable experiences without being 
happy. At the same time, however, there does seem to be 
a close connection between pleasure and happiness. I 
doubt that we can be happy (at the way things are going 
within our marriage) without sometimes having pleasurable 
experiences of one form or another,
I suggested that certain things, like being a close 
friend, or security, or material comforts, are conducive 
to happiness in marriage. However, although happiness 
within marriage often follows from the fact that these 
conditions are being met, it does not automatically 
follow from this. In the first place, our enthusiasms 
and preferences are widely different. We do not all find 
happiness in the same things and we may not all find 
marital happiness in the same kind of things, events or 
activities. At least there is no one activity that comes 
to mind about which it could be said that everyone finds 
happiness as a result of experiencing it. But we need to 
be circumspect. While as a matter of fact these elements 
are not necessary to someone's experience of happiness in 
marriage, they are necessary to the idea of a good 
marriage. If, say, close friendship is lacking, we would 
find it difficult to understand why they should claim
that their marriage is good. And a parallel argument 
applies to happiness. No matter what the conditions are
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that give rise to it, I am claiming that happiness in 
marriage is a necessary condition for a good marriage. 
Thus we might say: 'Your marriage would be better if it 
made both of you happy.'
Another reason for maintaining that happiness is a
separate constituent of a good marriage is the fact that
sometimes people feel guilt at not being happy in their
marriage where the other conditions we have noted, seem
to be met. Consider the case where, for no obvious
reason, X does not manage to feel happy. 'Given all the
advantages that I have in my married life' she might say
'how is it that I cannot manage to feel happy?' Along
these lines Friedan (1965:17) writes:
If a [married] woman had a problem, she knew that something must be wrong...with herself. Other [married] women were satisfied with their lives...She was so ashamed to admit her dissatisfaction...
People who feel guilt at not being happy within marriage 
often regard the fault as their own. They sometimes 
think of it as a moral failure, like their lack of 
application or perseverance, or simply that they have the 
wrong attitude towards their partner or their marriage.
In the light of the connection I am maintaining 
between the other elements within a good marriage and 
happiness, the question might be pressed: how exactly do 
matters such as 'being a close friend', etc., relate to 
happiness in marriage? Why should the satisfaction of 
these desiderata usually result in happiness within the 
marriage? As far as I can see, there are no a priori 
reasons why this is so. Certainly there is not a simple 
equation between these conditions being met and 
happiness. It could have been the case, surely, that 
people's happiness is always found not in marriage but in 
activities outside of it. Yet it does seem to be a fact 
of experience that marriage (in which the various other 
conditions are met) and happiness are directly linked. 
As a matter of fact, most people need a degree of
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supportive recognition from a close friend in a committed 
relationship in order to be happy. The evidence for this 
claim is mainly empirical;^® as a matter of fact, most 
people think that being in such a marriage does bring the 
couple happiness.
As I have said there is no a priori reason why there 
should be this continuity between the two. However once 
again a plausible explanation of a sociobiological kind 
might explain why generally this is so. Clearly 
conditions which make for successful long-term pair 
bonding, like close friendship and commitment, are more 
likely to be satisfied if they are also the conditions 
which make for happiness. It would be very odd if 
meeting them always resulted in frustration or conflict. 
Accordingly it is not surprising that the human species 
should have developed in such a way that the two do 
coincide. Doing things that meet our basic biological 
drives - having a close friendship, having a soulmate, a 
home of one's own, healthy children, etc. - is very 
likely to make us happy. Hence we should not be 
surprised that the fact X believes that marriage will 
make her happy - or that she wants to continue in this 
state because it makes her happy - is regarded as a good 
reason for her choosing to marry or to remain married. 
If something will make one happy this is a prima facie 
good reason for doing it; and if my arguments concerning 
the major elements in a good marriage are sound, we have 
good reasons for thinking that satisfying them in 
marriage, will make someone happy.*
I have ruled out the suggestion that the happiness 
one believes one will find within marriage is the only 
criterion we have for a good marriage. Even if we could 
employ the concept in this all embracing way, it would be 
useless unless it were filled out with a host of more 
specific concepts. In other words, it will not do to try 
to make 'happiness' do all of the work. The fact is that 
we do not assess a good marriage simply as consisting of
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the happiness a couple experience due to it. 
Furthermore, as we noted, a person may enter a marital 
relationship in pursuit of goals that seem quite remote 
from happiness. And they might want to continue being 
married even if they are unhappy, especially when other 
matters are a stake - like the well-being of their 
children. Nevertheless, we normally think that the 
happiness we believe it may bring, if not in the short­
term, in the long-run is a good reason for getting 
married and/or remaining married.
I hope that I have established: (i) if the other
conditions we have discussed are met this usually gives 
rise to happiness in marriage; (ii) happiness within 
marriage is a necessary condition for a good marriage.
This brings us to another interpretation of 'happiness' 
which is also usually implied by the decision to get 
married or mutatis mutandis to remain married. X might 
say ' I believe that if I marry Y this will bring me 
happiness in life' or 'being married to Y has brought me 
happiness in life'. This sort of happiness does not seem 
to refer to one's mood, nor is it a feeling that one 
occasionally might get, neither does the happiness need 
to involve the particular things or experiences within 
the relationship we have discussed which might make one 
happy. Happiness in the sense we are now discussing has 
to do with being contented with one's lot in life, or in 
being pleased with the way one's life is progressing over V':a long period of time. In this sense, someone who has 
been married a long time might claim to have 'found -happiness in life due to marriage'.Again 'happiness' 
in this context refers to her continuing experience of 
married life as a whole; over a period of time, her 
marriage has given her something she wants, happiness.
In other words, a good marriage is regarded as a way of 
achieving a happy life; it is thought to be a sufficient, 
though not a necessary condition for a happy life.
It should be stressed that happiness in life need
■
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not be the same as happiness in marriage. The former 
state is compatible with the undeniable fact that 
different people pursue a diversity of activities and 
relationships in the name of happiness. Clearly we do 
not all find 'happiness in life' by engaging in the same 
kind of things. The happiness experienced by a man of 
action may be quite different to that experienced by a 
contemplative scholar, the dedicated artist, the 
religious recluse.Such people might well claim to find 
happiness in their lives without their being married. If 
I am correct, it seems that while happiness within 
marriage, like happiness in life, is general, the latter 
is more general than the former. It follows that a 
person might find happiness in marriage but not happiness 
in life; it is perhaps her chief desire to succeed as an 
academic, but she cannot. Happiness in marriage is not 
a sufficient condition for a happy life. On the other 
hand, it seems possible (but unlikely) to suppose that a 
person can be unhappily married but happy in life, if 
other things are far more important to her than her 
marriage.“
There is another aspect of this general point that 
is worth noting. It could be argued that a couple are 
not obliged to sacrifice their own happiness for the rest 
of their lives, if their marriage seriously encroaches on 
this. Why? Part of the answer is that where the unhappy 
marriage clearly conflicts with their happiness in life - 
and if everyone concerned would be happier if the 
marriage were dissolved - we seem to give priority to the 
latter. If this is the case we can further modify our 
notion of the commitment we make on marrying as a promise 
which includes (in brackets); 'But not if it will destroy 
both of our happiness for the rest of our lives.'
One last point is worth our noting: in giving
happiness in life as the reason for marrying, one is 
ruling out the instrumentality of what is being done in 
relation to some other, different end. If someone were
"'5
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to ask 'What do you want to be happy in life for?' we 
would think that the question is odd. We do not want 
happiness in life for anything else - we just want to be 
happy, that's all. We do not aim at happiness in order 
to get other things; although as we have seen, we can and 
do other things, like marrying, in order to get 
happiness.
Conclusion
We now have an outline of some of the reasons that 
could be used to explain why we think that a good 
marriage is worthwhile. In a good marriage a person will 
have a close friend or loving soulmate, with whom they 
will have a shared identity, to whom and from whom they 
will make a lifelong commitment, and with whom they will 
find happiness. Or in more practical terms, in a good 
marriage we believe the partners will be close friends, 
that communication between them will be open, intimate 
and supporting, that sex will be good, that because 
important segments of their lives are shared they will 
develop a mutual identity, that they are both committed 
to each other by virtue of their marriage and that all of 
this brings them both happiness. Regarded as empirical 
claims the items in this list are still somewhat vague 
(it is unlikely that we could verify them 
psychologically) and it goes without saying, the list is 
as yet incomplete.
However a further test for my claim that the items 
discussed are necessary conditions for a good marriage is 
that they count as good reasons why someone might decide 
to marry or to remain married. In other words, if 
someone were to ask: 'Why has X decided to marry?' to
reply 'She and Y are close friends, etc.' makes the 
decision intelligible. It has been pointed out to me 
that whilst this makes the decision intelligible it is
not prima facie a good reason. It merely offers an 
explanation. Nevertheless I think that the two (i.e.
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reasons that make an act intelligible and reasons that 
make a decision good) are closely connected and my 
suggestion is that the concepts - in terms of which the 
decision to marry can be made intelligible - are the 
concepts which would count as good reasons for the
decision. Perhaps this point is more obvious in an 
example where the opposite is assumed. Suppose that X 
says 'I have decided to marry Y'; to point out to her 
that they are not even close friends is a (prima facie) 
good reason against such a move.^ Reasons thus become 
good reasons if they are sufficiently strong and 
appropriate for the decision in question.
On this account, some of the reasons we have
discussed count as prima facie good reasons for the
decision to marry and to remain married. If they are
met, these conditions may give us happiness within 
marriage. And happiness within marriage is a necessary 
condition for a good marriage. More importantly, I went 
on to claim that a good marriage is thought to be a 
sufficient condition (though not a necessary one) for a 
happy life.
,,ï.iîî
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Chapter Four
À critique of traditional marriage
According to many writers a major cause of 
unhappiness, especially for women, is that we are brought 
up to think that marriage brings happiness. For women
rather than happiness, marriage must result in
■ Ioppression, boredom and dependence. The seminal exponent 
of this view is Simone de Beauvoir.^ She maintains that 
marriage always subordinates a woman to a man and so 
erodes her freedom. This is the primary source of 
women's oppression. It is the source of their lack of 
self-determination in all other areas of life, their lack 
of personal growth, the cause of boredom and the 
occasional feelings of desperation in mothers, and of 
their sexual oppression. Thus from a prudential point of 
view it is irrational for a woman to choose to marry.
However de Beauvoir (1988:29) goes on to claim that it is 
not merely imprudent but immoral for a woman to marry.
It might be thought that nowadays de Beauvoir's 
arguments are entirely beside the point since the 
traditional marital relationship she criticized no longer 
exists. Women can do anything now? they can own 
property, enter the professions, bring up children alone,
(at least they can do these things in liberal western 
countries). This is a common line of argument. To 
answer it, I will show that many of the features of the 
traditional marriage de Beauvoir criticizes persist into 
the present and that most of her criticisms of marriage 
are still valid today. Concern might also be expressed 
that this task seems to be mainly empirical. But it is 
not. For the substance of de Beauvoir's attack on 
marriage is philosophical. Given what we know about 
human nature, she argues, the institution of marriage 
will always contain irremediable flaws.^ (It is not 
surprising therefore that most of the more recent
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feminist contributions in this area are expansions upon 
de Beauvoir's original criticism of marriage.^) I will 
show that the kinds of flaws de Beauvoir refers to, 
however, can be thought to show that marriage is a bad 
thing for both sexes.
The philosophical underpinnings of de Beauvoir's attack 
on marriage
Underlying de Beauvoir's claim that it is imprudent 
for a woman to marry is a view of human nature. It is 
the assumption that all human beings have certain natural 
desires? the most important of which is the desire for 
freedom. For our purposes, there are at least two 
relevant aspects to this. Firstly, following Sartre, de 
Beauvoir (1972:10-11), insists that freedom is 
fundamental to consciousness.“ Human consciousness must 
choose whatever theories, beliefs or values go to make up 
its contents.^ We are free to choose our world view. 
Material things in the world are, up to a point 
describable by the laws of Science. But no scientific 
theory or other approach that we use for understanding 
it, will ever give us the full account we desire. 
Nonetheless we have to try to make it intelligible. 
Conscious beings, then (are free to) choose the 
descriptions and even the basic categories with which 
they classify the world, be it scientific, religious, 
humanistic, etc.
Freedom, in this sense, is the basis of our values. 
As Sartre (1966:76) writes:
My freedom is the unique foundation ofvalues...
If a kind of person, action, state-of-affairs is deemed 
to have value, it is valuable only because one has 
consciously chosen it to be so. Nothing else can 
determine whether one should value this person (action, 
thing) rather than that. Without human freedom there 
would be no values, A similar claim underlies de
'1
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Beauvoir's view. She (1972:24) writes:
Freedom is the source from which all significations and all values spring.
As well as regarding freedom as a condition of all
values, de Beauvoir claims that it is itself a
fundamental value. She (1972:24) writes:
The man who seeks to justify his life must want freedom itself absolutely and above everything else.
Since his or her actions are the means of attaining
'■isomething that a person regards as good - even if it is 
only in the justification of the significant choices they 
have made in their life - they must regard freedom as a 
necessary value. The freedom valued consists (at least) 
in the ability to control one's actions by one's unforced 
choices.
De Beauvoir's claims seem to be corroborated by 
ordinary experience in which most of us believe that in 
the important areas of their lives, all adult persons 
ought to be autonomous, i.e. they ought to make their own 
choices and decisions (and act upon some of them) without 
undue interference from other persons. Even where such 
independence seems to give rise to anxiety and 
unhappiness, we seem to think that this should be 
overcome rather than decrease the person's self- 
determination .
Thus we believe that persons must be able to make 
their own decisions about the important alternatives that 
face them and to act upon some of these decisions? for 
instance, whether or not to get married. And when 
married, each partner must be able to make his or her own 
choices concerning some of the central features of their 
lives, e.g. whether or not to pursue their earlier career 
or hobbies, whether to have close relationships with 
their extended family, etc. Alongside this, to be self­
determining each spouse must be able to choose the groups
.■;;g
with whom they affiliate, socially, politically, in
-religion. They must be able to make choices - both
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specific and general - concerning the more intimate 
aspects of their relationship with their spouse, like 
whether or not (on a given occasion) to have sexual 
intercourse with him or, more generally, whether or not 
to have children, to practice contraception, and so 
forth. And to be self-determining they must be able to 
make an enormous number of choices concerning the 
mundane, inevitable aspects of everyday life; for 
example, their hairstyle, what clothes to wear, whether 
to eat this or that, and so on. Lastly, they must be 
able to choose whether or not they will continue with it 
if the relationship or the marriage is a bad one.
I might be asked: do we in fact believe that people 
should be free in all of these respects? My response is 
that there are good reasons for believing this. To the 
extent that an adult's capacity for self-determination is 
underdeveloped, their judgements and actions are likely 
to be governed by unconscious motives and compensations, 
their projects are likely to be frustrated, their lives 
more likely to be empty or dominated by the judgements of 
others. So a corollary of the claim above is that we are 
not fully responsible adult persons unless we are self­
determining. (However this is not to say that the 
choices or decisions that we make are expected to be 
without references to the preferences, wants or needs of 
others,)
De Beauvoir goes on to couple her account of the 
value of freedom with what she claims is a natural desire 
for freedom - which she suggests is found in all human 
beings - when she (1988:21) writes of the 'urge of each 
individual to affirm his subjective existence'. Like 
many others philosophers, de Beauvoir maintains (I think 
correctly) that there is in human nature a natural desire 
for (one's own) freedom.
She goes on to claim that there is another side to 
the desire for freedom that is fundamental to human 
consciousness, this is a desire we have for power over
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others; to dominate and subjugate them, or to turn them
into what de Beauvoir calls 'the other'. This latter
innate disposition is (1988:17):
...(another) fundamental category of human thought.
Elsewhere de Beauvoir (1988:483) writes:
. . .the temptation to dominate is the most truly universal...
To have power of this sort requires that one is a subject 
rather than an object in one's relationship with another 
person; in other words, the ability to maintain oneself 
as a subject requires that one has power over those with 
whom we associate. The other side of this coin suggests 
that an autonomous person is one who can resist being 
made an object, or of being dominated by another.
The desire to dominate others takes many forms. In 
a non-civilized state (perhaps a Hobbesian state of 
nature) the struggle for power might well manifest itself 
in a fight to the death; or if one party surrenders - due 
to fear of being killed - it can result in a master-slave 
type of relationship. In contrast, in capitalist 
societies today, the desire to dominate others reveals 
itself mainly in economic terms. Members of the 
economically powerful class (usually men) attempt to 
dominate others - and to gain social recognition and 
respect from them - by virtue of their greater wealth and 
economic power. They will use their superior power to 
exploit those with less of it. In modern bourgeois 
societies, in other words, economic domination is a way 
of meeting the basic human desire for power. The 
relationship between one class and the other in a modern 
capitalist economy is much more complex and nebulous than 
this caricature of it suggests, of course, but let us 
accept that competition in business boils down to the 
matter of a competition for greater power.
In such societies, however, women typically are 
denied access to the world of work at the level where the ;S;:
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work in question equates with p o w e r .  ^ so they must use
other means to meet this desire. They can do this,
especially in their relationships with men, by
emphasizing their beauty and their seductiveness. De
Beauvoir (1988:697-698) writes:
...she (a young woman) subdues her partner to her pleasure and overwhelms him with her gifts ...through promised benefits...or by artfully arousing his desire...
Or as Mitchell (1973:55) puts the matter succinctly:
One of the few resources women have is to 'sell' their bodies.
But women realize that this basis of power is short- ■V:lived; their beauty and hence their power as a seductress 
is limited. However they are encouraged to believe that 
there is another source of power at their disposal.
Marriage is this other way of gaining power and more 
generally of acquiring economic dominance and social 
respect. For they are persuaded that the wives of
prominent men share their husband's power.’ We will see
shortly why it is imprudent for a woman to believe this.
À second natural desire de Beauvoir (1988:391) 
claims that all human beings have, is the desire for 
self-fulfilment. We all naturally desire to develop our 
talents or potentialities. (The assumption seems to be 
that if we do so, this is more likely to result in a
:happy life.) For most of us, this aspect of our 
development appears to become rooted in late childhood 
when, if we are fortunate, we choose to undertake tasks 
which we find challenging and in which there is some 
probability of our being successful. Thus a young woman 
has an aptitude and she is encouraged to develop this 
aptitude which she has and many others have not. She is 
encouraged, this is to say, to become an actress, an 
artist, or whatever.
The development of any talent we may have however 
needs to be accomplished, we are told, through 
'transcendence' (as opposed to 'immanence').® According
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to de Beauvoir (1988:28-29) we achieve transcendence
...through a continual reaching out towardsother liberties...into an indefinitely open
future.
In more practical terms, what this requires is that one 
is engaged in creative projects which define goals beyond 
the present and that try to change the world in some 
lasting way.
De Beauvoir (1988:87-88) goes on to claim that 
transcendence is typically attained through meaningful 
and creative work. To engage in meaningful work is to
engage in freely chosen projects that do not stunt the
personality or force it into one single track and ignore 
all the rest, but permits one's personality to have a 
well-rounded development. On the other hand, de Beauvoir 
(1988:29) insists that without creative work, a human 
life is incomplete, if not worthless. One reason for 
this might be that the work a person does, when it is 
'meaningful', shapes their idea of who they are; and more 
generally, others usually identify who or what a person 
is in terms of his or her work. Thus we refer to 'so- 
and-so the actress', or the dancer, or the philosopher. 
Presumably this is because it is the most clearly public 
aspect of their life. To put the point differently: it 
is their work* (or more precisely their vocation or 
professional career^*) that defines a person in their own 
eyes and in the eyes of others.(This throws some light 
on the sense of rejection and loss of identity that 
accompanies an extended period of unemployment).
We can find meaningful projects and transcendence in 
work. However it is obvious from the point above that 
this should not be confused with mere repetitive work. 
There are of course many people in the workforce who find 
their work a drudgery. When work is soul-destroying, 
this alienates a person from their sense of 
transcendence. Of such cases, de Beauvoir (1988:29) 
writes :
...transcendence falls back into immanence.
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stagnation, there is a degradation of existence into the 'en soi' ~ the brutish life of subjection to given conditions...
In contrast, meaningful labour enables the individual to 
find the right orientation of themselves in their work, 
to fulfil themselves in their current situation and also 
to see how and in what direction they can develop in the 
future.
Women - who until recently anyway have been denied 
access to the sense of fulfilment that is possible in a 
career - are persuaded that even today marriage 'still 
offers them the best c a r e e r T h e  traditional view, as 
de Beauvoir (1988:167) writes, is that marriage for a 
woman is:
...a most honourable career, freeing her from the need of any other participation in the collective life.“
To put the point in another way: our mores suggests that 
a woman's sense of creative fulfilment can be found when 
she is a housewife and when she bears and rears children. 
(As we noted, numerous popular women's magazines, films, 
television programmes, attest to this.) And as we shall 
see shortly, this belief too is badly mistaken and it 
compounds the plight of married women.
A third natural desire we all have is to be wanted
sexually and to attain sexual fulfilment.^ '* We want to
express our sexuality freely.^* De Beauvoir claims that
this is a form of transcendental project for males.
During erotic pleasure, she (1988:393) writes, the man's
body behaves in keeping with his transcendent
consciousness
...he projects himself towards the other, without losing his independence.
It follows that when the male and female have sexual 
intercourse, she is objectified and possessed by him. 
Unlike a man, however, de Beauvoir claims that a woman is 
not able to find transcendence in her sex organs. Her 
sexual desire is (somehow) 'absorbed back into her whole
i.1,
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body' . In the light of this de Beauvoir (1988:417)
writes of a woman engaged in heterosexual intercourse as:
Being more profoundly beside herself than is the man because her whole body is moved by desire and excitement, she retains her subjectivity only through union with her partner.
For a woman the pleasure of sex includes the whole 
personalities of both partners, emotions as well as 
physical feelings.^’ And this (so-called) difference 
between men and women is one of the many sources of a 
woman's sexual oppression*
As we noted, de Beauvoir maintains that to be 
desired sexually is one way in which a woman hopes to 
gain power over men. However, as we saw in Chapter Two, 
in the traditional mores, for a woman to try to satisfy 
this desire by having sexual intercourse in advance of 
being married, or extra-maritally, is regarded as morally 
wrong. Traditionally, while men have been allowed to 
'sow their wild oats', sexual intercourse for women was 
(and to some extent still is condoned) only within the 
institution of marriage. Furthermore given the problems 
of venereal disease and nowadays AIDS, pregnancy, and a 
lingering social stigma surrounding premarital and extra­
marital sexual relationships, to have sexual intercourse 
outside of marriage is risky for women. Hence they see 
marriage as the most obvious way of meeting their natural 
desire for sexual satisfaction. Once again, as we shall 
see, this belief also is seriously mistaken.
Thus de Beauvoir claims that women, like men, have 
the natural desire for autonomy over their own lives 
together with the desire for power over others, they 
desire transcendence through creative projects and sexual 
fulfilment. They see marriage as the most obvious means 
of meeting all of these natural desires. But due to 
certain irremediable flaws in the marital relationship 
these expectations cannot be met. If this is the case, 
it is clearly imprudent for women to choose to marry.
However de Beauvoir goes on to claim that it is not
merely imprudent but immoral. She (in conversation with
Friedan 1975:18) says:
No woman should stay at home and raise children ...women should not have the choice...^®
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For de Beauvoir, this is not simply a matter of marriage 
being an imprudent choice for a woman (or, presumably for 
a man if he takes on the domestic role). À woman "who 
chooses to marry, to become a housewife and to bear and 
raise children is doing something morally wrong.
It might be objected that this claim seems to be 
inconsistent for someone who tells us that her moral 
perspective is built on the existentialist ontology to be 
found in Sartre's Being and Nothingness.^^ Surely, we 
would expect de Beauvoir to emphasize the overriding 
importance of individual choice and not be concerned with 
moral considerations of right and wrong. So how can we 
be individually responsible for all of our choices and at 
the same time have our choice restricted by a moral 
requirement that rules out the choice to marry? Before 
we answer this^ let us consider de Beauvoir's attack on 
marriage in more detail.
Marriage and the destruction of a woman's autonomy
Marriage destroys a woman's freedom. This claim 
seems to follow a fortiori if, as de Beauvoir (1988:483) 
maintains, we are bound to seek power over others: in a 
close relationship with another person, like being 
married to them, one's spouse must limit one's freedom in 
some ways. And if, as we are told, the power 
relationships within monogamous marriage are always 
unequal and it is true that wives are bound to be more or 
less dominated by their husbands due to the inimical 
power relations in marriage, a woman must always lack the 
autonomy she naturally desires over her own life. There 
are a number of empirical explanations as to why this is 
so.
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According to de Beauvoir, a major cause of male
domination is the bourgeois system of private ownership,
from which the institution of 'male-headed marriage' is
the inevitable r e s u l t . I n  the traditional marriage the
husband is expected to be the breadwinner, he is expected
to 'bring in the money'. With this income, he is
expected to support his wife and family. At the same
time, however, this entitles him to a privileged position
within the marriage. Since he (the husband) earns the
income he thereby is taken to own it. As a result he has
(financial) control over his wife and family. Usually,
what follows from this, is that the husband regards his
wife as a kind of private property which he owns. In
other words, his financial superiority within the
relationship is one form of his power to dominate and
exploit his wife. Engels (1986:15) makes the same point
graphically when he writes:
Within the family he is the bourgeois, and the wife represents the proletariat.
As a housewife, a woman has to depend on her husband 
financially and this dependence is one main cause of her 
lack of freedom.
Two aspects of this general point deserve to be
emphasized. Firstly, in the traditional marriage it is
the husband's role, mainly due to his superior economic
status, to be the head of the household and he has this
status in the view of most members of society. As such,
usually, he thinks of his wife as being subordinate to
him. In the recent past, she took his surname, belonged
to his religion, his class, his c i r c l e . A l s o  as the
head of the house, he will expect to make the important
decisions which affect them both. Ultimately he decides
where they will live, the kind of lifestyle they will
have, the friends they will or will not have, and so on.
As a result, de Beauvoir (1988:448) writes:
They [men] look to marriage for an enlargement, a confirmation of their existence...
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extension through time and the universe...
Secondly, since the husband is expected to work in 
paid employment in order to provide the family income, he 
will be the one with a career and public status. His 
sense of identity will mainly come from and will be seen 
in terms of his occupation. Thus typically a man is not 
defined by his marital status. As de Beauvoir (1988:446) 
points out:
...he is regarded first of all as a producer whose existence is justified by the work he does...
In this way, the husband reaches out beyond the domestic
sphere. If he is successful in the paid work that he
does, moreover, he is likely to find his work meaningful
and rewarding and this, in turn is related to his sense
of self-fulfilment or transcendence. If he is fortunate,
for instance, he may actively and creatively participate
in the structuring of society. De Beauvoir (1988:105)
claims that such a man is the 'incarnation of
transcendence'. She (1988:449) writes:
In his occupation and his political life he encounters change and progress, he senses his
It is little wonder that as a result of these (alleged) 
advantages de Beauvoir (1988:483) feels justified in 
claiming 'Marriage incites man to a capricious 
imperialism.'
On the other hand, marriage is a freedom-destroying
experience for a woman. Firstly, the world and its
possibilities which are made accessible to the teenage
girl are 'snatched away' from her. De Beauvoir
(1988:449) writes:
...she breaks more or less decisively with her past, becoming attached to her husband's universe.
Things which had previously been central in her life - 
perhaps a career and related projects - are forgotten, or 
at the least, shelved.
Secondly, as a housewife, she is financially
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dependent on her husband. At best, she is only free to 
choose within the parameters of the financial resources 
allowed to her by her husband. As a housewife, she is :excluded from the public sphere of paid employment. As 
a result, her horizons are significantly narrowed; 
'domestic service and attendance upon infants are her 
roles'.^® For this reason alone the wife finds herself in 
a subordinate position. At the same time, the wife is 
required to loyally serve her husband for her lowly wage 
or more usually for no wage at all.^ '* But as Greer 
(1971:319) points out:
No worker could be required to sign on for life [in this way]: if he did, his employer could disregard all his attempts to gain better pay and conditions.^®
On the other hand, the services provided by a woman, as 
a housekeeper and child caretaker although they 
constitute a substantial contribution to the family's 
economic productivity, are ignored as a source of income.
This brings us to the third way in which a 
housewife's potential for autonomy is eroded, namely, she 
will lack a robust sense of her own identity. Not only 
does she become economically dependent on her spouse, she 
becomes dependent on the marital relationship to provide 
her with a sense of identity. She is defined in relation 
to her spouse. She becomes her husband's 'other half'; 
e.g. the doctor's wife. Some of the conventions that 
typically we associate with the marriage ceremony 
symbolize such a subordinate relationship. For instance, 
the bride is 'given away' by the father, the man 'takes' 
a wife. At no time does she seem to belong to herself; 
from being her father's property she becomes her 
husband's in much the same way as a piece of property is 
passed from one owner to the next.^®
On marrying instead of a man and a woman creating a 
joint identity together, according to de Beauvoir, what 
in fact happens is that the man gains a partner who is 
identified with him, a complement to his identity. On
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the other hand, in effect the woman loses her own 
identity. She loses the identity that she had as a 
worker and the continuity of her sense of her 
individuality provided by outside work relationships. As 
a result of her inferior role within the traditional 
marriage, she is likely to have a poor sense of who she 
is, or of self-esteem. She has become 'in essence, a 
servant and general l a b o u r e r ' a n  object for her 
husband. Often she becomes so far removed from power, 
she never contemplates what it would be like to have 
genuine responsibilities (like that of being head of the 
house).
It would be wrong to suggest that de Beauvoir thinks 
that in the unequal power relationships of the 
traditional marriage, women are the hapless victims of 
their enslavement. On the contrary, a woman is usually 
the willing accomplice in the surrender of her freedom. 
De Beauvoir (1988:452) suggests that the great majority 
of women
...are more active than young men in seeking marriage and taking the initiative in the matter.
Why would a woman choose to do this when the results so
undermine her freedom? Perhaps as Millett (1972:37)
suggests, it is a male conspiracy:
...a sporting kind of reparation to allow the subordinate female certain means of saving face.^
A veneer of choice is given to a woman when she chooses
to get married. But it masks the fact that this choice
will limit her freedom more than any other she is likely
to make in her life. This is the point at which a woman
is free to take the initiative for the last time. For as
Greer (1971:186) writes, this is the last stage in the
romantic adventure
...the one adventure open to her and now it is over. Marriage is the end of the story.
If she is going to be dominated from there on by her
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husband, she had better be thought to choose to do so.
À more plausible reason de Beauvoir (1988:168) gives
for women actively seeking marriage is that often she
does this to find a means of economic support. Through
marriage, a woman
...can hope to rise...into a caste superior to her own, a miracle that could not be bought by the labour of her lifetime.
Usually she can attain a better standard of living with
a husband than through her own endeavours. In this way,
women 'identify their own survival with the prosperity of
those who feed them.
This is further support for the view that a woman
naturally strives to 'marry well' (to find a rich and
powerful mate) to improve her social status in the belief
that 'some of his privilege will, so to speak, rub off'
on her.®^  So, seemingly, disparate features in her life
'love' and 'status' are inextricably intertwined.
Firestone sums up both of the points above - i.e. the
conspiracy (to make women believe they choose to marry)
and the view of marriage as a means of social advancement
- when she (1970:132) writes:
To participate in one's subjection by choosing one's master often gives the illusion of free choice; but in reality a woman is never free to choose love without external motives [improved social status].
Of course, only a small percentage of women in fact gain 
the economic benefits and social mobility for which, we 
are told, they marry. However, society makes much of 
these women. Furthermore, the prize always looks closer 
at hand than it is.®^  One reason why this pursuit of 
advancement and thereby vicarious power is frustrated is 
that it is usually self-defeating. A woman about to 
marry believes that she will share her husband's power 
but it is usually the woman who becomes the victim of it, 
by finding herself only in a subordinate role; he has 
'ownership and control' of her.®*
Once having accomplished her ambition to marry (for
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whatever motive) the woman wants to please her husband. 
She wants to create a home for them both, where 'he does 
not have to fight for his position' in the way that he is 
required to in the competitive world of work.®'* She wants 
to cook for him and to wait upon him. Furthermore she 
wants to look up to her husband, 'to seek his guidance to 
think of him as her superior'.®® Added to this she 
usually sees herself as a sexual object for her husband's 
enjoyment. She tries to keep her body approximate 'to 
the accepted image as a condition of his continuing 
desire and pride in her'.®® In this way she is 'more 
often a sexual object than a person' for her husband, as 
well as herself.®’ (At the same time, she is unlikely to 
ask herself whether or not her husband is attractive to 
her, only whether she is attractive to him.) She makes 
herself pretty for him and she makes his life pleasurable 
by tending to his physical and emotional needs.®® Such a 
woman typically embraces her husband's political opinions 
and values.®* Indeed, de Beauvoir (1988:663) claims that 
the woman
...tries to see with his eyes; she reads the books he reads, prefers the pictures and the music he prefers...she adopts his friendships; his enmities, his opinions...
She is usually content (and is expected to be content) to j
submissively accept her subordinate role, to be the 
shadow of her man."®
However we are reminded that by behaving like this, 
a woman makes choices 'not in accordance with her true 
nature...but as man defines her'."^ She puts herself
entirely in his hands; she forfeits her autonomy. As de 
Beauvoir (1988:653) puts the point:
...she will humble herself to nothingness before him.
But there is a paradox in such behaviour; it is self- 
defeating. When the housewife lets her identity be 
swallowed up by her husband in the way described, then 
there is nothing left for him to love. When she lets
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herself be so dominated by her husband, there can be no 
reciprocal relationship because she has let herself 
become nothing but a reflection of this man.
There is an equally troublesome reason why this 
subservient role is counterproductive to her interests. 
The wife has to be watchful in case she loses her spouse 
to another woman. She must discover and humour her 
husband's weaknesses; she must learn to apply in due 
measure 'flattery and scorn, vigilance and leniency'."^ 
He must be granted neither too much nor too little of the 
latter. If she is too lenient, she runs the risk of 
losing him. In which case, whatever money and passion he 
devotes to this other woman is taken from her, his wife. 
Furthermore she runs the risk of a mistress gaining 
enough power over her husband to make him divorce her. 
On the other hand, if she annoys him with her 
watchfulness, her scenes, her demands, if she denies him 
all sexual adventures, she is also likely to turn him 
against her and again she risks divorce. The position 
seems intolerable. She may well feel that she has no 
'option but to run away'."®
But if there comes a time when the wife can no 
longer tolerate this state-of-affairs, having chosen to 
marry and to be a housewife, the woman usually lacks the 
necessary training to enter any adequately paid 
profession. Not having any marketable skills she is 
totally dependent on her husband's goodwill. Without an 
outside source of income, she becomes reliant on her 
husband's earnings and hence his generosity. She has 
become 'his vassal'."'* Furthermore in those cases where 
this goodwill is absent, for a woman to contemplate 
divorce becomes only a theoretical possibility. Lacking 
the necessary skills, the wife knows only too well that 
life would be very hard for her to survive without her 
husband's financial support. And if she has children, 
her marketability as a housewife to another man is 
further minimized. In ways like the above, de Beauvoir
i':k:’h
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daims the traditional marriage destroys a woman's 
autonomy and her identity.
A response to de Beauvoir's assessment of autonomy
De Beauvoir (1988:493) claims that an important 
factor in the loss of a woman's autonomy in marriage is 
due to her giving up the paid employment she enjoyed when 
she was single, but it could be objected that this is 
adrift of the facts. At the time de Beauvoir was writing 
either middle-class single women did not work or if they 
did, most of them earned far less than their male
counterparts. As a result such women were unlikely ever 
to have been financially independent. Even nowadays if 
they work, the majority of women earn at least 30% less
,1
than men."® When they marry if they go out to work, this
is unlikely to bring about economic parity between a wife
and her husband. It seems unlikely that many of them
could be financially independent if this means they would
earn enough to support themselves.
In response to the point above it might be suggested
that women who work, no matter how small their income,
get a sense of financial independence since they are no
longer completely dependent on their husband's income."®
Taylor and Mill (Rossi 1970:105) made the point
colourfully (a hundred years earlier) when they argued:
...a woman who contributes materially to the support of the family, cannot be treated in the same contemptuously tyrannical manner as one who, however she may toil as a domestic drudge, is a dependent on the man for subsistence.
What Taylor and Mill suggest is that to give herself a 
sense of financial independence, a woman should be both 
a wife and try to have a successful career."’
However de Beauvoir (1988:498) seems to think that 
even in these cases, the husband would financially 
dominate his wife. To see this, we need to make a 
distinction between earning money and controlling it. In 
the traditional relationship the husband will always
134
control the household income.'*® Since the husband 
controls it of course, merely returning to paid 
employment is not going to automatically solve a woman's 
lack of financial independence. She might earn an income 
of her own but this will be controlled by her husband.** 
It might be pointed out that nowadays most of us do 
not have the sort of financial arrangements in marriage 
that de Beauvoir is discussing. Financial dependence and 
the associated lack of one's own identity are no longer 
applicable to modern marriages. Societal expectations 
have changed. More and more women are entering the 
workforce and have an income of their own and a status in 
their own right. They no longer need to accept an 
inferior financial role in marriage.
But it is wrong to suppose that all traces of these 
differences have disappeared; 'equality is, even so, 
rar e'F urther, we might query the assumption that in 
the typical modern marital relationship a husband will 
always have control over how the household income is 
spent.Certainly there are no a priori grounds for 
supposing this. And at first blush, one's own experience 
seems to suggest that couples vary widely as to the part 
each plays in the financial management of their affairs. 
But the empirical evidence indicates that even today, in 
most marriages, whilst it is the wife who manages the 
day-to-day household budget, the husband still has the 
final say over the main financial decisions.®® Despite 
the current emphasis on the importance of equality and 
sharing in marriage, the empirical findings indicate that 
financial equality in the management of their affairs 
only happens in 20% of cases.®* As de Beauvoir (1988:445) 
suggests :
Modern marriage can be understood only in the light of a past that tends to perpetuate itself.
We are dealing with deep-rooted socio-economic causes 
whose efficacy might diminish (temporarily) but they do 
not go away.®® It seems, in particular, that in most
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marriages today, de Beauvoir's indictment that marriage 
results in the husband financially controlling his 
spouse, is vindicated.
Another way in which de Beauvoir's general claim is 
vindicated in modern times is in the disadvantage that 
most married women experience (in contrast with their 
husbands) if they pursue a career. Most people still 
expect a working woman to assume the main responsibility 
for the upkeep of the home. It is still her 
responsibility to continue to do most of the housework 
and to make adequate provision for childcare. She has, 
in effect, a 'double shift'.®® She has to bear the double 
burden of two jobs, one paid outside the home, the other 
unpaid inside.®’ Most husbands, in contrast only have to 
work the one shift.®® There are some cases, of course, in 
which married women are successfully engaged in 
professional or managerial careers and they are not faced 
by the double burden of housework and childcare.®* For 
instance, some (usually middle-class) women can maintain 
household standards and avoid the problems of raising 
children by employing a domestic worker. Working-class 
women, on the other hand, usually have no option but to 
bear the double burden. As a result, unlike her husband, 
the choices of work outside of the home that such wives 
can make are limited due to their role as a housewife or 
mother.
This brings us to a related disadvantage which many
wives in paid employment experience. If they want to
have a career, this usually means that they will have to
compete with men in the public sphere. For as Friedan
(1965:300) counsels:
If a job is to be the way out of the trap for a woman, it must be a job that she can take seriously as part of a life plan, work in which she can grow as part of society.
However it is pointed out by many writers that the 
woman's career is typically interrupted when she retreats 
from the labour force to have and to care for young
1.
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children. (For at the same time as pursuing a career, 
women want to be good wives and mothers ; they want to 
perform their roles as wives and mothers successfully.) 
Usually this is at the very stage at which ambitious men 
are taking the first key steps up the promotion ladder. 
This too places a wife at a disadvantage when compared
Iwith her husband who, typically, does not have his careerinterrupted in this way. As a consequence of this, we
are reminded of de Beauvoir's (1988:165) point:
...it is more difficult for woman than for man to reconcile her family life with her role as worker.
This too, surely, is a feature of the traditional 
marriage which still applies today.
Before we leave this point I have a quite different 
observation to make. It concerns the expectations which 
is placed in the traditional marriage upon the husband to 
provide the family income. At the time de Beauvoir was 
writing, it was generally expected that when a man 
married he would support his wife and family. A large 
portion if not all of his income was allocated to this 
end. But where this is the case, we might ask; isn't 
marriage imprudent for him? De Beauvoir also overlooks 
the point that in having to support his wife and family 
and having to finance the upkeep of a home, most men have 
no choice but to continue in paid employment. They are, 
as Greer (1971:250) colourfully puts it, '...screwed 
permanently into the system'. Many husbands also find 
that they are unfulfilled in their work but cannot stop 
working because of their financial duties to their wives 
and families. With such economic demands placed upon 
them it is not clear that in most marriages, husbands are 
any more economically independent than their wives. 
Furthermore, no doubt we can all cite cases in which the 
wife has control over the household purse strings. Her 
husband brings home the pay packet and the wife is the 
one who makes the decisions regarding when and how this 
income shall be distributed. To this extent she holds
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the financial power in their relationship. Where this is 
the case, de Beauvoir's criticism of this aspect of 
marriage applies, mutatis mutandis, to men.
A different difficulty we might have with de
Beauvoir's general argument that marriage leads to the
destruction of a young woman's autonomy is that this
claim is disingenuous. On de Beauvoir's interpretation
of the phrase 'to be free to do something', entails that
one is able to actually exercise the choice to do that
thing. But many women are not aware that they have this
choice vis-a-vis marriage until it is too late - they are
already married and have borne children.®® And this is
not surprising. For as de Beauvoir (1988:445) writes:
Marriage is the destiny traditionally offered to women by society.
The ability to know what we want in the choices we make, 
is not always as straightforward as it might seem. To 
paraphrase Sartre (1966:624-625), the choices that are 
available to us depend upon the factivity of the 
situation. And we have seen (in Chapter Two) many of our 
thoughts and actions with regard to marriage are shaped 
by the mores in which we have been raised. Women 
typically choose to marry not in an atmosphere where not 
marrying is a real option but in the facticity of a 
social context in which the overriding belief is that 
marriage is the first and foremost of goals for young 
w o m e n . ( T h e y  often believe also that part of their 
adult identity is tied up with being a wife and mother.)
The choice for most young women is not whether or not to 
marry but who to marry. Hence the idea of a choice - to 
marry or not to marry - is not a real option for most 
women.
However in support of de Beauvoir it might be argued 
that once they are married, if they realize they have 
surrendered their freedom, every woman can do something 
about this. For some, as Greer (1971:18) suggests, it 
may be that all she needs do is to free herself 'from the
■ II
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desire to fulfil her husband's expectations'. But often 
the problem is greater than that. Often she is faced 
with the choice of whether or not to end an unhappy 
marriage. She has to choose, this is to say, between 
staying married with the accompanying frustration of her 
life goals, or to divorce, with the accompanying upheaval 
and distress caused not only to her spouse but to their 
children, parents and family, and often in the awareness 
of the lack of any acceptable alternatives open to her. 
If these factors do not completely determine her choice, 
they significantly circumscribe it. (And similar 
arguments apply mutatis mutandis to her husband).
De Beauvoir is aware of these difficulties of 
course. She recognizes the conflict between a woman's 
need to assert herself as an independent person and, at 
the same time, the restraints that seem to limit this 
choice.®^ However de Beauvoir insists that we are all 
capable of resisting the 'seductions of dependence'.®® A 
woman can 'cast herself as transcendent and posit a 
desiring project of her own' . Like Sartre, de Beauvoir 
maintains that every human being is both a pour-soi and 
en-soi ; we are both a transcendence and an immanent 
facticity. We are limited by our facticity but given 
these limits, human beings are always free to transcend 
their present situation and choose a new course of action 
from the many possibilities that are always before them.®®
A final difficulty needs to be noted, although it 
will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. It 
concerns the claim that in marriage the wife must be 
subordinate to her husband; the husband must be the head 
of their household. If this is a logical 'must' it is 
clearly false; there is no contradiction in denying the 
claim or demonstrating that the contrary is often the 
case. Nor is this the 'must' of causal connection; it is 
not a matter of say, psychological necessity. It is 
psychologically possible that in marriage the husband is 
dominated by the wife. And we can all cite cases where
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the wife is (or seems to be) the dominant partner. The 
husband in such cases has a good reason for the claim 
that he lacks autonomy due to the relationship.
The 'must' in question follows, of course, from de 
Beauvoir's belief that we are all motivated by the desire 
for power over others, the basic human desire to turn 
them into 'the other'. Following de Beauvoir, we need
this principle to comprehend human relationships. When
we try to make sense of the latter, we cannot escape the 
universal nature of the 'temptation to dominate'.®® Thus
the dominant/subordinate relationship in marriage is 
inevitable. But is it? And if it is, if marriage does 
entail that one or other must be the head of the house, 
must this be thought to reflect badly on the institution 
of marriage, as de Beauvoir claims?
I
Housework and the loss of self-realization
Another natural desire that all human beings have, 
we noted, is the desire for self-fulfilment; we want to 
realize our potentialities as persons.®’ And we can do 
this by reaching out beyond our present circumstances 
(transcendence) in creative projects which define goals 
beyond the present and try to change our world in some 
lasting way. While marriage might frustrate a woman's 
natural desire for freedom and power, it is often claimed 
that she can at least have a sense of personal growth or 
fulfilment in a meaningful vocation as a homemaker, or as 
a housewife. De Beauvoir denies this.®® She claims that 
being a housewife creates a sense of emptiness or 
'nothingness' in women. Why is this?
First of all, rather than being engaged in self- 
developing creative acts, the housewife (or homemaker) 
will soon discover that she is condemned to a life of 
mindless and repetitive work, i.e. housework. Rather 
than being meaningful labour, housework is stultifying 
labour. Cleaning the house, after all, has little point 
to it, beyond maintaining a clean house.®* It is, as de
140
Beauvoir (1988:470) says, 'an endless struggle without
victory over the dirt'. The housewife's days are, she
(1988:466) writes:
A gilded mediocrity lacking ambition and passion, aimless days indefinitely repeated, life that slips away gently towards death without questioning its purpose...
Her creative and rational capacities are stultified 
through the repetitive acts of shopping, cooking, 
cleaning, washing, ironing, and so on. Rather than 
growing, the housewife is trapped in a present that 
always remains the same; she leads a life of immanence as 
opposed to transcendence.
A housewife's natural desire for self-fulfilment is 
frustrated in another way. Rather than finding a sense 
of fulfilment in her relationship with others, she is 
alienated from her fellow housewives. Typically she 
lives in a neighbourhood where there are other housewives 
who are as boring as she is. De Beauvoir (1988:557) 
claims :
...their correspondence deals especially with beauty counsel, recipes for cooking, directions for knitting.
To make matters worse, underlying such intellectual 
shallowness there is a competitive hostility between 
housewives. Each tries 'to keep up with the Joneses'. 
Each tries to impress the other with her possessions, for 
these are the signs of success in the housewife's world. 
They compete for 'the nicest home, the most successful 
kids'.’® And in this battle, each acquisition, each new 
piece of furniture in one woman's home is seen as a 
threat to another's relative status. Further, a dress 
which beautifies a friend may also be seen in terms of a 
threat from a competing sexual object. Because of this 
competition and since her greatest allegiance is bound to 
be towards her husband (upon whom she is financially 
dependent), true friendship between housewives, we are 
told, is impossible.’^
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...can get away with it only if she adds that she is neurotic, abnormal, childhating, and therefore 'unfit'.
*I
At first blush, the account above seems to be a 
tendentious caricature of a housewife's lot, (I will 
return to it in Chapter Six.) But even if we were to 
accept that like any caricature, there is a semblance of 
truth in the overstatement, it could be pointed out that 
there is a further feature of self-fulfilment in the 
lives of most housewives, namely, they have children. 
Isn't motherhood one creative project in which a 
housewife can discover true fulfilment and 
transcendence?’^ Indeed in the traditional mores it is 
believed 'motherhood is the only way in which a woman can 
discover true fulfilment and genuine respect'.’® Every 
housewife is expected to make motherhood 'a central focus 
of her life';’* otherwise she is 'shirking a 
responsibility'.’® On the other hand, women who are 
unable to have children and who want to have them, are 
pitied whereas those who could have children but who do 
not want them, are thought to be unnatural, selfish and 
even 'unfeminine'.’® As Firestone (1970:228) writes, a 
woman who does not want to have a child 1
There is another way in which the claim above is 
confirmed. Sometimes in a state of boredom, alienation 
and loneliness, a housewife believes that she will solve 
her problem - her sense of loneliness and isolation - by 
having children; she believes that having a child will 
make up for the emptiness she finds in her life. She 
thinks that motherhood must be 'the fulfilment of all 
that she has wanted in the world'.” Thus for such a 
woman to intentionally become pregnant seems to be 'the 
incarnation of a creative project'. It seems to be a 
prima facie example of 'defining goals beyond the present 
and trying to change the world in some lasting way'.
De Beauvoir (1988:514) denies this. In the first 
place becoming pregnant is not a creative project. 
Pregnancy is just a natural, animal (en-soi) function
142
that a woman undergoes; the woman merely submits to her 
biological nature, 'she does not control it'.’® She is 
arrested 'at the level of biological experience'.’* in 
other words, pregnancy is not a transcending process. 
The woman does not make the baby, rather her body 
accommodates the growing foetus which 'makes itself 
within her'.®° She may want to have the baby but she 
cannot creatively participate in its foetal development. 
Nor can she determine the nature of the child she will 
have. Thus there is no creative act or transcendence 
involved.
Does a woman fare any better in terms of 
transcendence when child rearing? De Beauvoir does not 
think so. The mother nourishes the child. She attends 
to its physical and emotional needs, but she does not 
transcend herself in the situation. Human creativity 
requires that one brings a preconceived idea(s) into 
reality through labour. At best all the mother does is
to lay the necessary framework for the child to grow and
perhaps to transcend itself at some point in the future.
In which case de Beauvoir (1988:539) writes:
...her transcendence through the universe andtime is still by proxy.
It is not she but the child who becomes capable of 
changing the world. If, on the other hand, the mother 
consciously views her children as a creative project, 
spending her time with them, manipulating their 
personalities and interests so that they become what she 
intends them to be, she deprives them of their autonomy.
By smothering them with attention and constant direction, 
children are not given the chance to experiment with 
their own projects and so develop the ability to choose 
what they might like to do with their lives. Nor are 
they given the opportunity to develop self-reliance and 
other necessary skills which will enable them to become 
self-determining agents. In other words, by trying to 
justify her life through the lives of her children, the
i
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mother my consign her children to immanence as well.
There is worse to come. If a woman does decide to
devote herself to motherhood, this is 'a precarious
venture on which to base a life'.®^ Pregnancy, childbirth
and motherhood are not what most women expect them to
be.®^  It is seldom a solution to her problems. A child
seldom satisfies a mother's desire for self-fulfilment.
They are not a substitute for rational companionship.
The baby, de Beauvoir (1988:525) points out, is not even
active in the relationship, 'its smiles, its babble, have
no sense other than what the mother gives them'. Added
to this, in the early days a mother is usually constantly
mentally and physically debilitated due to the fatigues
of childbirth and sleep deprivation. And later on, young
children make more housework; there is more mess to be
cleaned up by the mother. For these as much as any other
reasons, it is unlikely that a woman qua mother will find
transcendence by having children.
A further factor worth our noting is the claim that
many women tend to feel they have lost rather than gained
something when they have a child. For women that grow up
with hopes of a career, it can be traumatic to suddenly
find yourself stuck at home with a baby. As Oakley
(1980:280) writes:
What is lost may be one's job, one's lifestyle, an intact 'couple' relationship, control over one's body or a sense of 'self'.
This sense of loss will increase where the responsibility 
for children is seen to be mainly the province of the 
woman.®® And despite the many suggestions that there is 
today a more equal acceptance of responsibility (by 
fathers), mothers are usually still deemed to be 'solely 
responsible for childcare'.®* Lastly, even if she does 
get some sense of fulfilment from them, at some point the 
woman stops having children. When they grow up and leave 
home, she will be left feeling that she has lost her 
purpose in life.®®
In the chapters ahead I want to concentrate on de
f
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Beauvoir's claim that the gender roles we perform in 
marriage entail a diminution of transcendence. So by way 
of clearing the ground I want to raise some other 
concerns I have with her account. Perhaps it is not too 
difficult to accept the claim that if she merely 
passively conforms to the tradition, the housewife will 
be in bad faith.®® But it might be pointed out that there 
is a sense in which an autonomous woman can choose her 
subordinate role as a housewife. Let us suppose that she
conforms to the housewife's role because she sees the
■advantages of it, not simply because it is 'the done 
thing'. Suppose the woman makes a deliberate choice to 
be a housewife and mother. (Autonomy is not co-extensive 
with wisdom.) If she acknowledges that she always could 
choose whether or not to remain in this relationship, 
wouldn't de Beauvoir have to say that the woman is 
autonomous to the extent that she remains the ultimate 
judge of what she will do and think, including the 
decision to be a housewife?
Given the disparaging account of this role we are 
considering, however, it is an odd choice for a woman to 
make. She chooses not to utilise her own talents; she 
would rather have 'a piggyback' than succeed on her own 
efforts. She invests all of her energy into securing a 
'good' husband. She chooses to let her husband be head 
of the household. She chooses to let him determine her 
projects. She chooses to let her desires be submerged so 
that his can take precedence over hers, even if his 
desires are completely at odds with what she would have 
chosen for herself. She chooses to be no longer 
responsible for herself. At some point presumably she 
chooses to be an en-soi, to abrogate her freedom; she 
chooses to deny her own possibilities and projects. If 
this is really what happens I think we might agree, using 
de Beauvoir's terms, that such a woman chooses to live in 
bad faith. Nonetheless the self-determining housewife 
could make even this choice.
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A second difficulty I have with de Beauvoir's 
account concerns her views about personal growth or 
fulfilment that attaches to the world of work. It is 
naïve to assume that all or most married men have 
creative and meaningful jobs, a more fulfilling and 
creative lifestyle than their wives. It overlooks the 
fact that the majority of men are not privileged, well- 
educated, middle-class professionals.®’ They are poorly 
educated and working-class, with monotonous, lowly paid 
jobs in which it is difficult to see how in any sense 
they can be thought to express themselves creatively. 
The sorts of things de Beauvoir has to say about the 
advantages attained by men in marriage, in other words, 
has to be seen at best in the context of middle-class 
society. Even here the facts appear to be somewhat 
different to those suggested by de Beauvoir. I suspect 
that most middle-class men too will experience a lack of 
fulfilment partly due to their jobs and partly to their 
gender roles within marriage. In which case, no doubt de 
Beauvoir would say, if this is the case a man too should 
not marry.
A third related difficulty concerns the contingent 
nature of de Beauvoir's claims. She objects to marriage 
partly because of the roles of housework and mothering 
since she claims this entails an inevitable lack of 
fulfilment for women when they perform these roles. A 
man, on the other hand, seems to gain every advantage 
from this arrangement. According to de Beauvoir 
(1988:451) his material needs are attended to; his dinner 
is on the table in a neat and tidy house, he has clean 
shirts everyday, he has his children cared for, and 
generally his existence is enhanced. We might think 
there is something in this. There is a great deal of 
empirical evidence for instance, which indicates that the 
psychological health of married men is significantly 
better than that of single men or married woman.®® 
However even if this is correct, it needs to be stressed
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again that it is only contingently so. These alleged 
advantages are not necessary features of a man's lot in 
marriage. It is quite possible for marriage to 
degenerate for men to the level which, de Beauvoir 
claims, most women experience it.
This brings me to my last point in this section. As 
we have seen, de Beauvoir claims that being a housewife 
and a mother - or at least having the responsibility for 
the housework and the children - are stereotypical 
domestic roles that a woman, rather than a man, must 
perform in marriage. This is not to say that all married 
women perform these roles. For instance, where birth 
control is free or readily available a woman need not 
become pregnant unless she chooses;®* and some choose not 
to, while some find they cannot have children. But where 
the roles of housework and mothering need to be 
performed, de Beauvoir points out that they are as matter 
of fact “ and it is generally thought they ought to be - 
a woman's role. We need to ask: ought such tasks be a 
wife's role in marriage? In other words; are there good 
reasons for thinking that this ought/ought not to be her 
role? We need secondly to be clear about what precisely 
'self-fulfilment through creative projects' means and if 
it is the case that housewifery and. motherhood are 
necessarily precluded from this. We will return to these 
questions in Chapter Six.
Marriage frustrates a woman's desire for sexual 
satisfaction
We noted that as well as destroying a woman's 
freedom and self-fulfilment, marriage destroys the 
chances of a woman having the kind of sexual satisfaction 
she naturally seeks. De Beauvoir (1988:400-404) holds, 
firstly, that sexual intercourse in a traditional 
marriage makes it extremely difficult for a woman to know 
and nurture her own sexual desires and needs.*° They are 
required instead to meet men's sexual expectations and
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needs. The pre-dominant view of sex for centuries has 
been based around penetration and the male orgasm; male 
dominance and female submission in sexual behaviour.*^ 
But more than this, secondly, the marital sexual
relationship is 'the source of her sexual oppression'.*^
Like de Beauvoir, many feminists contend that sexual 
activity in a monogamous heterosexual marriage is the 
place in which harassment and rape are most overt.*® 
Before discussing these claims however, it is worth 
reminding ourselves that although they have the 
appearance of being empirical they also follow
necessarily from the claims which de Beauvoir makes 
concerning power relations and transcendence in a long­
term heterosexual relationship.
There are a number of reasons why marriage 
frustrates a woman's desire for sexual satisfaction- 
Firstly, as we saw in Chapter Two, marriage changes what 
begins as an erotic relationship into a legal one. 
Rather than seducing or being seduced by a woman, who 
freely gives herself, marriage gives the husband a legal 
right 'to take his pleasure'.** Conversely the wife has 
a legal obligation to perform her marital sexual duties, 
whether she likes it or not. But de Beauvoir (1988:454) 
objects, when her sexual desires become subordinate to 
those of her husband's, the married woman loses
'ownership of her own body'. To make matters worse, in 
many marital relationships the husband feels entitled to 
have unrestricted sexual access to his wife even - in 
some cases - when this is against the woman's will. 
Sometimes this can take the form of his pestering or 
badgering her to have sexual intercourse with him. 
However some husbands obtain sexual intercourse with 
their wives by the use of physical force against her; 
they rape their wives.*® Many women experience rape in
the marital relationship - they are physically forced to
■have sexual intercourse when they do not want this. This 
kind of behaviour some husbands seem to think, is
" " î
...there is nothing for her to discern or construct; there is nothing for her to find out except what [her husband] will do to her...
find herself given to someone who is exercising a right over her.
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justified as a result of what they consider to be their 
legal entitlement in marriage.
It seems that again married women are inclined to 
connive in their own downfall here. We are told that in 
the typical sexual relationship, a woman chooses to offer 
her body in exchange for marriage; she sees that her role 
is to 'provide sexual satisfaction for her husband'.*® 
She sacrifices her sexual autonomy and offers herself as 
a sexual object for her husband's use. As a result, it 
is little wonder that a husband may think he has a right 
to have sexual intimacy whenever he so desires and that 
his wife has an obligation to participate. By having her 
sexuality used in this way, the married woman is confined 
to immanence. As Dworkin (1992:116) writes;
This is why de Beauvoir (1988:167) claims that the sexual 
relationship in marriage is a form of prostitution. In 
return for financial support and social mobility, the 
woman offers her body as 'capital' for exploitation. She 
finds it easier to sell herself to a man, her husband, 
than to try to make her own way in the workplace.*’
This is part of de Beauvoir's more general claim 
that marriage (1988:463) is 'obscene in principle'. It 
transforms into rights and duties those mutual relations 
which, she (ibid) claims, should be founded on a 
spontaneous urge. Sexual intercourse should be a 
spontaneous act, not performed to meet a (marital) right 
which is given in perpetuity to another person. It 
should be a matter of passion rather than a legal 
obligation. Incidentally de Beauvoir adds, this kind of 
sexual encounter is unlikely to be successful. She 
(1988:463) suggests:
The husband is often chilled by the idea thathe is doing a duty, and the wife is ashamed to
1
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In time husbands lose out in the exchange too, for their 
sexuality becomes detached from other emotions which 
remain ignored and unloved.*® So what began as a mutually 
desired sexual exchange in marriage quickly reduces into ■ ■ ■an unwanted one.
Another cause of a husband's lack of sexual interest 
in his wife as a sexual partner, de Beauvoir claims, is 
due to housework®* and motherhood^^. While a woman's 
beauty is the original source of her attraction and 
power, both housework and pregnancy 'are its enemies'.®®^ 
Pregnancy destroys a woman's figure; housework, her mind.
As a result, a husband often loses his sexual desire for 
his wife.
In contrast with sexual encounters within marriage, 
sexual intercourse, de Beauvoir (1988:463) claims, has to 
be based upon a 'spontaneous urge'. What she seems to 
mean by this is that sexual pleasure is only to be found 
in spontaneity - not doing what is required of you (by 
the law or the mores) but rather because you 
spontaneously desire to do so. De Beauvoir (1988:459) 
writes :
...in a genuinely moral erotic relationship there is free assumption of desire and pleasure...when the other is recognized as an individual.
Lack of spontaneity seems to be an inevitable feature of 
sex within marriage. Marriage turns sex, for the husband 
as well as the wife, into a mundane everyday experience; 
for once a sexual relationship has been established for 
a period of time, 'the magic of eroticism spontaneously 
evaporates rather rapidly' After a number of encounters 
between husband and wife, the adventure and erotic 
excitement of a new person fades. Even where erotic love 
exists before the marriage, it rarely persists through 
the long years which follow. All that is left is a 
'steady if not satisfactory sex supply'.
What is surprising to de Beauvoir is that anyone 
should think that it could be otherwise. She (1988:464) I
150
consequences follow: first she has no right to any sexual activity apart from marriage...
i
#
writes :
... it is pure absurdity to maintain that two married persons, bound by ties of practical, social and moral interest, will provide each other with sexual satisfaction as long as they live.
Familiarity breeds both boredom and contempt. When a 
married couple know each other so well, they will no 
longer experience their spouse as a freely choosing 
individual (pour-soi) but rather as a sexual object (en- 
soi). At best, sexual relations in marriage lead a man 
and woman to use each other for their own ends.
Finally, the boredom women experience with the same 
sexual partner, inevitably leads her to (improper) sexual 
fantasies with a different man. If she is fantasising 
about, say, Richard Gere when 'making love' (sic), to her 
husband, she is really not enjoying the latter but 
another person. Hence de Beauvoir (1988:465) says that 
sexual intimacy of the kind experienced in an established 
marriage
...is no longer an intersubjective experience in which each goes beyond self, but rather is a kind of joint masturbation.
De Beauvoir makes this general point in another way.
She (1988:466) claims that acceptable spontaneous sex can 
only be achieved when it plays 'an episodic and 
independent role'. Monogamous marriage precludes this by 
the demand it makes of fidelity. De Beauvoir (1988:454) 
notes :
In regard to her erotic fate, two essential
De Beauvoir maintains that not only sexual intercourse 
but fidelity also should be freely given and not be 
regarded as an obligation. She (1988:464) argues that 
fidelity has a place in the early stages of any sexual 
relationship because lovers do not want their sexual 
intimacy 'to be contradicted by experiences with 
outsiders; they want each one to be irreplaceable for the
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o t h e r F i d e l i t y  in this context is meaningful since 
'it is freely given'.However to regard fidelity as a 
moral duty or a legal obligation is, once again, to turn 
one's body into an instrument for the other person to use 
at any time. We should be able to express our sexuality 
freely and not be constrained by the law or any 
externally imposed code of conduct; the law or a moral 
list of 'do's and don'ts' have no place in this aspect of 
our lives.
Does marriage necessarily destroy the possibility of 
women having the kind of sexual satisfaction they 
naturally seek? Is satisfactory sexual intercourse 
necessarily a matter of two people falling spontaneously 
and passionately into each other's arms? Must marriage 
turn what begins as an erotic satisfying relationship 'into a legal one, in which a husband thinks himself 
entitled to sexually harass and even to rape his wife?
Is it reasonable to demand sexual fidelity in marriage?
We will discuss these questions in detail in Chapter 
Seven.
Why marriage is immoral
We have considered de Beauvoir's claim that it is 
not in a woman's best interest to marry. It is 
inevitable that her husband will become head of the 
house, that her roles in marriage as a housewife and 
mother will destroy the possibilities of her self- 
fulfilment or transcendence, and that her sexual 
satisfaction will be forfeit. To stress the point: a
married woman's freedom is thwarted by the power 
relationship in which she is economically dependent on 
her husband and in which she gives up her own identity 
and projects to further the identity and projects of this 
other person. She thwarts her creativity and the 
development of her talents and capacities by becoming a 
housewife and a mother. She thwarts genuine sexual 
satisfaction (or anyway makes sexual satisfaction very
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oppression.
Moreover, as de Beauvoir points out, a choice of
difficult) by becoming legally bound to a long-term 
exclusive monogamous relationship. Hence such a choice 
(to marry) is extremely imprudent for a woman. (And this 
applies presumably to a man insofar as he fulfils these 
roles or meets these conditions.) However these are 
prima facie self-regarding considerations. It is not 
obvious how such reasons lead to the claim that a woman 
is being immoral if she marries. So where exactly does 
morality fit into the picture?
The answer is that since we are committed to valuing 
freedom above all else, then we are committed to value 
those institutions which protect and enhance freedom. Or 
conversely, if one values freedom, one is logically 
committed to oppose those kinds of institutions that 
limit or destroy freedom. Thus de Beauvoir (1988:28) 
writes :
...we shall pass judgements on institutions according to their effectiveness in giving concrete opportunities to individuals.
Institutions are immoral insofar as they limit an 
individual from choosing, or where the choices that are 
available to a person are severely restricted by the 
facticity entailed by the institution. We can see now 
where morality fits into the picture. When the majority 
of women make this choice, the effect is to limit the 
freedom - especially in terms of economic and political 
power - of the entire class of women. Women as a class 
remain exploited because they lack economic and political 
power necessary to escape their oppression and this, to 
a large extent, is due to their choosing to marry. 
Moreover, as long as being a housewife and mother is the 
vocation they choose, women will remain oppressed. This 
too serves to reinforce an institution that limits the 
freedom of those who make up the class. Hence marriage 
itself is an oppressive institution; indeed, as we noted, 
for many feminists it is the primary source of women's
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this nature indirectly influences others. By choosing a 
particular role, we are endorsing that role. We are 
saying that it is morally acceptable for a person to 
choose to be this sort of t h i n g . T h e  most immediate 
effect of the choices she makes within marriage is on the 
minds of a woman's children. A mother is an important 
role model for her children. When she chooses to be a 
housewife, children grow up believing that this is the 
most natural role for a woman. In this way an oppressing 
institution is perpetuated through her children. Because 
her actions endorse and perpetuate an institution which 
harms so many, the woman makes a choice which is 'an 
absolute evil' (If they were to universalize their
choices, presumably they would see that they are 
reinforcing an oppressive institution.)
In the next three chapters I want to consider some 
of these claims in more detail. Firstly, the claim that 
in marriage a head of the house is inevitable. One of 
the couple (for de Beauvoir it is always the husband) is 
bound to regard themselves (or to be regarded) as head of 
the household, which in turn subordinates the other and 
so destroys their freedom. Secondly, the claim that the 
gender roles we have in marriage are inevitable and that 
these roles - especially being a housewife and mother - 
destroy the need a person has for transcendence through 
creative projects. Finally, the claim that good sexual 
experiences must be forfeit in marriage. The former have 
to be freely chosen events between two pour-sols which is 
only achieved in sexual relationship with a series of 
different sexual partners. In short, fidelity as a duty 
entails bad sex.
ni-
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Chapter Five
The head of the household
I
De Beauvoir maintains that in a marriage 
relationship it is inevitable that one or other of the 
partners will be in the dominant role, 'the head of the 
household'; and that this in turn entails a severe 
diminution in the other partner's autonomy. The question 
we need to ask in this chapter is: does marriage entail 
a relationship like this? In the traditional marriage, 
we noted also how de Beauvoir maintains it is the husband 
who is always the head of the household and his wife is 
subordinate to him.^ Presumably this situation is 
justified if a relevant, unfailing and universal 
difference could be found between men and women that 
entailed male domination. Can such a difference be 
found? In this chapter, I will begin by considering some 
of the affirmative claims - from the Judaic-Christian 
tradition, Aristotle, Rousseau, and the more recent 
sociobiological claims concerning the natural 
dispositions of the different genders - which aim at 
justifying (or explaining) male domination. I will go on 
to consider the claim that even if there is not a 
universal relevant difference, we want or we need someone 
to be in authority in a marriage. I will then argue that 
a more equitable relationship between a husband and wife 
is possible. However I will show that even here it 
appears that in marriage a diminution in an individual's 
autonomy cannot be avoided.
As we noted, de Beauvoir maintains that in the 
traditional marriage the husband is bound to regard 
himself (and to be regarded) as the head of the 
household. Obviously this does not mean that it entitles 
the husband to be overbearing, to harass his wife, to 
force her to do things against her will, or to use her in 
other ways as an instrument for his own ends. He may be
.s
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considerate and concerned for his wife, he may support 
her in her projects and put her interests before his own. 
What his being 'the head of the household' does require 
is that the husband is ultimately responsible for making 
the important decisions and of taking charge when 
cooperative action is required within the family. It can 
mean, for instance, he ultimately decides such things as 
where they will live, the kind of lifestyle they will 
have, the friends they will or will not have, and so on. 
As the head of the household, the husband will expect to 
be responsible for such decisions and on these occasions, 
presumably, he will expect his ruling to be followed. On 
a more mundane level, his being the head of the house is 
manifest in such things as his expectation to drive the 
family car, or for his wife to launder his shirts for 
him, or to have his dinner waiting on the table? on the 
other hand, if she has projects, these are expected to 
take place unobtrusively and must not interfere with her 
domestic responsibilities. We need to ask how this kind 
of domination is to be justified (if at all).
Biblical sources
There are a number of biblical texts which suggest
that male domination in marriage is determined by God and
as such is morally right. They assert the dependence,
subordination and - in some cases - the inferiority of
women. To take one from the many examples available,
Paul (Corinthians 1, 11:8-9) says:
For man was not made from woman, but woman from man. Neither was man created for woman but woman for man/®
No doubt it will be objected that it is wrong to 
interpret such passages in a way that takes little 
account of the culture of the times in which they were 
written. It could be pointed out, for instance, that 
Paul's strictures concerning women occur within the 
general context of patriarchy, as well as against the 
background of the peculiar circumstances obtaining in the
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11cities of Corinth and Ephesus at that time.® Further Paul 
does make some comments about women which seem to support 
a more egalitarian outlook.* Nonetheless it would be 
wrong to minimize Paul's evident attitude in favour of 
male domination, particularly where this concerns 
marriage. His view has been very influential. It is 
regarded by many 20th century Christians as justifying 
(God-given) male domination of women. The inferior
status of women to men is regarded by most 
fundamentalists at least, as divinely inspired doctrine.®
À quick way of showing the moral irrelevance of an 
appeal to divine (or Paul's) authority on this matter is 
the following response: either there is a good reason for 
the divine command that women should be subordinate to 
men, or there is not. Now if there are 'bad' reasons for 
God's command - it is just the result of an arbitrary 
whim or perhaps unfair favouritism - then what reason 
does a rational person have to accept the claim that we 
should obey? We may obey simply because we will be 
punished if we do not. But surely, if the only defence 
that can be given for a command is a naked appeal to 
power, then it is better - more courageous - to choose to 
ignore the command and risk the punishment.
The more likely alternative is that God has good 
reasons for commanding what He does. But then if there 
are good reasons for commanding A rather than B, surely, 
it is because those reasons are good reasons that one 
should do A, not merely because God says so.® In other 
words, we require good reasons for male domination in 
marriage if we are to accept this.
Perhaps the good reasons in question can be found in 
the fact that the power arrangement in marriage reflects 
the natural state of things. Many philosophers in the 
past have given versions of this kind of naturalistic 
argument. Let us consider some of them.
faculties.
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Naturalistic arguments for male dominance
Men dominate women just because men are naturally 
dominant; women are dependent upon men because they are 
naturally inclined to dependence. Some philosophers, 
like Montesquieu (1977:108)’, Rousseau (1911:321), and 
Schopenhauer (1951:62)® concentrate on the superior 
physical strength of men to justify male domination. For 
others, like Aristotle (Politics 1259-1260), Comte 
(1974:504)* and Fichte (1970:394-396) female subordination 
is mainly due to psychological differences between the 
genders. For the latter writers it is mainly a woman's 
lack of rationality that entails her subordination? 
according to Fichte (ibid) it comes down to the matter of 
'an intrinsic weakness of her reason'. Both views have 
their counterparts in modern times.
Let us begin with the overt sexual differences in
the physical make-up of males and females. According to
Rousseau (1911:321):
But for her sex, a woman is a man; she has the same organs, the same needs, the same
But sex is not a mere contingency (as we might be tempted 
to think from the quotation above), rather it determines 
the entire nature and role of the subject. Everything 
else follows and ought to follow from a person's sex. 
Thus a woman ought to have a different education, moral 
values, role in society, and an entirely different 
function in the domestic household, from that assigned to 
a male. In other words, as a result of the sexual 
difference, male and female are (or rather 'ought to be') 
quite different ways of being human. And this in turn 
requires the domination of women by men.
Accordingly, Rousseau suggests in Emile Book V that 
by the end of his (ideal) education, the young man's 
accomplishments and experience ought to include the 
ability to support himself, if necessary with a trade, so 
that he is independent of the goodwill or charity of 
other men. He ought to be familiar with the arts and the
1
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sciences, with government, the laws and public affairs in
general? he ought to be familiar with the moral norms in
his own and other countries and he ought to have an
independent faculty of judgement. When it comes to
marriage, Emile (1911:412) is told by his tutor:
You hope to be a husband and a father: have you seriously considered your duties? When you become head of a family you will become a citizen of your country.
Marriage for Emile ought to involve his proper inclusion
into the body politic, whereas his wife and family ought
only to be connected to society through him, the head of
the household.^'
In contrast, a woman's education ought to be quite
different. Rousseau (1911:349) writes, this is because
...the works of genius are beyond her reach, and she has neither the accuracy nor the attention for success in the exact sciences.
As a result, a woman's thoughts should be directed to the 
study of men. For we are told (1911:328) that she is 
specially made 'by nature' for man's delight! She is to 
be trained
To be pleasing in his sight, to win his respect and love., .to make his life pleasant and happy, these are the duties of woman for all time, and this is what she should be taught while she is young.
Rousseau is in no doubt that the sexual difference 
between a man and a woman requires that a man be the head 
of the household.
In recent times, a more complex (and plausible) 
attempt to make the same general point is given by some 
sociobiologists.il They claim that due to the long 
evolutionary past, neurological and physiological 
differences between the sexes have emerged and they 
suggest that these are the cause of the many divergences 
in social behaviour of men and women. The neurological 
differences referred to include the subtle but 
significant differences in the way the brains of males
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and females develop, due to the effects of their 
different hormonal environments during fetal growth.^ 
Among the physiological differences alluded to is the 
fact that from an early age most females are smaller and 
are physically weaker than males of the same age. Adult 
males have a greater height, broader chests, a higher 
muscle to fat ratio, etc., and are stronger than adult 
females. It is reckoned that the muscular strength of 
the average adult woman is about two-thirds that of a 
man.^ Females have a more delicate skeleton (although 
they have a larger pelvis, presumably in readiness for 
pregnancy and childbirth); they have smaller lungs, 
trachea and larynx; a female has faster pulse rates, less 
haemoglobin, is less able to metabolise calcium, and so 
on. No doubt many of these things make a difference to 
the relative strength of men and women.
I need to make two further points, both of which I 
will return to later. First of all, if distinctions 
regarding justified domination were to be made along 
these lines, the criterion of differentiation would be 
greater strength, not sex. So whatever distinctions are 
made on these grounds could apply alike to men and women. 
Secondly, something needs to be added also, surely, about 
social influences. From the earliest years, cultural 
proscriptions begin to interact with the neurological and 
physiological differences in shaping the experiences of 
little boys and girls, and presumably lead to a 
difference in dominant/subordinate expectations of the 
genders within marriage. Before we consider the question 
of why this justifies male domination - or how their 
superior physical strength justifies value judgements 
concerning the power relationship between a couple - let 
us consider some of the innate psychological differences 
between the sexes that are purported to exist.
Significant psychological differences between the 
sexes were suggested by Aristotle (Politics 1259-I260a). 
He claimed that a woman is not a fully rational being
   ' ' '  ' ■'"i
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when compared with a man; at best she is a weak,
unaccomplished and botched version, devoid of many of his
essential attributes. Aristotle (ibid) also suggests
that the virtues are different in a woman:
...temperance, fortitude, and justice are not, as Socrates believed, the same in a man as in a woman; a man's fortitude is shown in ruling, a woman's in obeying.
It appears that this dissimilarity ought to mark a
difference in gender role expectations within the home.
Aristotle thought, particularly, that they show why the
male ought to be the head of the house. In Politics
(1259b) he asserts:
The male is naturally more fitted to command than the female (except where there is a miscarriage of nature) ..../*
We might think that Aristotle's general point is
vindicated in modern times, by the many subtle yet
significant psychological contrasts between the sexes
that have been discovered in, for instance, the responses
of members of each sex to psychological tests. (Or to
put the point more cautiously, it is claimed that
although there are no consistent differences in the
average scores between males and females in IQ test
scores,when the results are analyzed according to the
type of ability, we do find consistent differences
between the sexes.) As Shafer (1987:361) points out:
... females...have greater verbal ability than males...males outperform females on tests of visual-spatial ability and arithmetic reasoning.
There is evidence which shows that females have greater 
verbal ability than males. We are told that this 
involves not merely females being more talkative^® but, 
more interestingly, their being generally better at 
understanding complicated pieces of writing and being 
more creative with words.Males, on the other hand, 
appear to have greater mathematical ability and also do 
better on tests involving what is known as 'visual-
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similarly, that being head of the house is a
'I1
I
spatial' a b i l i t y . T h e y  are generally better, for 
instance, at exercises where the subject is required to -,find a shape (say, a circle) which is concealed in a more 
complex design.
We could go further and suggest an explanation for 
this difference along sociobiological lines. In the long 
hunter-gatherer period, as Ridley (1994:243-244) 
suggests :
Men needed superior spatial skills to throw weapons at moving targets.. .women needed skills for success at making allies within the tribe, manipulating men into helping her...
Over the very long stretch of evolutionary time, male and 
female minds became hard-wired to respond in ways 
consistent with these gender-related tasks. So that 
nowadays little boys are the beneficiaries of a more 
developed latent visual perception while little girls 
naturally tend to be more fluent speakers and to have 
better verbal memories.
What (for want of a better word) I will call 'non­
intellectual' psychological differences between the 
sexes, have also been found. For our purposes, the most 
important of these is aggression. Males, we are told, 
are generally more aggressive than females.^® Studies 
conducted on children in several different societies have 
borne this out. In all of those tested (from quite 
different cultural backgrounds) it has been found that 
boys are likely to play more roughly, more likely to 
attack each other and fight each other or fight back when 
attacked, than are g i r l s . A l s o  they are more prepared 
than girls to cause injury to others.Most importantly 
for us, it is suggested that aggression is associated 
with competitiveness and the drive to dominate others. 
For one obvious way in which aggression is manifest is in 
trials of strength, or battles of will (which can be seen 
in activities such as sport, politics, and most obviously 
in warfare). We might think that this implies.
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manifestation of the latent male psychological tendency 
to be aggressive.
If males are naturally more aggressive than females 
this has obvious implications for our discussion,If 
the former naturally has a greater competitiveness, 
ambition and drive to dominate, coupled with a greater 
physical strength, this helps to explain why the typical 
male assumes that he ought to be the head of the house. 
The cause is within his nature. The biologically greater
strength and drive to dominate that males have, moreover,
■might seem to make it futile for women to try to compete
with them in this regard. Such a competition would seem
to be doomed to failure since she is always naturally
handicapped. Thus we might be tempted to conclude that
a woman should just accept her subordinate status within
the relationship (or as de Beauvoir suggests, keep out of
this relationship altogether).
A credible alternative explanation of male
aggressive behaviour can be given in terms of nurture
(rather than nature). As Broderick (1988:42) writes:
Underlying attitudes...are largely formulated at an early age...these first years in the family are the foundation on which all that follows must be built.
Perhaps the explanation of male aggression is due mainly 
to social conditioning. In other words, there are no 
significant natural differences between the sexes that 
would account for male aggression; however any slight 
strands within their nature that are present we 
encourage, educate and coerce males into adopting as they 
are nurtured.
By itself this does not seem to be the basis for an 
adequate explanation. We would need to know why not just 
in ours but in every society, adults should condition 
children in the same way. For in all societies, as we 
noted, males are generally more aggressive than females. 
De Beauvoir recognizes this. The dominant/subordinate
roles that exist in marriage today, she contends, are an
163
inheritance from the very long period in which humans 
lived in hunter-gatherer societies. She (1988:85) points 
out that in all known earlier societies:
While man hunts and fishes, woman remains in the home...
During the long hunter-gatherer period the sexes had (and 
needed to have) different roles. The role difference was 
essentially due to the fact that women had frequent 
pregnancies and they had to breast-feed their babies. 
This meant, roughly, that they needed to stay near the 
home, gathering vegetable foods, while the men went on 
hunting expeditions for meat/" As a result, females 
evolved a more benign social character, passive, gentle, 
while males became tougher and more aggressive. And 
because physical strength and aggression were the ways in 
which power was expressed in these primitive societies, 
males became dominant.
In addition to the point above there is quite 
different empirical evidence that needs to be mentioned, 
which supports the claim that males are naturally more 
aggressive/dominant than females." Firstly, a similar 
strong inclination for the male to dominate is found in 
males of other closely related primates, for instance in 
apes." Obviously this cannot be explained in terms of 
human conditioning or socialization. The tendency of 
males to dominate, moreover, is found in very young 
animals of many different species when there is little 
evidence of any conditioning at all. Secondly, 
aggression and the attempt to dominate has been shown to 
vary according to the level of the sex hormone 
testosterone, that is present in a male; males are found 
to be more or less aggressive according to their 
testosterone levels."' Females too become more aggressive 
if they receive this hormone.^’ So it seems that hormones 
play a significant role in shaping aggressive/dominant 
masculine behaviour.
In a discussion of the causes of male domination in
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Often it has been impossible for the sexes to trespass on what has been regarded as the other's territory...
I
marriage, however, while few of us would deny that some 
role differences are connected with our biological or 
psychological natures, there can be no doubt that the 
causal explanation is much more complex than this. So 
let us return to a cause touched upon earlier, namely, 
the way males and females are socialized. Rousseau 
acknowledged this; or rather he was none too confident in 
his view that being born male naturally means dominance. 
If it were true, for instance, as he claims that 'a woman 
is naturally made to be a man's helpmate' then there 
would be no need for all of the fuss and effort to ensure 
a certain kind of subordinate role develops in the girl, 
through her upbringing and training. What is the purpose 
of the different types of education and other social 
pressures, if adult males and females are naturally the 
way they are? You can hardly justify the existence of 
different education for the different sexes by claims 
about what they are supposed to achieve, if this would 
have happened anyway without them. Parent fish do not 
have to take special steps to make sure that their young 
can swim. They are born to do that.
In our earlier discussion of a normative tradition 
we noted that children are presented with a more or less 
consistent picture of how we expect them to behave when 
adults. Similarly men and women are subject to social 
pressure of various kinds to make them behave in 
stereotypical ways. So that, as Radcliffe Richards 
(1986:190) writes:
We have been socialized into accepting especially 
stereotypes in which men have greater access than women 
into status occupations and roles. This brings us to 
another plausible causal explanation of male dominance 
within marriage that needs to be mentioned.
As de Beauvoir pointed out, in the traditional 
marital relationship husbands have greater access to the
■■I
î
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economic world of power and status outside of the
marriage. In their working lives, men tend to have more
opportunities, more resources, more status and more power 
generally than women and they may bring these 
expectations home with them into the marital
relationship." In other words, the power that men
possess in their lives outside of the home gives them 
certain advantages within the home."
From the above sketch, we may conclude that there is 
considerable empirical evidence (physiological, 
psychological, sociological) which is relevant in an 
explanation of the strong tendency for male domination.
I hope I have said enough now to ask: Does this not
vindicate de Beauvoir's claim that in a marital 
relationship men are bound to dominate their wives?
Doesn't it justify the commonly held view that in the 
traditional marriage, husbands ought to be a head of 
their household?
There is much, of course, that is wrong with the
arguments above. Firstly, the alleged superior physical
strength of males to females is not universal. As
Radcliffe Richards (1986:362) writes:
Even the most dyed in the grain of male supremacists... could hardly claim that all men were stronger (or whatever) than all women.
The empirical data is only of an average. Not all men 
and all women fit the mould (as is the way with 
averages). Some wives are stronger, taller, broader, 
than their husbands; so, as we noted, whatever 
distinctions are made along these lines apply alike to 
these women. At the same time, there are pressures for 
men to conform to the behavioral expectations of the 
masculine stereotype; which can be difficult for those 
who do not fit the mould. But - to adapt a point made by 
Radcliffe Richards (1986:203) - you cannot deride a weak 
man, on the grounds that he ought to be stronger than his 
wife in order to be the head of his household and claim 
that men should be heads of households because they are
166
physically stronger. If they all were stronger there 
would be nothing to deride. But if there is thought to 
be something (to deride), some husbands at least are, by 
the criterion of natural strength, unsuited to the 
position of headship.
Yet even if most husbands are stronger than their
wives this is a feature that is becoming increasingly
obsolete in the relationship between males and females.
As de Beauvoir (1988:84) observes, with the advent of
modern technology:
...the control of many modern machines requires only a part of the masculine resources and... (the female is) as far as this work is concerned, man's equal. Today...vast displays of energy can be controlled by pressing a button.
Technological advances have made it possible for the 
weakest person to operate a fork-lift truck which lifts 
tens of tonnes, or to fire a missile which kills 
thousands of people. In which case, male dominance which 
historically might be justified in terms of their 
superior strength, would be much more difficult to 
justify in these terms in the light of the developments 
in modern technology.
Some of the critical points above apply to the 
alleged psychological differences between the sexes. A 
significant number of females will be, for instance, more 
spatially-visually adept than males; the evidence 
suggests that a quarter of all females tested have
 ■■:greater spatial-visual ability than half of the males. 
Similarly the tests for levels of aggression, etc., 
between males and females; refer only to average results.
Our own experiences will have shown us that there are 
many wives who appear to be more aggressive than their 
husbands or many husbands who seem to be more submissive 
or gentle than their wives. Furthermore many other 
empirical differences discovered suggest no more than a 
tendency of one or other of the sexes towards certain 
attitudes, propensities, or kinds of behaviour. Social
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conditioning, no doubt, could moderate or suppress some 
or most of the differences (or reinforce them) if this 
was thought to be desirable. To support this 
observation, there are many case studies which show that 
where a girl is brought up in a way that teaches her to 
be independent of males in tasks requiring visual-spatial 
dexterity, her skill in this area is much higher than 
where a girl is brought up in a home which encourages 
dependence on m a l e s . A n d  the same is true mutatis 
mutandis where boys are raised in a home which encourages 
independence.
We should notice also (for the purpose of the 
discussion in the next chapter) that any differences that 
there are, cannot explain more than a small number of the 
roles that males and females typically perform within the 
traditional household. An innately superior visual- 
spatial ability might explain, for instance, why the 
husband is more likely to be the handyman in the home 
(put up shelves or hang the wallpaper) or why he is more 
likely to better perform tasks like driving the car 
which, perhaps, require superior visual-spatial ability. 
But we should notice that the extent of the divergence in 
the social practice cannot be explained simply by a male 
advantage in visual-spatial ability. It cannot account 
for the fact that driving the car is almost exclusively 
regarded as the function of the husband in households. 
For, as I have suggested, the psychological tests in 
question suggest that at least half as many wives will be 
as genetically advantaged in this area as their husbands.
Moreover if their superior visual-spatial ability 
explains why the husband performs certain household 
functions, we might wonder why there is not a 
corresponding female influence over household tasks which 
employ the innate advantages she enjoys, like greater 
verbal ability." Why isn't the wife typically expected 
to represent the household at meetings, or in family 
matters that require the ability to speak or negotiate?
168
The point is: even if we accept a general psychological 
explanation for the source of the differences within the 
sexes, we could argue that these differences are not 
reflected within the traditional marital household, where 
women do not appear to have the same opportunities to 
make the most of their (alleged) naturally superior 
talents. I will return to this topic in the next 
chapter.
The last and most important point I want to make is 
that the few dissimilarities which may be suggested by 
differences in biology, psychological tests, natural 
levels of aggression and the like, do not entail a moral 
conclusion that the husband ought to be regarded as the 
head of household. Although in the recent past such 
facts were often used to support value judgements 
concerning the different spheres of the sexes; (and it 
seems reasonable to suggest again that many of these 
ideas persist and are built into our present beliefs and 
expectations.)" If you are a woman, we were told, you 
have less physical strength than a man, so you ought not 
to engage in occupations that require greater physical 
strength; you ought not to be a miner, bricklayer, etc." 
If you are a woman you are less aggressive and 
competitive than a man so you ought to recognize this and 
avoid getting into aggressive and competitive situations 
with men. (On the basis of this, it was claimed that
jobs such as teaching, typing, assisting in shops, 
housework, ought to be a woman's domain; whereas 
business, politics, soldiering, ought to be the preserve 
of men.) If you are a housewife you are dependent upon 
your husband so you ought to accept the responsibility 
for tasks like housework, shopping, etc. If you are a 
woman and you are able to bear children, so you ought to 
want to have a baby and to make a home for it, you ought 
to want to accept the major responsibility for the 
child's upbringing. And since the weak need the 
protection of the strong, childbearing women ought to
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want men to look after them; they ought to want their 
husband to be head of the house. On the other hand, if 
you are a married man you are very likely to be stronger, 
more aggressive, assertive and self-reliant than your 
wife, so you ought to regard yourself as the head of your 
family. This list could be longer, of course, and all of 
us would have no difficulty in extending it."
All of the examples above are illustrations of the 
fallacious move of switching directly from talking about 
what is the case, to talking about what ought to be the 
case." But most philosophers accept that the mere claim
-that men and women are by nature different - or the 
rehearsal of some of these factual differences, whatever 
the extent of their truth - does not by itself entail or 
warrant the value judgements that are thought to follow 
from them.^® On the contrary, since aggression, for 
instance, is not generally regarded as a desirable 
characteristic, the chauvinistic husband would find it 
very difficult to convince many of us that his being 
naturally more aggressive in itself provides a moral 
justification for his dominance in the household.
The mistake might be due to the fact that the word 
'natural' is equivocal in this context. Sometimes it has 
connotations of 'conventional' or 'typical' but more 
usually it means 'inborn' or 'innate'. In the former 
sense, it would be true to say that in most societies it 
is natural (typical, conventional) for a woman bring up 
a baby. But this does not answer the question of whether 
this should be the case. If by contrast 'natural' is 
taken to mean something like an innate and inescapable 
potential - as the acorn, if it survives, will naturally 
turn into an oak tree rather than a pine tree - then one 
would have to concede that the natural physical and 
psychological differences between men and women do set
some general limits on what each partner in a marriage 
can do. But it is still debatable if statements about 
the jobs or careers we ought to perform or, more
f
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importantly, the role we ought to occupy in a family, 
follow from such innate qualities. And even if some 
roles are entailed by our natures, this still does not 
entitle us to draw a conclusion like 'men ought to be 
head of house'. For while the evidence above may offer 
an explanation of the fact that in most households, if 
both sexes compete for power and status, most men have a 
natural (or nurtured) advantage in gaining dominance, we 
cannot go on to claim that this shows also that his being 
the head of the house is morally justified or fair.
If you must have a head of the house, why should 
this be the more naturally dominant partner? An issue of 
this kind should be decided by relevant criteria; and it 
is not obvious that a natural tendency to dominate is 
such a condition. It is not clear that we would agree to :it, say, from behind Rawls' veil of ignorance. In the 
first place, it seems to add an unfair advantage to the 
natural advantage one of the couple already has. To 
paraphrase Radcliffe Richards (1986:203) if you were 
really setting out in an unprejudiced way, rather than 
reinforce a natural tendency, you would arrange for the 
protection of the weak. Or you might try to reduce the 
power of the strong. The last thing you would do is to 
encourage institutions like patriarchy which seems to 
deprive the weak of all other options, in order to force 
them to depend upon the strong.
The thrust of the argument above can be put in
another way. It is not clear why being the head of a
household requires the office bearer to have the greater
physical strength or aggressive tendencies. Why exactly
do these characteristics justify a person's claim to be
head of household? Couldn't we say, rather, as Mill
(1975:522) pointed out, this view is to blame for
All the selfish propensities, the self-worship, the unjust self-preference, which exist among mankind...?
If you must have a head of the house, why shouldn't the 
one who is more rational, or more experienced, or older,
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or more sensitive, be the determining voice in cases 
calling for a domestic decision or where there is 
disagreement?
personality to occupy this role.
Perhaps the answer is that we want the more dominant
We want someone to be head of the house
A possible explanation of why, in present times, the
husband is regarded as head of the household is that some
men and women want a hierarchical marriage. De Beauvoir
offers one explanation of why some women might prefer
this arrangement. She (1988:439) writes:
...[they] prefer to take shelter in the shadow of man.
Some women want to provide their husband with their 
domestic labour, their emotional and sexual services, and 
so on, in exchange for economic support from him as the 
breadwinner. As de Beauvoir would say: a married woman 
chooses to subordinate herself to her husband in order to 
avoid the demands of freedom.
This observation seems to be heading in the 
direction of Nietzsche's contention that in the marriage 
relationship all women want to completely surrender to 
their husbands. He (1974:319) writes:
...[a] woman wants to be taken and accepted asa possession.
A woman wants to be her husband's possession; she also 
wants a subordinate status in the outside world of work, 
politics and culture."
It seems doubtful that generalizations of this kind 
are based on anything like sound inductive techniques.^® 
And even if per impossible it is true that all women want 
to be their husband's possession, the same general 
criticism applies to this claim (about the putative wants 
of women) as we made earlier about appeals to nature. 
Even if it is a fact that all women want to be dominated, 
this would not make their domination morally justified I
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(any more than, say, anyone wanting to be a slave would 
make one's enslavement morally justified). It is clear 
that we are not prepared (morally) to let people do 
whatever they want, just because they want it. It is on 
the basis of this quite reasonable assumption that 
parents, doctors, social workers, spend a lot of their 
time trying to persuade individuals to forgo their prima 
facie irrational wants for alcohol, cigarettes, drugs.
Furthermore, even if we overlook this last point, 
and even if we suppose that generalizations of this kind 
could be legitimately made about the wants of most - or 
even some - women, what if anything are we to say about 
the wants of the (putative) minority of women who do not 
desire to subject themselves to their husbands, or to the 
husbands who do not desire to dominate their wives? How 
in such cases are we to justify the claim that men ought Ïto be head of the house?
In response to this kind of question, it is claimed 
by Ortega (1957:159) that 'wanting to be a man's 
possession' or 'wanting to be subordinate in marriage' 
belong to the essence of femininity.'*- 'Femininity' 
refers to the appearance, character and behavioral-style 
expected of a woman, and we are told entails qualities 
like wearing clothes that enhance the female figure, or, 
more significantly, being gentle, passive, 'fragile', 
irrational, weak, and dependent. It seems also to 
include wanting to spend most of one's time looking after 
a particular man (and offspring) or, in the unlikely 
circumstances that she uses her abilities or talents, of 
making sure that she 'presents no threat to the man's 
position'.'*^  Evidently these are not sufficient 
conditions because Ortega (1957:160) goes on to assert
...the classification of human beings into menand women is obviously inexact.
Women who do not desire to be a man's possession, lack 
one of the necessary conditions of femininity. Thus it 
is unfeminine, presumably, for women to want to study at
I
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universities, or to have independent political opinions, 
or to use these or other opinions against their husbands. 
The ideal 'feminine' woman wants to devote all her 
endeavour to the service of her husband. The exceptions 
to this ideal can be explained by the fact that not every 
woman wants to be 'feminine', wants or can conform to 
this essence. We might wonder why Ortega should suppose 
that any woman would want to be feminine, (given what 
this involves). However I think this view reflects an 
important current in popular opinion, often found in what 
I have called 'the traditional marriage'. And perhaps it 
is not completely absurd if, as the tradition explains, 
(masculine) men are strong, adventurous, brave, creative 
- inclining towards genius - while (feminine) women are 
'passive, timorous, incapable of coping on their own, and 
generally nondescript'." Even so, as we noted, to want 
to be his possession cannot mean that a wife wants her 
husband always to get his own way, for this seems to be 
a contradiction, or that she wants him to force her to do 
things against her will, which surely is a contradiction.
J
What Ortega might mean is that a feminine woman wants to 
depend upon her husband financially and emotionally, to 
always look to him for encouragement or for reassurance 
to overcome her anxieties or fears, and so on; or that 
she desires nothing more than a happy marriage, wonderful 
children, a lovely home, and that she believes that her 
husband knows best how to arrange this state-of-affairs. 
Thus she puts herself under his control, following the 
advice and instruction that he gives her. By this route 
she may think that she has found an effective way of 
getting all of the important things she wants in life. 
(In contrast, if she were on equal-footing with her 
husband, her self-determination may lead to the 
frustration of the things she most wants.)
Let us assume that at least some of the above are 
the motives for her wanting to be 'a possession of a 
man'. And let us assume that the traditional marriage is
-;dS
174
best fitted to those who do fit the ideal feminine type.
%
Presumably those who do not fit the alleged ideal-type 
can set up differently organized yet less than ideal 
marriages. Further let us suppose that most men and 
women want the kind of marriage relationship Ortega 
describes - which also seems very doubtful to me in terms 
of an inductive generalization.
Even then, all that these claims would show is that 
most people prefer such marriages. Once again they do 
not show that in marriage, wives morally ought to be 
subordinate or that their husbands morally ought to 
dominate. Or rather, their desire to be dominated or to 
dominate is morally problematic, unless one is committed 
to a form of radical preference-utilitarianism associated 
with Hare (1981), which equates 'morally right conduct' 
merely with the optimum preferences of those affected. 
Hare would argue that the domination of a woman by her 
husband in the way described is not morally right because 
the husband would not accept such conduct if the roles 
were reversed." The dominant husband, in other words, 
has a double-standard, one for himself the other for his 
wife: but (it is often argued against Hare) the
consistent husband could accept subordination if he were 
a woman.
The view that 'wives who want to be subordinate 
ought to be' is strongly objected to by de Beauvoir, of 
course, for whom a necessary condition of a pour-soi is 
that the individual needs to choose for herself when 
important matters affect her. As we noted earlier, where 
there is little evidence of self-determination, she 
maintains that the individual is in 'bad faith' and she 
holds them (I think correctly) to be in some measure 
defective as a person. So the fact that some men and 
women may want the kind of marriage relationship Ortega 
describes, does not establish that it is morally right. 
Furthermore, although both partners may want it, I will 
argue that a more egalitarian relationship is required if
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they are to show mutual respect for each other (which 
they need to do in a good marriage).
We need someone to be head of the house
Let us now consider the claim that marriage needs a 
head of the household. In marriage there are many 
opportunities for conflicts between the spouses. The 
disagreements can be so severe they can lead to the break 
up of the marriage. Such disagreements may be few in 
number but when they do occur, there needs to be a 
determining voice in the relationship. To resolve 
serious differences and thus in the interests of harmony 
and the permanence of the marriage, one or other of the 
couple needs to be in authority.
To be in authority is to be in charge of other 
people; or to regulate their behaviour. This is usually 
in accordance with agreed rules, (laws, standards). Thus 
referees, aeroplane pilots, teachers, are typical figures 
in authority. The referee on a football pitch is 
required to interpret the rules in order that the game 
can proceed. When someone plays in the game, moreover, 
he or she is taken to rationally and wittingly accept the 
referee's authority; the players agree to do the bidding 
of the referee whilst the game is in progress. They 
confer on him or her the right to take certain actions 
and to inflict penalties if a player transgresses the 
rules. If the latter has transgressed badly enough, they 
are taken to have agreed to the referee ordering them off 
the football pitch. In a similar way, this sort of 
authority needs to be conferred on one or the other of 
the partners in a marriage. One of them must have the 
right to decide, to pronounce, to judge and even to 
punish, for the sake of the harmony and permanence of the 
marriage or, in some cases, in order that married life 
can proceed.
The argument above can be traced back to Hobbes 
(1962:104) when he points out that the durability of an
I
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institution like marriage requires that
...one of them govern and dispose of all that is common to them both.
Locke (1965:353) argued in much the same way. He noted
that a husband and wife will have many conflicts and
differences :
It therefore being necessary that the last determination i.e. the rule should be placed somewhere...
In a similar vein Kant (1974:167) points out that where 
there is no head between husband and wife this will lead 
to 'nothing but wrangling'. And a parallel claim is made 
more recently by C.S. Lewis (1974:87) who maintains that 
the lack of a head can lead to the dissolution of the 
marriage.
We might challenge the analogy above - like a 
referee in a football match, in a marriage one or the 
other needs to be in authority. In the former, given the 
conflict of interests, a neutral third-party seems to be 
necessary to ensure that those engaged in the activity 
stick to the rules or play fairly. But if the analogy 
with marriage were to hold, one of the competitors in the 
game would need also to serve as the referee and decide 
when and how the rules apply. But the referee would not 
then be regarded as someone who is able to take the 
standpoint of a neutral or impartial observer. Anyway a 
married couple are not engaged in a competitive game - 
where an important point of the activity is that there 
should be a winner and loser - unless we assume, like de 
Beauvoir, that necessarily a power conflict will occur 
within a marriage.
We might dispute the assumption that one or the 
other has to be in authority in a more interesting way, 
by pointing out that there are other types of human 
relationships which clearly do not need to have a head; 
for instance, friendship. As we saw earlier, friendship 
is (or rather is supposed to be) a relationship between 
equals. In such a relationship, X and Y will want to do
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things together, to share intimacies, to do things for 
each other; they will act in ways to promote each other's 
well-being; each will coordinate at least some of their 
own projects with those of the other, and so on. On the 
other hand, if Y were to be using their relationship to 
demonstrate his power over X (or, say, to support his own 
self-esteem) we would say that he has missed an important
point of friendship. For to be X's friend means that y 
recognizes X's worth as a person, that the relationship
is not valued merely as a useful instrument for Y's own 
ends. None of this is to suggest that X will not fall 
out with y ; that friends are not supposed to have 
conflicts. However their arguments are not expected to 
be about their relative power and status with respect to 
one another in their relationship. Friendship implies an 
absence of power struggles of this kind; they are not 
expected to vie with each other for dominance. In other 
words, their friendship is not supposed to need to have 
a head. If this is so, why should a marriage need a 
head?
It might be objected, I think correctly, that the 
analogy between marriage and friendship is also false. 
Although in a good marriage the married couple will be 
friends, we have seen that the former relationship 
involves more than friendship. I have argued that 
marriage is a legally binding commitment which is meant 
(legally) to be exclusive, enduring (if not 
indestructible) and in which the couple share intimacies, 
a common property, (usually) children and a common life. 
Friendship (usually) lacks these features.
So the question with which we are concerned can be 
put in the following way: when a couple share a common 
life, etc., and are held together by a legally binding 
contract, don't they need a head, especially since there 
can be serious conflicts in such relationships? To 
resolve such differences and in the interests of harmony 
and permanence, doesn't a marriage need one of them to be
' I
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If Mill is correct, then it is not the case that in all 
relationships between individuals one of them must be in 
charge.
Once again, however, it can be objected that this is 
not a good analogy. In the first place, unlike a 
marriage contract, in a partnership contract it is usual 
for the participants to set their own self-interested 
terms (e.g. an expense account, company car, a percentage 
of the profits of the business). If these terms are not 
met, there may seem little point in a frustrated partner 
wanting to continue with the relationship. A second 
difference is that business partnerships and marriages 
are not supposed to be enduring in quite the same way. 
For instance, it might be quite sensible to sell a 
flourishing business at a profit, if the partners so 
desire. This would be a nonsensical thing to consider 
doing with a flourishing marriage. Similarly, if there 
are major differences between the partners, it might be 
reasonable to dissolve the ailing partnership and for the 
partners to go their separate ways. This is just what 
most of us do not want to happen to a marriage. We want 
the marriage to endure. Thus we might suppose on this
:
in authority?
Perhaps there are other kinds of long-lasting
legally-binding relationships where property is shared
and the association is expected to endure even through
conflicts, yet where it is not thought that a head is
essential. One such relationship between two (or more)
persons, is a business partnership," Like marriage, such
a partnership is given legal recognition and is expected
to endure. In fact Mill sees the marital relationship in
these terms. He (1975:472) writes:
The most frequent case of voluntary association, next to marriage, is partnership in business: and it is not found or thought necessary to enact that, in every partnership, one partner shall have entire control over the concern, and the others shall be bound to obey his orders.
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analogy, that a senior partner, so to speak, is needed in 
a marriage to resolve differences since we want the 
marriage to endure. Obviously there are many other 
differences between the two relationships. However I 
hope that enough has been said to suggest that even if a 
certain kind of business partnership does not require a 
head, the arguments for this do not transfer easily over 
into marriage.
Let us assume, for the moment, that a marriage 
always needs a head to resolve differences. The next 
question that arises is: why should this always be the 
rule of one of them - the same particular person ~ over 
the other? If there is a serious difference of opinion, 
surely a marriage is more likely to be harmonious and 
enduring if the more expert of the two in the particular 
field has the determining voice. Why not say that each 
time a conflict of wills or interest prevents an 
important decision from being made, the decision should
be made by the more expert of the two in the disputed
area? One problem would be to decide who is the expert 
in the area of conflict. Let us assume the couple 
themselves are in the best position to assess the 
relative expertise vis-a-vis each other. If there must 
be a head, isn't it more rational to let whoever of the 
two is the more competent decide?
There is a good reason for resisting this approach. 
Many, if not most of the uncertainties and disputes in 
married life involve value judgements. Some aspects of 
the latter can involve complex matters of fact - about 
which the more expert partner might be thought to know 
best - but when they are apprised of the facts, it is 
usually thought that the ability to make value judgements 
will be within the scope of both partners. For when it 
comes to making value judgements, this not only requires 
an awareness of the facts but, just as importantly, it 
involves sensitivity and moral competence, abilities 
which do not necessarily result from expertise in a given
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area. To take a trivial example: if one of them, say, 
the husband, has greater economic expertise and he thinks 
that one large shopping expedition each week is cheaper 
than two or three smaller excursions, his wife may well 
defer to his judgement. But if the husband goes on to 
say that the larger shopping spree is preferable, there 
is no reason to treat this judgement as automatically 
superior to his wife's. She might well prefer the more 
expensive alternative. In this respect, neither of them 
will have superior wisdom; discernment of this kind is 
part of each of their rational equipment. And a 
corollary of this is that neither of them should be 
trusted with automatic authority, similar considerations 
apply to other key issues in marriage, for instance, 
where they should live, whose career or work is to take 
priority, whether to have children, and so on. In such 
cases, who is supposed to be in the better position to 
make the decision? It seems likely that on these and 
many other matters neither partner will be better 
equipped than the other. At the same time, once a 
decision has been made, both will reap the benefits or 
disbenefits which result from it.
An answer to this problem might be that in cases of 
conflict, where neither of the two have expertise yet 
when a decision is required, the decision-making 
prerogative should be shared. If on one occasion the 
husband makes the decision then on the next, it is the 
wife's turn to decide. This way of resolving conflicts 
has some advantages. Firstly, if they knew that the 
decision-making was 'turn-about', the discord arising 
from the abuse of authority where just one of them makes 
all of the decisions, would no doubt be greatly reduced. 
Secondly, such a procedure would establish a greater 
equality between the partners. Thirdly, such
distribution of authority in the family would seem to 
allow for something like a friendship relationship 
between the two, which I have claimed will not be met in
!
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a hierarchical structure. Can we say that if marriage 
needs a head to resolve differences, then a 'turn-about' 
arrangement is the best way to proceed?
Unfortunately there are serious limitations to this
proposal. An unacceptable situation could always arise
where an important decision has to be made which 
crucially affects one of the partner's actions or 
lifestyle and he or she is not able to decide for him or 
herself because it is not their turn to make the 
decision. For instance, the issue in question might be 
whether or not one of the spouses should make a career 
decision and override alternative family plans. Should 
he/she accept promotion in a different part of the 
country or reject it in favour of the other's career or 
their children's education? To make such a decision 
depend upon merely whose turn it is to decide, strikes me 
as a quite irrational way of proceeding. This brings us 
to what I think is the right answer to the problem of a 
head of the household.
.
A democratic solution to the question of the head of the :house
Ideally both partners should participate in the 
decision-making process, as opposed to having all of the 
key decisions made by one of them or a 'turn-about' 
arrangement in the ways described above. Important 
marital decisions in other words, could always be the 
outcome of discussion in which both of them are able to 
state their case and so influence the final decision 
(even if one of them has eventually to accept decisions 
that they had previously resisted). We have seen at 
least one of the supporting reasons for this, namely, 
that most domestic decisions are matters of judgement, 
not of fact or computation. Further, on the basis of the 
present proposal, this would no longer be a matter of the 
stronger or more wilful partner imposing his or her 'ruling, when both spouses are significantly affected by
t
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the decision. So it is worth exploring some of the 
implications of this present proposal.
A form of decision-making is required in which both 
can participate and in which each partner's voice carries 
equal weight. One thing to notice concerns the issue 1under discussion. To have equal status in the process of s
decision-making, both partners will need to have equal 
access to the relevant information. What is at stake?
Why are the customary solutions, if any, unsatisfactory?
What possible solutions are there? How do the various 
proposals satisfy their different interests? Which of 
them might be helped or hurt if a given proposal is 
implemented? Are some of the proposals more value 
inclusive or such that both of them would accept this 
compromise? An implication of the considerations above 
is that in order to make a judgement, each partner will 
need to have an adequate grasp of the problem, and they 
will both need to have equal access to the information 
relevant to the decision. So it will not do if only one 
of them has up to date knowledge of the family finances, 
and so on. Each will need to have equal access to the 
relevant information (e.g. their bank balances), each 
will need to consider what possible solutions there are, 
how the various possibilities satisfy their different 
interests, who would be helped or hurt if a purchase is 
made or a spending proposal is implemented, whether some 
proposals are more value-inclusive than others, and so 
on. Another way in which their equal standing within the 
relationship can be put under a lot of pressure is when 
each of the spouses wants to pursue their own careers, 
and their different desires conflict. Sometimes a major 
decision has to be made, like: should one of their
careers be promoted if this requires that the other 
partner's career is moderated or even sacrificed? The 
manner in which they ought to proceed is to work towards 
a solution by discussion and adjustment; although the 
process of decision-making, can be complex.
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Another aspect to note is the decision itself. 
Clearly this part of the process can be complex. There 
may be differences in values or moral or political 
principles between the two of them; there may be a 
different order of priorities even when they share the 
same principles. As a result, any decision that is made 
at the end of the deliberation will not have the force of 
an a priori demonstration. Yet though there will always 
be a logical gap between the reasons given in support of 
it and the decision itself, we can assume that the latter 
can be rationally supported by the accompanying reasons.
The justification of trying to make all major 
decisions 'shared decisions' in the way described, 
resides in a combination of at least three supporting 
assumptions. The first draws upon the fact that neither 
partner should be trusted with unchecked power since 
there will be many issues where the other partner (or 
neither partner) knows what is best. Secondly and more
importantly, there is the assumption of the moral 
desirability of self-determination of both partners; this 
is to say, if in keeping with de Beauvoir, we accept that 
the desire to be self-determining (is within our nature) 
and that it is morally desirable then it follows the 
husband and wife should have the opportunity to 
contribute when making decisions which affect them both. 
Thirdly, on the assumption that each of them requires as 
much influence as the other, since they are both affected 
by the decisions, then we need a procedure that is 
maximally tolerant and sensitive to both of the competing 
views. Let us consider these points in more detail.
As we noted, it is obvious that in marriage (as 
elsewhere) neither partner will have incontrovertible 
knowledge. Indeed there is more likely to be a general 
state of uncertainty about most matters. As things are 
changing all of the time due perhaps to unforeseen 
circumstances that nature or other people inflict upon 
them, it is quite wrong to expect certainty as to what
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they ought to do, both in terms of immediate tactics or 
long-term plans. In these circumstances, neither of them 
should be trusted with unchecked authority - neither 
should be the head of the house. On the other hand, the 
procedure I have described is more likely to take account 
of such uncertainties; they are more likely to adapt and 
to have control over the changing conditions.
The second point concerned the moral desirability of 
self-determination and the problem this raises for 
decision-making in marriage. On the one hand, each 
individual is expected to be witting and free in the 
important decisions they make in their lives; such as the 
choice to marry, or in their conduct within their 
marriage. As we have seen, even where a woman 'prefers 
to take shelter in the shadow of her husband' most of us 
believe that this dependence should be overcome. We 
might justify this expectation in the way de Beauvoir has 
'as a fundamental desire in human nature'. However, if 
de Beauvoir is correct, one of the major defects of 
marriage is the lack of autonomy that it involves,
particularly for the wife. But if important decisions
can be made in the way 1 have sketched, then it seems
reasonable to claim that both wife and husband are able 
to decide for themselves what they are going to do, in 
the sense of their being able to make choices among 
alternative domestic policies, actions, lifestyles. The 
procedure I am proposing - which is after all, no more 
than the ideal democratic procedure - appears to meet the 
requirement for both husband and wife to be self­
determining in the marital relationship.^ (But no matter 
how self-determining each partner may be, problems still 
remain, and I will return to this shortly.)
The third point was that in marriage we need a 
system that gives each of the couple as much control over 
their own lives as possible and which allows each to 
determine decisions which affect the shared parts of 
their lives. We need a decision-making procedure that
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allows for equality of status and influence. The 
procedure I have outlined is a process that demands 
sensitivity to each other's interests, compromise and 
adjustment. If they are both participating in the 
decision - and if each partner's voice is to be given 
equal weight - the only manner of proceeding is to work 
towards solutions by discussion and compromise in the 
manner suggested.
I need, lastly, to emphasize an implication of the 
proposal above. De Beauvoir maintains, as a necessary 
feature of any relationship, that one or other of the 
partners must try to take the dominant role? and that in 
the traditional marriage, the husband as head of the 
household, takes this role. In contrast, I have argued 
that a husband and wife are capable of having a 
relationship in which both participate on an equal- 
footing. If my argument is correct, then a dominant/ 
subordinate order is not a necessary condition of 
relationships. A situation of equality is possible and 
there need be no real differences between the genders in 
this regard. Or more cautiously, my solution to 'the 
head of the household' question suggests that a different 
basis for power relationships is possible than that given 
by de Beauvoir.
Marriage and the loss of autonomy
It might be objected that one important aspect of de 
Beauvoir's objection remains unanswered, namely, that 
even where there is an ' equal relationship between the 
partners, marriage inevitably leads to a diminution of 
autonomy. This loss equally applies to men; the marriage 
relationship and the mutual obligations it entails seem 
to limit the freedom of both partners, not just the 
wife's.'*®
To soften the blow, we might note that this charge 
can be levelled at any egalitarian relationship, for 
instance, friendship. In friendship there has to be some
'"1:
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loss of autonomy on the part of each individual. We 
cannot view all of our actions in friendship purely as a 
matter of our own self-interested concern. If we did, 
this would inevitably lead to riding roughshod over our 
friend's interests. We are committed to respecting our 
friend, to regarding his or her feelings and interests as 
being of equal value to our own, and so on.
When it comes to marriage, the same sorts of 
considerations apply. However due to their living 
together, there is the possibility of a greater loss of 
autonomy for the individuals involved. This is a common 
indictment of marriage. It is not just ties of close 
friendship in marriage that require both spouses to 
consider each other's interests as well as their own; 
there are many other factors that dent each partner's 
autonomy.
When deciding what to do, for instance, they both 
have to consider the interests of another person as being 
of equal importance to their own whereas before marriage 
(we are led to believe) most individuals are free to 
largely move and act without prior consultation with 
anyone else. In most marriages many of the preferences, 
interests, activities of husband and wife will not 
overlap or even connect with those of their spouse. For 
one of them an escapist story in a book or on television 
may seem a good way to spend a quiet evening at home, for 
the other the prospect of such activities leaves them 
cold. Thus one or the other may find their autonomy 
continually intruded upon by the demands of the other.
There are encroachments on each other's emotional 
space. Different individuals have different preferences 
for things as varied as how much affection ought to be 
expressed between them, in private or in public, what is 
or is not appropriate to tell other people about their 
relationship, and so on. No doubt some find their 
partners too demanding in this regard. They think of 
their partners as having too detailed or rigid
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expectations; especially where their partner's attitudes 
on such issues take on the force of a household law. 
Faced with such an attitude either of them may feel that 
they are not free in the sense that they cannot be 
themselves in the relationship.
A different limitation on freedom concerns the 
physical space they are allowed by their partner. By 
virtue of their living together every married person has 
the living space available to them limited. At the same 
time, most individuals require some level of privacy, or 
personal space. If they believe this is insufficient, 
they regard this as an encroachment on their freedom. A 
related aspect might be called 'possessiveness'. Couples 
seem to vary as to how carefully they keep track of the 
other's activities inside and outside of the home. At 
one extreme, there are individuals who insist on knowing 
where their spouse is at all times, or expect to receive 
full reports on their spouse's activities and plans. In 
contrast, there is a sense of freedom which comes outside 
of such a relationship, when no one has any idea of where 
one is or what it is one might be doing. Another 
restriction on freedom concerns their partner's 
expectations concerning time. When one lives on one's 
own (it is often claimed) one can get up, eat, sleep, 
when one likes. On the other hand, in most marriages not 
only is dinner set for a particular time but both 
partners are required to be present.
At first sight all of this seems to be an 
unavoidable sacrifice. In which case, each prospective 
spouse is often advised to decide for themselves prior to 
making wedding vows whether or not they think that the 
inevitable diminution of autonomy is going to be 
sufficiently offset against the benefits that marriage 
offers. Once they are married, what de Beauvoir calls 
the 'natural desire for freedom' is most evident when 
either party feels that important aspects of their 
freedom are circumscribed by, or sacrificed, in the
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relationship. They feel trapped or suffocated by the 
other and struggle against it. In such circumstances 
some, for instance, withhold a response valued by the 
other person, or become addicted to television or 
alcohol, and a few literally run away from the 
relationship to avoid the other person. In ways like the 
above, even where there is a more or less equal 3
relationship between the couple, don't we have to accept 
that marriage results in a diminution of each partner's 
autonomy?
There are a number of ways to answer this objection.
Firstly, one obvious point needs to be stressed. In any 
marriage, there will be many decisions which obviously 
concern only one of the partners. In which case, the 
other may give advice but they cannot expect this advice 
to be any more than just that, i.e. advice. What their 
partner decides has to be respected even if it goes 
against the advice given. We might note that this is one 
way in which one shows respect to one's partner. To 
respect him as a person is to acknowledge that like 
oneself, he is self-determining. This is not to suggest 
that in respecting my husband, I necessarily like his 
choices, or that I respect his intelligence or that, at 
the time, I even like him or want to spend any time with 
him. Respecting him, rather, requires that like him or
,not, I recognize him as an individual whose choices 
deserve to be taken into account no less than my own. 
Different as these may be from mine, they should 
nevertheless weigh equally with my own. In a good 
marriage, this is to say, we need to exercise autonomy in 
our self-regarding actions and we need to have this 
recognized and respected by our partner. In addition, we 
each need to respect our partner's autonomy, even when we 
think that their decisions are unwise.
This brings us to a second reason for claiming that 
in a good marriage the individuals can be autonomous.
Our autonomous choices can be other-oriented as well as
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self-oriented; we can choose to make decisions in terms 
of interpersonal values as well as those based on 
personal preferences. In other words, in the decisions 
we make, we are quite capable of choosing to sacrifice 
our own wants and interests for another person's sake, 
particularly where this is at little cost to ourselves 
and the decision means a great deal to them. Thus to be 
autonomous does not require merely that each person 
pursues their own interests in their own way, as if 
nothing else but their own self-interest could count as 
a relevant expression of their autonomy. If autonomous 
choices were always this self-centred then, clearly, one 
ought not never to have too close a relationship with 
another person for, when interests conflict, it would 
threaten one's autonomy. But also if this were so, 
autonomous individuals as well as being morally 
impoverished would be very lonely; for regarded in this 
way, autonomy implies an undue self-centredness (which in 
turn implies isolation).
The view expressed in the objection suggests also 
that autonomy is something an individual has and which he 
or she then chooses relationships to suit. It is as if 
self-determination is a given in human nature that 
naturally takes place at an egocentric level and then, as 
an optional extra, whoever wants to, can circumscribe or 
forfeit it in a relationship with another person. Surely 
this is false. For, in the first place, our sense of 
autonomy develops out of our dependent relationships as 
children with adults and our responses to them, and then 
out of the interdependent relationships we have with 
others. This is to say, one's sense of autonomy develops 
and is just as likely to find expression in our 
interdependent relationships. In this context, we may 
care about how other people feel in such a way that we 
may choose to forgo our own interests or want to shoulder 
responsibilities in order to help them.
Marriage can be such a relationship. After all.
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one's connection with one's spouse is not to something 
wholly external to oneself but integral to one's life.
Many of the self-determining choices we make can be made 
from the perspective of the love we have for them (our 
spouse). We can choose to do something for their sake, 
for their well-being, needs or interests. Moreover as an 
expression of our own autonomy, we can choose to 
contribute to their happiness even when this means 
sacrificing our own. We can choose to make such a 
sacrifice also from the standpoint of what is considered 
best for the relationship.
There is a related point that is worth stressing.
A striking feature of such choices is that one usually 
experiences them as being self-determined; one does not 
often feel regret or remorse that one's decision has been 
constrained by the relationship. Usually one experiences 
them moreover as a choice made in full awareness of the 
alternatives, as an expression of one's ability to 
deliberate, to come to one's own conclusion about what to 
do and then of acting accordingly. (What point could 
there be to an experience like this if, when married, we 
are unable to choose for the sake of our partner or 
marriage?)
This brings me to a third response to the alleged 
limitation on one's autonomy in marriage. It concerns 
those situations where the couple are faced with an -important conflict of their different interests. For 
both individuals to have an equal sense of their autonomy 
there must be an absence of power struggles. Earlier we 
saw that when there are important differences between a 
couple and a decision has to be made, there is a way of 
making the decision in which both partners can 
participate and which gives both of their contributions 
equal weight; a process in which each partner can 
recognize the other's right to make his or her own 
decisions and not try to dominate or control them. It 
follows that when there is a problem, using the procedure
■ s
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I have outlined, a husband and wife will not vie with 
each other for dominance. This does not mean that they 
will never argue. The point is rather that their serious 
arguments will not be about power and status.
In ways such as the above, I think that autonomy can 
be accommodated within a good marriage. However if it is 
still insisted that there is bound to be an encroachment 
on one's freedom due to marriage, my fourth response is 
that the rewards it brings - being valued by another 
person, sharing one's most deep-seated intimacies with 
them, etc. - might be thought to more than make up for 
the occasional loss of one's sense of freedom in this 
relationship. Yet even here by forsaking something or 
doing something for someone one loves one's experience 
need not be of sacrificing one's autonomy but rather of 
satisfying it. By choosing to act in a self-sacrificing 
way, for the sake of one's beloved, one affirms one's 
autonomy.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that there is nothing 
in the physical or psychological natures of males or 
females which suggest why we must accept that one or 
other ought to be head of the house. Perhaps the most 
compelling argument we considered for choosing to have a 
head of the household is that there needs to be a way of 
settling disputes when common action is necessary. I 
argued that such disagreements can be resolved either by 
deferring to the partner who has the more experience or 
where each partner in turn takes the responsibility for 
the decision. But in a good marriage where mutually 
acceptable decisions have to be made, the more rational 
alternative will be the kind of practical decision-making 
procedure I have described, where in effect, both share 
the role of head of the household.
fi
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Chapter Six
Housewives, mothers and transcendence
The next issues that we need to consider are de 
Beauvoir's claims, firstly that being a housewife and a 
mother are stereotypical roles that married women almost 
always perform and they ought not to do so; secondly, 
that due to housework and caring for children, the 
housewife/mother is debarred from self-fulfilment through 
creative work (viz. transcendence).
The first point above is based upon an empirical 
claim. As a matter of fact in most married households 
there is a distinct - though not absolute - division of 
labour along sexual lines.^ However the division in 
question goes beyond the mere facts about what husbands 
and wives traditionally do and still do today. It 
includes also beliefs about the different tasks that the 
man and woman ought to perform, (as well as beliefs about 
what the behaviour, character traits, tastes, leisure 
activities of each of the couple ought to be). Certain 
of the household tasks are defined as domestic. These 
jobs are usually unpaid and it is generally thought that 
they ought to be the wife's work. Other kinds of work 
are public, paid and ought to be the husband's work.=
Most households include children for a considerable part 
of their history. Usually this also affects how we 
regard the division of labour. It is generally thought 
that child-rearing ought to be a woman's role - to be 
done unpaid in the home by the wife/mother. A different 
set of roles are prescribed for the husband/father. He 
ought to provide the income to meet the needs of his wife 
and children as well as keeping the house and garden in 
good repair. In this chapter we need to ask: ought such 
tasks be a wife's and a husband's role in marriage?
De Beauvoir's second claim is that due to housework 
and motherhood, a married woman is prevented from a sense
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of transcendence through creative work. This appears to 
be an a priori claim: if you are the former, you cannot 
have the latter. To see if this is so, we will need to 
be clear about what precisely 'transcendence through 
creative work' means and if it is the case that being a 
housewife (or a househusband) and a mother are 
necessarily precluded from this.
Let us begin with the view that housework and 
motherhood are domestic roles a married woman does and
ought to do.
Housework and motherhood
Housework involves cleaning the home, laundering, 
cooking, washing-up, making the beds and performing a :myriad of other trivial tasks. For most of us it is, as 
Radcliffe Richards (1994:211) says, 'a jumble of mediocre 
stuff'. However in all households, work of this kind has 
to be done on some occasions for the home to function at 
all. The trouble is that in the traditional way of 
thinking, in the marital home housework is and ought to 
be a woman's work. At the least, it ought to be her 
responsibility to see that this work is done even though 
most of the chores involved may be done for the sake of 
other members of her family. It is and ought to be her 
task to see that the home functions smoothly.
Housework is not quite the burden today, of course, 
that it used to be at the time de Beauvoir was writing.
As a result of time and labour-saving household gadgets 
and the like, women do not need to be tied to the home in 
quite the way they were fifty years ago. Also pressures 
directing wives to the domestic service of their husbands 
and families have lessened considerably, both in their 
extent and the firmness of their enforcement. 
Nevertheless insofar they still do remain, the usual 
expectations concerning, what is proper for a woman and a 
man to do about the home, are of the traditional kind.
She is expected to shop, clean, cook; he is expected to
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go out to work, maintain the car, repair appliances.
Where the woman stays at home to be a housewife, she 
is usually taken to prefer this to other roles that she 
might have performed. She is taken also to regard the 
chores she performs as her contribution to the well-being 
of her family. But nowadays more and more women do go 
out to work. Even so, in most homes a married woman is 
still expected to be responsible for the housework.® Even 
if her husband regularly 'does the washing up', it is 
commonly thought that the act is supererogatory because 
it is really his wife's job. Even in more enlightened 
households, where husbands and wives divide the 
housework, the household chores are still usually thought 
to be the wife's responsibility;'* it is a rare home in 
which a man will not presume as a matter of course that 
whatever a woman's other commitments, she is responsible 
for domestic matters. In short, we appear to be faced 
with a differentiation between the domestic roles we 
believe a married couple ought to perform, which is based 
merely upon the difference of their sex.
Another traditional role for most women in marriage 
is motherhood. Not only does the woman bear the child 
but she is expected to be its primary caretaker. However 
child-bearing and rearing can be more enjoyable than de 
Beauvoir's sketch of it above suggests. Once again 
because of labour-saving devices, disposable nappies, 
playgroups and the like, mothers do not need to be tied 
to their children (in first-world countries) in quite the 
way they used to be. In other words, most women do not 
seem to find mothering the encumbrance that de Beauvoir 
describes. Except for a short period around the birth of 
a child, a woman can combine motherhood with work or a 
career. Thus nowadays more and more mothers go out to 
work, especially after their children reach school-going 
age,® But again, (and despite shifting public attitudes) 
it is still the mother who is thought to be responsible 
for looking after the child.® She ought to be responsible
I
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meeting its physical and emotional needs throughout its 
childhood. Let us consider how anyone would justify the 
separation of the sexes into these roles.
The traditional domestic roles are natural
For some traditionalists the argument in defence of
the long-established domestic roles seems to be based on
the fact that men and women just are different by nature.
As we noted, the sociobiologist, Wilson lends support to
this view when he (1978:132) writes:
...the universal existence of sexual division of labor is not entirely an accident of cultural evolution...[a] biological component delineates the options...
Only the woman can become pregnant and give birth to the
infant. She has to undergo a long confinement in order
to give birth. And then, in the past anyway, for many
more years the infant was dependent on her for food,
shelter, clothing and many other comforts. So, as we
noted, she needs to make a home for her child and if he
was to support and protect them adequately, she needed to
make a home for her husband. On this account, a
different set of roles were prescribed for the latter.
If he was to do all he could to ensure his progeny's
survival he was naturally driven to provide (the income
for) their food, clothing, etc., repair their home, and
generally protect his family. It seems to be thought, as
Ruskin (quoted in Millett 1972:132) writes:
Each [naturally] has what the other has not; each completes the other.
In other words, the traditional housework arrangements 
reflect the natural state of things. The impression 
given is that men and women would naturally drift towards 
such tasks in marriage if they were left to their own 
devices.
Of course the tradition did not permit males and 
females to behave in any way they were inclined. To 
ensure that they continued to behave in the required
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ways, as Wilson (1978:132) writes:
...each society must,..condition its members soas to exaggerate the sexual differences...
Similarly in present times we are subject to a 
socialising process and pressure of various kinds, to 
make sure we behave in the conventional ways, and we are 
discouraged from trespassing on what is regarded as the 
other's role, by penalties of various sorts (varying 
degrees of social disapproval). But (we need to ask 
again) if men and women are just like that. If they do 
perform different tasks within the household due to their 
natures, moreover, what is the purpose of the societal 
rules and pressures supposed to be? You can hardly 
justify socializing people in such-and-such a way if what 
they are supposed to do would happen anyway.
A similar argument is used to justify what is still 
thought to be each of the couple's appropriate role as 
parents. Since the capacity to bear children is limited 
to a woman, some aspects of motherhood related to 
childbirth, are (quite reasonably) regarded as the 
woman's natural role. The universal biological
difference explains the difference in practice. Also it 
is claimed that women have 'a maternal instinct';? a 
basic drive which after the child is born, includes her 
being the primary caretaker of the child during its 
earliest years. In modern times this seems to require a 
preparedness by the mother (rather than the father) to 
stay at home to rear the child at least while the child 
is of pre-school age.® It is maintained that the roles 
parents typically perform is no more than building on 
their natural strengths.® Encouraging a male to earn the 
family's income, to repair the family house, etc., is 
only to entrench predispositions that are in his genes 
anyway and similarly when a female is encouraged to be 
nurturing and to accept the major responsibility for 
childrearing, her innate tendencies are being 
strengthened.
197
If this is the case, we might think that the same 
reasoning applies mutatls mutandis outside of the home.
In which case it seems unlikely that women could ever 
successfully compete in the public sphere of work, if 
what is needed are the very features that men naturally 
have (let us say, aggression, competitiveness) and which 
women do not. Conversely, men will not be good 
homemakers and carers of children, for their genes do not 
predispose them to settle for the uncompetitive and non- 
aggressive lifestyle of the home. Further, this may help 
to explain the basic similar pattern of male and female 
labour in domestic contexts (despite many other 
variations between societies) in most known cultures. 
Fundamental biological differences are reflected in their 
domestic arrangements."'
It is believed by most people, moreover, that wives 
ought (morally) to accept responsibility for keeping the
: ■family home clean and tidy, it is the duty of women with 
children to stay at home and care for the child,and by 
the same token, it is the duty of men to fulfil their 
traditional roles. However new arguments would be needed 
to show this, i.e. that there are moral duties of this 
kind. For instance, anyone arguing in support of it 
might try to show that these activities must be limited 
to the mother because, say, husbands are universally 
incompetent at them! (This is not to suggest that it is 
impossible to find a good argument to support the desired 
moral conclusion but the task may not be as 
straightforward as at first it might appear to be.)
The moral argument is nowadays usually given in 
quite the opposite way. It is argued that even if we 
grant that a slight biological component delineates some 
of the domestic options that husbands and wives have, we 
go far beyond the constraints of biology in most of the 
tasks that we traditionally think each of them ought to 
perform." And even if our natural dispositions do 
strongly influence a few of these roles, such
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Arguments against gender stereotyping
Anyone who has had anything to do with children 
knows that in all sorts of blatant or subtle ways they 
learn that the sexes have different roles. Girls are put 
into dresses and told how pretty they look; boys are 
dressed in jeans and told they look smart." Boys 
typically get footballs or construction sets for their 
birthdays; girls get Barbie dolls, with all of the Barbie 
accessories, and so on. Soap operas typically present 
men out at work and women in the home or shopping. 
International affairs, politics, business, sport in 
newspapers and television are male-dominated, whereas 
matters concerning the home or child-rearing are 
dominated by females. Despite a concerted effort 
recently by many educators and some parents to show males 
and females in more diverse roles, gender stereotyping 
continues unabated (albeit in less explicit ways),"
More to the point, children are socialized into 
believing that a woman should be responsible for the 
housework and that she should accept the major 
responsibility for the children, and that a man should 
earn the income to maintain them. But the roles could be
dispositions may be blunted, (if we think this morally 
desirable) by taking appropriate steps in a young 
person's socialization. The biological differences do 
not seem so large as to make this undertaking impossible. 
To put the point differently: it is claimed that most of 
the differences we associate with male and female roles 
are not due to nature at all but to convention," Gender 
roles,®'* which not only account significantly for the way 
people regard themselves but also the way they experience 
and react to other people, are socially constructed. We 
have been socialized, particularly, into most of the 
beliefs and attitudes we have towards gender roles in 
marriage. Furthermore such stereotyping is morally 
objectionable. Let us consider this claim.
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- and in the future no doubt will be - otherwise. Thus 
it makes sense for de Beauvoir to maintain that a woman 
chooses to be a full-time housewife and mother; she
Î
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chooses to put her other projects to one side and devote 
herself to the service of her home and family. As we 
have seen, de Beauvoir (and many others) go on to claim 
that gender stereotyping of the kind described is morally 
wrong. And that women particularly ought not to accept 
these roles.
However I have a problem with this claim; at least 
I have a number of difficulties in understanding it. The 
first problem is to understand if it is this kind of 
stereotyping, or stereotyping as such that is wrong. Is 
the argument 'all gender stereotyping is wrong because 
all stereotyping is a violation of an individual's 
autonomy' (as we would expect an existentialist to say)? 
Or is the argument 'gender stereotyping is inevitable but 
a certain kind of stereotyping is wrong'? Thus is it 
wrong to socialize a young girl to believe that she 
should choose to marry, become a housewife and a mother, 
when she could be socialized into believing that there 
are other, better (more fulfilling) ways of life? Let us 
begin with the claim that any kind of gender stereotyping 
whatsoever is wrong.
All gender stereotyping is wrong. Watkins, Rueda & 
Rodriguez (1992:149) write:
...we [must] offer children the widest possible choice to discover what they can BE and DO...
It is wrong to socialize a child into any particular 
role; people ought to be autonomous from infancy. This 
assertion is not directed against bringing up boys in a 
male role and girls in a female role but at socializing 
them into one or other role as such. If we adopt this 
position, we rule out a number of things. Firstly, we 
cannot insist that what is wrong with the present type of 
gender role stereotyping is that when they become women, 
females are performing a role that has little
Ï
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justification in nature. Nor can we claim that we should 
give boys and girls each a different role expectation 
than those we presently find. For ex hypothesl the 
thesis is not that it is wrong to rear children to have 
certain gender role expectations but that it is wrong to 
give them any at all because this violates their 
autonomy.
The argument in a nutshell is that children should 
grow up autonomously. But how are children supposed to 
make autonomous choices especially during their earliest 
years? There is abundant evidence from developmental 
psychologists to show that young children could not 
possibly do this.®? Cultural and social influences being 
what they are to human beings in their infancy, they 
would not survive without some direction from adults. 
The level and extent of this may vary from child to 
child, from time to time, but it is not possible either 
to grow up anywhere without being taught, subtly or 
explicitly, that some things are expected of you simply 
because of your sex. So it is difficult to understand 
how children (to say nothing of toddlers) are supposed to 
grow up autonomously.
If this point is conceded it is then difficult to 
see what would take the place of traditional gender role 
stereotyping in their socialization, in order to avoid 
the objectionable influences of the present kind. In an 
attempt to do this (i.e. to avoid the conventional 
stereotypes) some parents, for instance, might dress 
their daughters in jeans or teach them to play football. 
But what this boils down to, surely, is an attempt to 
make them like boys - as if this is the desired 'neutral' 
autonomous role (which of course it is not). By itself, 
moreover, this sort of engineering is not likely to 
succeed since it is unlikely that we could insulate the 
child from the myriad of other gender role influences 
(television, newspapers, peer groups) in their social 
environment.
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Perhaps the point is that gender stereotyping of
children could be much more neutral than it currently is.
The existing gender role stereotypes go far beyond the
constraints of biology. Men and women are biologically
different but these differences are not that radical. We
are closer to each other, for instance, than either sex
is to anything else. Rubin reflects this view when she
(1975:179-180) asserts:
Far from being an expression of natural differences, exclusive gender identity is the suppression of natural similarities.
Could we go on to argue that this 'natural similarity' 
between males and females is such that their upbringing 
could be and ought to be gender neutral?
There are a lot of problems with this view. 
Firstly, even if we say that children ought to be reared 
to fill the same neutral role it seems to me that 
children will not be autonomous (to the same extent as 
present gender role stereotyping) but the product of 
their upbringing. To change the mix does nothing to 
foster or lessen the degree to which children are 
directed into a particular type of role. And the 
question arises: change the mix to what? If children are 
brought up in an environment where example, exhortation, 
books, television and peer group behaviour offer no clear 
stereotypes, but which either presents female or male 
roles as identical - or indiscriminately mixes them up - 
they would be no more free to choose 'what they can Be 
and Do', to exactly the same extent, (whatever the extent 
may be) as they are at present. They would still be 
products of their social environment.
There is another difficulty. The parent who does 
not want her child growing up in the conventional gender 
role pattern, must censor books, etc., and avoid 
displaying a consistent female pattern of behaviour 
herself, and attempt to thwart consistent patterns 
projected by friends and neighbours. And there is in 
addition a moral problem to be faced by such an approach:
’i i
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children will, as a result of such an upbringing, face 
many dissonances and difficulties particularly with their 
peers. Most people would wonder about the moral 
justification of this type of gender role engineering. 
But while all of this weakens the thesis, it does not get 
rid of the view that the stereotypes in which children 
are raised should be gender neutral.
However the latter claim overlooks a major problem. 
Given the sorts of changes envisaged, the outcome would 
be different and one might start from there to try to 
mount an argument in favour of this difference in 
upbringing. But we would be presenting an argument to 
the effect that it is better to socialize children into 
this stereotype rather than that; rather than an argument 
against stereotyping as such, or in favour of autonomy. 
To stress the point I made earlier; to change the mix, in 
which ever way this is done, does nothing to put an end 
to the fostering of assumptions, or to lessening the 
degree of direction in the upbringing of a child. It 
does nothing for the person's autonomy. So if autonomy 
is what is required, we need to look elsewhere than the 
bias in the way we presently stereotype our children.
To summarize the points above: if the argument is 
that children should grow up unsocialized, autonomous 
beings, my response is that in realistic terms they 
cannot be. If the argument is that they should grow up 
with their gender role options open, again the answer is
.that in realistic terms, most could not. If the argument
is that we should bring children up identically, making 
males and females indistinguishable in books, on 
television, and so forth, this would make it harder to 
predict what either of them would turn out to be in adult 
life, but this is a different matter from giving them the 
freedom to choose what 'they can Be and Do' in this 
context. For they will be subject to stereotyping, only 
the stereotypes will be different to the present ones.
Let us suppose that de Beauvoir's claim is the prima I
II
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facie more plausible one that although we cannot grow up 
with our options open, we can choose the gender role we 
wish to adopt when we are adults. In other words, 
although we have to socialize children, we ought to let 
them decide the gender role they will adopt for 
themselves once they are adults. One (extreme) way this 
choice could be accomplished is by the young woman 
choosing to change her sex. Modern medicine has given 
women (and men) this choice, so a female can choose to 
become a male and take on a male role. Further despite 
the fact that there are enormous constraints placed on 
such a choice - social, economic, legal - there are a few 
instances of women (and men) who do change their sex in 
this way. It might be countered however that rather than 
a genuinely autonomous choice, what this could show, 
equally plausibly, is that in such cases the child that 
was born female was never effectively initiated into the 
female gender role. With more effective socializing she 
would not have even contemplated the choice.
Let us suppose now that the desired change is simply 
of gender role and not of sex. Some individuals - for 
instance, some lesbians - do seem to disentangle 
themselves from most aspects of the gender roles in which 
they were raised. But it is the exceptional rather than 
the average woman who is able to overcome such odds to 
make this notion of choice meaningful. So much so that 
such cases do not really amount to evidence that once 
attaining adulthood there is no difficulty in the idea of 
adopting the gender role of one's choice. Nor do they 
seriously challenge the fact that most of us are 
prisoners of the role that we have acquired through our 
socialization. Most people are to a greater or lesser 
extent, successfully socialized into their gender roles 
by the time they become adults. So that we are no more 
free to change our role any more than we are to become
totally different people. Perhaps de Beauvoir is correct 
when she suggests that there is nothing by virtue of our
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nature that prevents this if we wish it, but by and large 
we are not able to and neither would we wish to, if we 
could. For most of us do not seem to resent the roles 
into which we have been socialized. Indeed we happily 
accept them.
But de Beauvoir and other feminists claim that the 
cause of most women's acquiescence to housewifery and 
motherhood is, in effect, a socially fostered ignorance 
of a woman's alternatives. So our acceptance of these 
roles should not count.®® But what if most women were to 
say that they have freely chosen their roles, and if they 
wanted to change them, they could? If truly autonomous 
rejection of our stereotypical gender roles is possible, 
how can we deny the claims of those women who say that 
they have chosen to be a housewife/mother and they would 
not change it for anything (which is probably what many 
women would say)? It will not do to insist that they say 
this because they are in a state of socially fostered 
ignorance. For if autonomy in such cases is not 
straightforwardly possible, then by a parallel argument, 
none of us make the choices we think we are making and it 
makes little sense for de Beauvoir to prescribe autonomy 
(or for others to demand the widest possible choices in 
order 'to discover what we can BE and DO'). Perhaps the 
best that can be said is that a woman's conviction that 
she has chosen to marry, to become a housewife and 
mother, while not conclusive evidence that she has chosen 
this, is the best evidence we have that she has.
There is a last way we might interpret the claim 
that we do not need to adopt the traditional gender roles 
of wife or husband; this is the more modest proposal that 
an adult person is able and ought to choose some aspects 
of their gender roles for themselves. If all that is 
meant by this is that they could decide for themselves 
some aspects of how they will behave, take on some roles 
traditionally assigned to the opposite sex, and so on, 
this would not present insurmountable difficulties for
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the idea of autonomy in this context. Some women (and 
many men) can and do make such independent choices. No 
doubt given an upbringing with less pervasive gender role 
stereotyping - like, for instance, if children were given 
role models of parents exercising equally free choices - 
the number of adults making significant choices of this 
kind would increase.
But a problem still remains. There can be little 
doubt that some male and female traits in this regard do 
have a genetic origin. As Wilson (1978:132) writes:
At birth the twig is already bent a littlebit...
If this is so, even with an education, training and 
upbringing as gender neutral as possible, many males are 
still likely to fail to participate fully in, say, child 
rearing; many females are still unlikely to engage in car 
maintenance or replace the washer on a tap. If we try to 
eliminate this and insist on equal participation in the 
domestic roles, the amount of regulation that this would 
require might well place many of the personal freedoms 
that we enjoy in the current practice in jeopardy.
The common domestic good
A different way of justifying the traditional 
domestic roles (to their being based upon putative 
differences in nature) is in terms of domestic 
efficiency. What this justification stresses is the 
usefulness of the division of labour to be found in the 
traditional marriage. It results in a convenience for 
everyone, or 'the common domestic good'. The view is 
usually supported by the claim that, for whatever reason, 
most men and women are just more competent to perform 
their traditional domestic roles. Women just are better 
at jobs such as ironing, cleaning, washing. So much so 
that men should be excluded from such activities for 
their own good. They should not be allowed to waste 
their energies doing chores which will nearly always
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elude them. Along the same lines it is claimed that men 
are just not as good at 'mothering' as women. The 
impression is given that many children would be seriously 
damaged if fathers generally were expected to be the 
primary caretakers. Just because there are the 
occasional exceptional husbands who are more competent at 
such things than their wives, this should not be allowed 
to make everyone else suffer by changing the traditional 
roles. A similar appeal to a common good to be brought 
about through efficiency, saving time or personal safety, 
is used to justify the exclusion of women from certain 
activities inside (and outside of) the home; for 
instance, servicing or driving the family car. It is not 
that we cannot perform such tasks but that we would be 
less efficient at them than men, or that we could be 
seriously damaged by being allowed to try.
One further point might be added: even though we are 
more or less efficient, there need be no suggestion of 
inequality between the roles of husband and wife. It is 
sometimes added that this is what is objectionable about 
our attitudes towards the traditional housewife's or 
mother's role in marriage. It is the inferior status 
that is usually associated with the former or the
demeaning attitude that some people (particularly 
feminists) have towards the latter, that is so unfair."
Along these lines it is claimed that housewives and
mothers provide a much more important service than their
antagonists suggest. For instance, a home is more than
just a house and a homemaker is more than just a
housewife. As Broderick (1988:189) (somewhat
sentimentally) suggests:
The design and...level of maintenance andgeneral ambience of a family residence aremajor indicators of the character and social position of those who live there. She who takes responsibility for it is thereby...the producer and director of the family's life-style and social image.
Grocery shopping or preparing meals is more than the mere
i.
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provision of food for the family. The evening meal may 
be, for instance, the basis on which family cohesion is 
built. A similar claim could be made about child-care. 
It involves a great deal more than feeding, clothing and 
cleaning children. It involves, as we noted, the 
mother's shaping the child's sense of self, the child's 
ideas of morally right conduct, its view of the world. 
And when the children begin to grow up, the task of 
monitoring and fostering the relationships among family 
members is another important function of her traditional 
role. In which case, a mother provides important social 
and emotional support to the family. However these and 
related functions of a wife and mother are usually 
omitted from the account. As a result the stereotypical 
roles that women perform are usually so devalued.
It is sometimes suggested that one explanation of why 
the value usually given to the husband's and wife's roles 
is different, is due to the fact that the former receives 
payment for his work. In the traditional division of 
labour there is, on the one hand, the waged work of the 
husband, and on the other, the unpaid work of his wife. 
But not getting paid for her work implies that her 
contribution to the domestic economy is not of equal 
value to her husband's. As a result he is regarded as 
the provider and she as his dependent. If, on the other 
hand, wives were paid a wage, by their husbands or by 
central government for doing housework and for mothering 
this could reflect some level of recognition of the 
equality between the contributions of both. She would 
be financially rewarded for contributing to the domestic 
economy.^® Ideally, she would be treated no differently 
from the periods when she is earning a livelihood in the 
public sphere." A byproduct of this proposal might be 
that the value we attach to the woman's role will change.
Against the view that central government should pay 
women for their work in the home, it could be objected 
that this still implies that such work is a woman's job.
«ï
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As Radcliffe Richards (1994:300) points out:
Except for making people financially independent, it would leave everything much the same as it is now.
However Radcliffe Richards (1994:317) thinks that if a 
woman prefers to do more of the childcare herself then 
the idea of the wages being paid by her husband 'need not 
be a bad thing'.
I do not see that this leads to an improvement in a 
wife's status or an improvement in the way that she is 
valued. In the first place, it overlooks the fact that 
in such circumstances her husband would have the 
additional power over her, of being her employer. In 
which case, presumably she would be less free than before 
since as her employer he could now be able to make 
decisions without her point of view being considered. 
This problem may seem somewhat exaggerated but the fact 
that a woman might be financially better off would not 
seem to be any more beneficial to her status in the 
family than under present circumstances. Besides this, 
if shopping, washing, preparing and serving family meals, 
is 'a jumble of mediocre stuff', even if a housewife were 
to be paid by her husband, this would not give her work 
status simply because it is so monotonous.
We noted earlier the claim that there is a more 
valuable component to many of the female-typed family 
tasks and because of this it could be argued that the 
housewife/mother ought to be given equal - some might say 
superior - status to her husband. (The phrase that is 
commonly used is 'equal but different'.) A wife/mother 
can provide important social and emotional support for 
her family. However, according to de Beauvoir 
(1988:391), what housework and motherhood cannot provide 
is the sense of self-fulfilment that results in 
'transcendence' for the housewife/mother. This equally 
applies to househusbands (the few that there are)." I 
shall return to this point shortly.
Before this, the question still needs to be asked:
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why should cooking and cleaning be the woman's role? Why 
ought a mother rather than a father rear their children? 
The links between the sex we happen to have and our 
different levels of ability at housework seem to be very 
tenuous. Once again the arguments we introduced earlier 
apply. Even when relevant physical and psychological 
differences between men and women are admitted, there is 
no evidence to suggest that any of these differences show 
that all women are generally better - more efficient - 
than all men at housework. If distinctions could be made 
in terms of 'better or worse at housework' surely these 
would depend on criteria applying to men and women alike. 
And even if most women are more efficient at such-and- 
such a task within the household, the admitted difference 
is out of all proportion to the degrees of the 
differences we find in the usual gender roles in the 
traditional marriage.
Parallel considerations apply to mothering. Knowing 
that someone is female (or male) does not enable us to 
draw conclusions about her (or his) acumen or depth of 
feeling as a parent or anything else that would entitle 
us to regard her (or him) as being more or less able as 
a parent. And if because only the woman can wean the 
baby requires that she should breast-feed it, this does 
not imply that only she should do the cleaning, washing, 
shopping for it. And certainly, such differences do not 
justify the sacrifice of the mother's other life-plans to 
the demands of her family.
I mentioned earlier that domestic arrangements have 
become more flexible and less formal in most homes 
nowadays, and it is now fashionable for some husbands to 
help with the housework - presumably they recognize that 
this domestic burden, carried out by women in previous 
generations, is quite irrelevant to the difference in 
function implied by the difference in sex. However as we 
noted the husband still only helps with the housework and 
the children, the wife still has the responsibility for
*
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the majority of the household tasks. As Beck & Beck-
Gernsheim (1995:20) write:
Little or nothing has changed...especially where responsibilities for the household and children are concerned.
And if these differences in their roles are unwarranted, 
the best way to overcome them would be for them to 
genuinely share the responsibility for both the housework 
and mothering. If this were to happen, this would 
eliminate the need for the wife to be a full-time worker 
in the house. Ideally both spouses could pursue their 
careers, and housework and mothering would just become 
part of the inconsequential everyday tasks that have to 
be performed. We might find it useful here to make a 
distinction between being 'a mother' and 'mothering' (or 
maternal responsibility). We can understand the former 
in a narrow biological way, and let the latter refer to 
all of the chores involved in caring for and rearing a 
baby. Most aspects of mothering can be shared; or 
rather, in a good marriage most child-rearing duties can
■ ■ ::be and ought to be a joint responsibility of the couple.
It might be thought that there are problems with 
this proposal. One is that giving up control over child- 
rearing would mean the loss of a traditional area of 
power for women. To put the matter succinctly: in the 
face of their isolation in the home and their relative 
powerlessness outside of the home, a major source of 
power has been women's control over the child-rearing 
process. But to cling on to this (especially when it is 
not necessary) seems to have seriously interfered with a 
woman's autonomy. Often in the past, moreover, the one 
person who might have shared in child-care, her husband, 
has been turned away from it. We might add also the 
advantages to the woman in sharing child-care with her 
husband; she would have more time for herself and very 
likely access to more opportunities outside of the home.
Concern might be expressed also that if we do 
significantly change the traditional marital roles so
.fa
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that husbands can readily become the primary caretakers 
of children - this would, as Wilson cautioned, lead to 
the 'significant loss of genetic fitness'. Traits which 
were in the past advantageous to the successful evolution 
of human beings could be lost. I can only respond that 
given the information at our disposal - given the very 
many influencing factors that determine genetic fitness - 
it seems to me very unlikely that sharing housework and 
mothering will result in such a cost.
Let me conclude this section by stressing two 
points: I think we have to accept that there are
biologically based sex differences in a few significant 
domestic roles. However the range of activities and 
roles in marriage (and outside of it) need reflect 
nothing more than this, i.e. those differences due to 
biology. At the same time, we could stop assuming that 
in marriage every husband ought to adopt masculine roles 
(in the conventional sense). Nowadays there is no 
obvious reason to suppose that he should be primarily 
responsible for them, when he might prefer and be better 
able to clean the house, care for the children. For if 
gender roles are bad, they can be bad for men too.
However this brings us to our next problem. No matter 
which one of them does it, according to de Beauvoir, 
housework and mothering are not activities which will 
lead them to transcendence.
y
Creativity and transcendence
We noted that according to de Beauvoir, a natural 
desire that all human beings have, is the desire for 
transcendence. This is the desire 'which compels 
individuals to project themselves into the world towards 
chosen possibilities'.^^ Or to put the point differently: 
to transcend him or herself (in the required way) a 
person needs to engage in creative projects in the 
w o r l d . F o r  it seems that one experiences transcendence 
through work which, de Beauvoir (1988:29) writes:
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...defines goals beyond the present and tries to change the world in some lasting way.
We are told that we all need such 'a disinterested 
curiosity, a taste for adventure and for new 
experience';^® or, at least, we all need in our lives as 
much personal growth of this kind as is possible.
We experience transcendence, then, through creative 
work and projects yet only 'work beyond the home and 
family offers the opportunity for transcendence',^^ 
Activities, like housework and mothering destroy our 
creative capacities, for the former activities are so 
puerile yet so time-consuming and exhausting that they 
leave no room for anything else. Thus another reason why 
women should avoid marriage (housework, mothering) is 
that it undermines their opportunities for transcendence 
and with it inter alia the development of their creative 
potentialities or talents.
To see if this claim is plausible, we need firstly
to be clear about what the notion of 'creative work' 
might involve. De Beauvoir is not overly helpful in this 
regard. Creative workers, she (1988:580) writes:
...transcend...themselves in the work they produce, go beyond the given...
One's work is creative (in the appropriate way) it seems, 
if by engaging in it one consciously pushes oneself 
forward or grows. So clearly, a first (trivial) 
condition is that a person must be engaged in some sort 
of work, project or activity to have the epithet 
'creative work' correctly applied to it. This is 
obviously correct. One cannot be creative simpliciter.
It goes without saying that a person who never puts pen 
to paper cannot count writing as one of her creative 
projects; a person who never puts brush to canvas is not 
a creative painter.
A second necessary condition, I would have thought 
is that the work or project must be one's own. Whatever 
it is one produces must be one's own way of looking at
:I%
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things. A piece of writing or painting that is a copy of 
someone else's work, would not be creative. This does 
not mean that it must be entirely new - something that 
has never been done before - just that it is distinct and 
therefore can be differentiated from other similar works. 
The originality might lie in the choice of perspective, 
or in the way the materials are used. But no matter how 
little the difference, there has to be an element of 
originality for a piece of work to count as being 
creative.
Another necessary condition concerns the 
intentionality of the agent; one must intend the work or 
project for it to be a creative act. A person cannot be 
creative by accident. To see this, we might make a 
distinction between, on the one hand, someone being 
creative in a project and, on the other, a project that 
is said to be creative. While the latter might be 
accidentally brought about, a person must be conscious of 
what she is doing if she is to be described as 'being 
creative'. For example, it is said that given sufficient 
time, a computer (it used to be a monkey on a typewriter) 
might happen to produce, say, Macbeth. But for 
'creative' to apply, we assume that Shakespeare intended 
to write Macbeth; he intended to write a play on this 
particular theme. Or to take another simple example, it 
is sometimes suggested that a painter is creative if she 
deliberately drips paint on to a canvas*® whereas had she 
accidentally upset the cans, it seems improbable to think 
that she could count this act a creative project.*^
The idea of one's being creative then requires that 
there must be an activity or a piece of work, it must 
represent a person's own way of looking at things, i.e. 
it must be original and it must be intended. Given these 
conditions, however a woman who creates a home from an 
empty shell, or a mother who brings up her children in an 
intentional, original way, might regard her work as 
creative. But evidently de Beauvoir's idea of
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transcendence requires more than this. It seems, 
firstly, that something needs to be said about the 
quality of the work.
If nothing about the good quality of the work is 
presupposed, a number of consequences would follow. 
Firstly, although I may know very little about painting 
or writing, the result of any mark I intend to produce on 
a canvass is original and by the criteria we have thus 
far, this would make me a creative painter, or the mere 
fact that I am writing a novel would mean that I am 
creative. But it is counter-intuitive to claim that 
anyone who merely puts brush to canvas or pen to paper is 
creative. Secondly, without the further condition - the 
good quality of the product - the concept of a creative 
project is redundant, since where they do not simply copy 
another work, everyone who writes, anyone who puts brush 
to canvas qualifies. In other words, if the idea of a 
'creative project' has no reference to quality then we 
would seem to be able to apply it indiscriminately. Even 
the most inferior works would count. If this is the 
case, if any work no matter how poor is deemed to be 
creative, then de Beauvoir would not bemoan the lack of 
creative projects in a woman's married life. Certainly 
she would not condemn the lack of creativity in housework 
and motherhood without presupposing that the quality of 
one's work and life is, in some way, better by being 
creative.
Can we say that any creative work she engages upon 
is a good thing? It seems not. For the potentialities 
de Beauvoir picks out as meriting development are value­
laden. She holds that only certain potentialities or 
projects should be developed, for only certain kinds of 
potentialities are appropriate to 'transcendence'.®^ De 
Beauvoir (1988:710-711) writes:
...women who seek through artistic expression to transcend their given characteristics; they are the actresses, dancers, and singers.
But it is not altogether clear why rather than aspiring
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to play the part of Lady Macbeth, someone with a skill 
for acting, shouldn't realize this potential, not in the 
theatre, but as a confidence trickster. Why shouldn't a 
person with a skill at painting just as much develop this 
talent by regularly painting graffiti on walls? We need 
to know why there is more to acting Lady Macbeth than to 
being a confidence trickster. We need to know, this is 
to say, the grounds (if there are any) for saying that 
only certain forms of personal development qualify as 
appropriate for transcendence.
We might attempt to overcome this difficulty by 
considering the suggestion that some activities or 
projects in themselves are likely to give rise to 
transcendence. From de Beauvoir's account, it seems she 
thinks that this is the case. Furthermore it seems that 
we can know in advance just which activities these are. 
Otherwise we could spend years developing one or other 
capacity only to find we are tired and bored with it and 
would have been more creative developing a different one.
Perhaps the answer is that only certain activities are 
capable of holding a person's attention for a long span 
of time; they are rich enough to provide a constant 
source of satisfaction. Of course people get bored with, 
say, writing; by the same token people get bored with 
knitting, cooking or taking care of a child. So the 
comparison between different pursuits must be in terms of 
their potentiality for transcendence. It may be the case 
that a person engaged in such an activity is not 
experiencing it in the short-term but its potential for 
transcendence in the long-term is justification enough 
for engaging in it. Some activities or projects 
presumably can be defended in these terms; they provide 
endless opportunities for fresh discriminations, for the 
development of further skills and judgement. So that we 
might say that the objective of an activity like knitting 
can be attained in a relatively limited number of ways 
whereas to engage in writing a novel is to explore new
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ideas, to develop themes, characters, and so on, all of 
which provide countless opportunities for individual 
growth and satisfaction for the individual involved.
But the objection might be pressed when the 
housewife creates a home for her family from an empty 
shell, she could be thought to be doing something of the 
same creative order as when the novelist writes a story 
or the artist paints a picture. This could be answered 
by pointing out that some activities give satisfaction in 
another way. Their wide-ranging content illuminates 
other areas of one's life. When writing a novel, one 
needs a broad body of knowledge which in turn could well 
throw light on other things in one's life. A person who 
systematically studies literature, or art, or philosophy, 
develops a conceptual outlook which could transform other 
things in her life. For such disciplines are intimately 
connected with the rest of one's experience. They inform 
one's outlook, one's everyday grasp of things (the means 
by which we understand ourselves and the world about us). 
On the other hand, skills such as knitting or homemaking 
do not have this wide-ranging content. Incidentally I 
suspect that this could be said of de Beauvoir's own 
examples of creative projects, singing and dancing. I 
can see nothing in the examples that suggest why they 
might be 'intrinsically creative'. If they are, I can 
see no reason why homemaking, knitting, gardening, should 
not be regarded as equally creative projects.
De Beauvoir also argues that a person's creative 
projects are found in the paid work they do.®^  A reason 
why a woman qua housewife and mother fails to achieve 
transcendence, we noted, is that she lacks a career or 
profession; in contrast, for this reason a man can be the 
'incarnation of transcendence'. Of course a small but 
significant number of women do have careers; they have 
made their way into medicine, law, politics, in 
scientific research, business management, etc. However, 
it is not clear that even when they do, their work is of
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such a nature that it must offer them opportunities for
transcendence. For many women claim to reach a glass
ceiling in their careers that lets them see where they
want to go but, due to male vested-interest and
prejudice, will not allow them to get there.
Furthermore, even when women do have a successful career,
de Beauvoir (1988:711) warns;
We rarely encounter in the independent woman a taste for adventure and for experience for its own sake, or a disinterested curiosity; she seeks 'to have a career' as other women build a nest...
Even where women break through the glass ceiling and do 
have a career that might lead to transcendence, it 
appears they usually fail to find the latter. It seems 
that the universe of transcendent work is dominated by 
men.
But once again this all seems quite disingenuous of 
de Beauvoir. In the first place, we rarely encounter a 
working man with such a taste for adventure. There can 
be no doubt that like most women, most men like having a 
job and they like to prove to themselves that they are 
capable of doing it well. However few are passionately 
concerned with the content of their work. This is not to 
say that their work is not important to them. As we saw, 
the work they do is important in most people's lives; it 
plays a crucial role in shaping their idea of who they 
are. However unlike most other activities in which men 
engage that are freely chosen, work is something, as we 
noted, that most of them have to do to maintain 
themselves and their dependants. They may be fortunate 
to choose the type of work they do, but not whether or 
not to work. This is to say, most adult males cannot 
avoid the fact of work. However being important in their 
lives is not to be identified with transcendence. It is 
not to be confused with 'a taste for adventure' or of 
'defining goals beyond the present and trying to change 
the world in some lasting way'.
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For one thing, we cannot overlook the fact that
there are very many men for whom work is an unavoidable
drudgery. They find the work they do soul-destroying,
not a source of transcendence. Marx makes this point
when he (1978:74) writes:
...[the worker] in his work...does not affirm himself but denies himself, does not feel content butunhappy, doesnotdevelop freely his physical and mental energy, but mortifies his body and ruins his mind. The worker therefore only feels himself outside his work...
No doubt this is the plight of the majority of men today 
in the workforce. A man whose job it is to turn a screw 
on an assembly line or whose job involves shovelling coal 
is unlikely to view his work as a fulfilling or creative 
activity. But then men do not spend all of their time on 
the assembly line (or down a coalmine). But then neither 
does the housewife or mother need to spend all her time 
on domestic tasks. I will return to this point shortly.
Before this, we should notice one implication of 
Marx's argument. Most women today who go out to work, 
have jobs in the food and catering industries, the 
clothing trade, or as shop assistants, or they look after 
children in schools or playgroups, or whatever. Why is 
it supposed that this will be more satisfying or creative 
than housework and mothering? We could accept that paid 
employment outside the home (a pay packet) is deemed by 
many women to be an acknowledgement that their labour or 
skill is thought to be of some worth. And also that many 
housewives (or househusbands) find any work outside the 
home more satisfying than remaining in their home day 
after day; for many women, being a full-time housewife 
means that they will be socially isolated or at the least 
they will have no 'support network'. They are stuck in 
their homes with few opportunities for companionship or 
social interaction. In contrast to this, outside 
employment is considered by many women as an important 
source of companionship. However these are reasons why
1
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housework is less satisfactory than outside work, not why 
it is less creative. And the point is: the work that 
most women do (like their husbands) is monotonous and can 
hardly be considered in terms of a creative project or 
transcendence.
Lastly, we might challenge de Beauvoir's major 
assumption that housework/mothering must hinder the 
development of all of our other creative capacities. 
Although she seems sometimes to regard this as an 
empirical fact, she also writes as if it is an a priori 
truth. The housewife's problem as de Beauvoir sees it, 
is that she has to stick to just the one thing. (De 
Beauvoir's housewife is not a well-rounded person.) But 
I see no reason why she should not develop some outside 
interests. As well as housework, for instance, why 
shouldn't she engage in other things - like intellectual 
activities or participate in sport, cultivate a range of 
different social interests - and then pursue those things 
in which she seems most likely to develop creatively?
De Beauvoir's answer seems to be that the 
traditional housewife/mother could not, for her work is 
too demanding and requires her to spend a
■ -disproportionate amount of time at the one thing. One 
obvious limitation on any thing she pursues (a la de 
Beauvoir) is that when she contemplates developing one or 
more creative aspects of her nature, the conscientious 
housewife must ask herself: 'Would this obstruct or
interfere with my domestic duties?' Another way in which 
the housewife's choice may be limited is where her 
desire, say, to be an actress is no greater or less than 
her desire to be a novelist; but she would be advised to 
cultivate her talents for the latter, for the former is 
more likely to take more and more of her time, and no 
doubt will involve her in other pursuits incompatible
with being a housewife. Nonetheless it could be argued 
against de Beauvoir that there is no reason in principle 
why a married woman/housewife should not develop an
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interest in a whole range of potentially fulfilling 
projects.
It seems to me unlikely that most women would want 
to do so. For to behave in this way would be like 
designing a dress in such a way as to include a little 
bit of every colour in the spectrum. No doubt there are 
many things we could do and many traits we could develop 
in this regard, if we had the time and wanted to take the 
trouble. However if we decide to develop some of them it 
must always be at the expense of others, so some 
selectivity will have to be exercised in the matter of 
which projects to work on. It is much better to
concentrate on one thing in the time available, the thing 
most likely to lead to the greatest sense of fulfilment 
and then to build her housework, mothering and everything 
else around it. In this way, there could be something 
other than domestic tasks dominating her life. Her life 
could revolve around the satisfaction of her major 
interest; housework and mothering could be incidental to 
that.
Thus far only a part of this argument against de
Beauvoir has been made. For while there are some
creative projects which if developed will be hindered by 
housework and motherhood (e.g. acting, international 
exploration), some activities seem to be mutually 
compatible with housewifery or child-rearing. (In much 
the same way, as say, alcoholism interferes with study 
but eating healthy food does not.) At its most general 
for instance, the habits of self-discipline developed in 
the pursuit of efficient housework might reinforce her 
capacity for concentrating on other subjects; to observe 
specifically her children or housewife friends may be 
useful in her development as a novelist. Some 
housewives/mothers seem to develop both areas 
harmoniously, each reinforcing the other, whereas de
:vBeauvoir suggests that housewives/mothers must find the 
simultaneous development of the two activities quite
4#
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incompatible. But there is no a priori reason why this 
should be so.
There are other difficulties I have with de 
Beauvoir's account. For instance, it has a rather 
egoistic ring to it. She talks about transcendence as 
though it can only occur at an individual level. You 
should engage in creative activities that will bring you 
transcendence or self-fulfilment. On the other hand, it 
might be argued, self-fulfilment is wrong if it is at the 
expense of other people. Or it could be argued that it 
is not self-fulfilment at all, if it is at the other's 
expense (i.e. that the complete self is social). It may 
not be possible for you to achieve the required level of 
self-fulfilment unless your endeavours are at least an 
ingredient in the personal growth of other people in your 
family or community. (This is especially the case in 
rural South Africa where it would be difficult - or very 
selfish - to blind oneself, in the pursuit of one's own 
projects, to the hand-to-mouth existence of most of the 
rural women around one.) Seen in this light, de 
Beauvoir's 'transcendent woman', this is to say, is 
morally acceptable only in a context in which she 
includes in an account of transcendence, some 
consideration of the self-fulfilment of other people. I 
do not want to go any further into the details of such 
arguments but de Beauvoir's opponents might argue in this 
way.
Against such views, de Beauvoir would maintain that 
when a woman marries and accepts a traditional housewife/ 
mother role, by virtue of the type of work she does, she 
is consigned to immanence. This is a result of her being 
limited to performing duties of a service nature for her 
family.®® If a married woman, on the other hand, is 
involved in creative work in the ways suggested above, 
she is no longer a housewife/mother in de Beauvoir's 
sense. Even if she were still to be mainly responsible 
for the smooth functioning of the home, the fact that she
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sees herself as a creative worker means that 'housewife/ 
mother' can no longer be an appropriate description. We 
can make this point more forcefully in another way: if a 
person defines herself as a housewife, she is involved in 
non-creative work and so is not fulfilling herself as a 
pour-soi. This is not to say that she cannot be happy
and satisfied with her life but she cannot have a sense
of transcendence. The same objection applies, of course, 
if a husband fills these roles. In which case, I think
that de Beauvoir's criticism stands.
Lastly, it needs to be added that in a good 
marriage, the couple will help each other grow; the 
husband will want to encourage his wife to realize her 
potential for becoming an artist, author, or whatever, 
and she will encourage him in his creative projects. One 
difficulty is to be precise about the nature of the help 
and encouragement required. It is difficult to see how, 
say, a wife could help her husband to become an actor if 
she knows nothing of the skills involved. But, 
presumably, she is able to provide a secure basis for him 
within which he can develop his potentialities, whatever 
the latter are, and vice versa. So that, for instance, 
she ought not to place unreasonable restrictions on the 
time she tolerates being left on her own in order for her 
husband to work or study; or she ought not to make too 
many other demands on the time of her partner. 
Alternatively the support and encouragement she might 
give could be financial; or the required support may 
simply be in the form of praise and reassurance, rather 
than attempts to undermine the partner's confidence. The 
point, once again, is more obvious when the opposite is 
assumed. We would say that if one of them is perpetually 
placing unreasonable restrictions on the time or money 
they allowed the other in this regard, if one of them was 
always attempting to undermine their partner's confidence 
in their projects, by telling them (their spouse) what 
they should or should not be doing, what they (their
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spouse) really thinks or feels, or what their motives 
really are, then this is unlikely to be conducive to 
their developing their talents or achieving their 
ambitions. Otherwise it is not clear to me why, as our 
ideas, projects and talents develop, we should not owe 
our biggest debts to the help, advice and support we 
receive from a spouse in a good marriage.
Conclusion
I began this chapter by considering de Beauvoir's 
claims that the stereotypical gender roles into which we 
are socialized within marriage, destroys a woman's 
autonomy. I have argued that while certain biologically 
based roles are inevitable, the usual domestic 
stereotypes go well beyond the few biologically or 
psychologically justified differences, and they are 
unfair to women and have no place in a good marriage. If 
housework and child rearing have to be done, this ought 
to be the responsibility of both husband and wife alike.
The second major issue discussed in this chapter is 
the claim that neither housework nor motherhood can meet 
the necessary conditions of transcendence or personal 
growth, which is a fundamental desideratum for human 
beings. Insofar as this is the case, I argued, the 
married woman is in no a worse position than most other 
people in this regard. De Beauvoir's condemnation would 
be better directed at the mundane nature of work which 
results from the division of labour in a modern 
industrial economy, of which housework is just one 
instance. Moreover there is nothing in principle that 
prevents a married woman from having a creative project. 
And there are some cases in which married women 
(including mothers) are successful authors, artists, or 
engaged in professional and managerial careers. Although 
sometimes the pursuit of a career clashes with one's 
duties as a wife or mother, this is no more than the 
clashes that any married person experiences, for
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instance, like those a husband or father has, when his 
work and family obligations conflict. However I agree 
with de Beauvoir that the possibility of a married woman 
enjoying a creative project depends upon her not 
regarding herself exclusively (or mainly) in the role of 
wife and mother. If she does the latter, then as de 
Beauvoir says, to the extent that she does this destroys 
the woman's possibilities for creativity.
Let us turn now to the problems she raises 
concerning sexuality in marriage.
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Chapter Seven
Sex and marriage
De Beauvoir maintains that marriage is a source of 
a woman's sexual oppression. As we noted, firstly, it 
destroys the possibility of her having the kind of sexual 
satisfaction she naturally seeks, by changing what begins 
as an erotic relationship into a legal one. Sex becomes 
a duty; whereas, we are told, a satisfactory sexual 
intercourse has to be a 'spontaneous and thrilling urge'. 
At its most extreme, this seems to be a matter of two 
people falling spontaneously into each other's arms. 
(Clearly if this is the case, husbands lose out too in 
their sexual encounters in marriage.) But there is a 
harsher implication of the legal nature of the 
relationship than sexual dissatisfaction. A husband may 
think he is morally/legally entitled to intercourse and 
in pursuit of this, that he is entitled to sexually 
harass or even to rape his wife. Thirdly, de Beauvoir 
suggests that satisfactory sex can only be achieved with 
a series of different sexual partners. But if this is 
the case, the demand for fidelity in marriage must 
frustrate our natural desire for sexual satisfaction.
In this chapter I want to challenge some of de 
Beauvoir's arguments. I will begin by objecting to her 
claim that sexual intimacy in marriage cannot be 'a 
spontaneous urge'. What is wrong with regarding sex in 
this way? The main wrong seems to be that it would 
permit harassment and even rape. Clearly this is 
unacceptable - but what exactly is morally objectionable 
with harassment and rape in marriage? I will explore 
some of the problems which can result if sexual 
intercourse is regarded as a legal and moral duty in 
marriage. Finally, I will discuss some of the moral 
issues that are raised by de Beauvoir's treatment of 
fidelity.
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Can there be good marital sex?
At the beginning of a relationship, lovers usually 
find their sexual intimacy to be exciting and intense. 
As we noted, this, in part, will be due to the lowering 
of emotional barriers, as secrets and hopes are shared. 
As this aspect of their relationship intensifies so 
usually does their level of sexual intimacy- The problem 
is that this intense excitement is by its nature short­
lived; or at any rate, the experience of new-found 
intimacy tends to dull over a period of time. After the 
initial excitement has worn off there is no novelty of 
this kind to be gained from one's present partner. If 
this is so, it seems reasonable for each of them ( in 
keeping with their natural inclinations) to choose to 
recapture the sexual thrill associated with the 
commencement of intimacy with someone else. If each of 
them chooses to have a sexual relationship with other 
partners then the whole exhilarating process can take 
place again. Once more it will be sexually exciting and 
emotionally intense. However again, in time the feelings 
of this kind that each has for the other must decrease 
and when it does, presumably, the lovers should choose to 
set off anew in search of other fresh conquests. In 
contrast with this, marriage - or any enduring long-term 
sexual relationship - is bound to be sexually lacklustre. 
This seems to be one way of interpreting de Beauvoir's 
misgivings about sex in marriage.
In response, I want to begin by pointing out that as 
well as it being an a priori truth - it goes without 
argument that sexual experience will vary from person to 
person - there is an abundance of empirical evidence 
which shows that sexual intimacy is not the same in every 
long-term relationship - whether married or non-married.® 
Neither will each partner experience it in the same way 
on every occasion in the same relationship. Some will 
have mostly satisfactory sexual experiences from the
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beginning? others may negotiate mutually satisfying joint 
experiences as the relationship develops. For many 
others, sexual intimacy will at times be better or worse 
than at other times; and yet others will have quite awful 
sexual experiences from beginning to end. In other 
words, it does not make sense empirically to lump all 
marital experiences of sexual intimacy together and say, 
as de Beauvoir seems to, that they are all instances of 
'bad sex'.
Secondly, the sexual expectations individuals bring 
to a relationship may be quite different. The source of 
our expectations no doubt involves an amalgam of all we 
have learned from others and from our own experience. 
Probably nothing is of more importance in this regard 
than the families in which we grow up. Some children are 
raised in safe, warm relationships; others have to be 
constantly alert lest they attract the anger of one or 
both parents. Some children are carefully instructed in 
sexual matters, whereas in other households the subject 
is never mentioned. There are, of course, very many 
other factors that help to form our expectations in this 
regard; books, television, films, sex education courses, 
religious beliefs, and previous sexual encounters, all 
play a part. It is not surprising then that the kind of 
expectations and experiences that individuals bring to an 
adult sexual relationship - married or otherwise - are 
different. De Beauvoir seems to suggest that all 
individuals start from the same baseline. Once again, 
regarded as an empirical claim, she is guilty of a weak 
induction.
A third point that needs to be made concerns the 
difference between individuals in their desire and 
frequency for sexual encounters. Generally speaking, in 
any relationship, married or single, one partner may be 
more demanding, or less interested, in sexual activity 
than the other.* If one of them desires sex less than the 
other, this might lead to the former being resentful ,v f.
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about the demands being made upon her (or him) or she 
might feel inadequate that her sexual appetite does not 
match her mate's. But no matter who has the greater 
need, it seems clear that frequent rejection or passive 
compliance will take its toll. It might make, for 
instance, the more needy partner doubt their own worth or 
perhaps their partner's emotional investment in the 
relationship. This problem can apply to any sexual 
relationship whether or not the couple are married.
Finally and surprisingly, de Beauvoir seems to 
overlook the fact that a large part of the pleasure 
involved, for both the male and female partner is derived 
from physiological changes during sexual intimacy.® There 
are numerous books and magazine articles which claim that 
one needs knowledge of the appropriate techniques (and 
the ability to apply them) to bring about the desired 
changes. No techniques of this sort will always be 
successful, of course. What might arouse a person one 
day " a certain touch or word - may not do so on a 
subsequent occasion; what feels good today, might 
irritate the lover tomorrow. However, generally, the 
view is that good sex is something which requires at 
least that a largely mechanical skill has been mastered. 
We are advised that a lover (or spouse) who does not have 
an adequate knowledge of such techniques will not be 'a 
good lover'.
But this seems to be just what de Beauvoir says 'good 
sex' is not. It is not merely the joint attainment of 
physical pleasure, for this she (1988:465) insists is no 
more than 'joint masturbation' (which sounds as if it is 
unsatisfactory). What I take de Beauvoir to mean is that 
many of the pleasures we experience in sexual intercourse 
are not merely the result of the appropriate physical 
stimulation. Presumably some account must be taken also 
of the state-of-mind of the lovers. The (appropriate) 
pleasure must include the whole personalities of both 
partners, their emotions as well as physical feelings;
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the awareness of each that it is this particular person - 
the one whom they love - that is doing the caressing, 
etc. It seems likely that this awareness will intensify 
the pleasure. Seen in this light, for example, the 
caress of a spouse (or a long-term lover) might be 
regarded as a gesture that is important to their partner 
because of what it conveys; often it will be taken to 
signify the love, say, a wife feels for her husband. In 
casual sex, on the other hand, it is likely to be 
interpreted as merely a prelude to the sexual activity 
that is about to take place.
We could couple with this, the point made earlier 
that the traditional view of sexual intimacy - I suspect 
de Beauvoir's view - is based around penetration and male 
orgasm. The (perhaps) different desires and needs of the 
woman are largely ignored. Feminists, since de Beauvoir, 
have argued for the need for sexual practices free from 
the primacy given to the above event and which include 
the equally important but different pleasures and 
excitement that can be experienced by women. Only then 
can we say that the sexual encounter meets the needs of 
both partners. If this is so, 'good sex' and the 
importance that we seem to attach to it, depends to a ./l: -
large extent on the nature of the relationship between
the lovers.
But where this is the case, we may argue contra de 
Beauvoir, that in this latter respect marriage has 
advantages over a casual sexual relationship, like a 'one 
night stand' or a brief affair. For in the married 
relationship there are an indefinitely large number of 
opportunities for a couple to engage in sexual intimacy 
of the preferred kind. There is a related advantage 
worth our noting. As a result of the numerous 
opportunities, if on some occasions sex is unsatisfying 
or even boring for one (or both) of them, this need not 
be cause for concern. Indeed the degree of physical 
pleasure gained from the act of intimacy itself might not
i
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The physical union with one's wife is...like sharing a great mystery together.
matter so much as the way in which the act was conducted 
- the setting, the conversation beforehand, feelings of 
closeness afterwards, and so on. On the other hand, in 
a spontaneous decision to have sex with a friend or a 
stranger, if the act did not meet one's hedonistic 
expectations, then the experience would no doubt be 
regarded as a mistake. And if this were to occur too 
often, it is unlikely that the encounters would continue.
For in a casual sexual encounter the object of sex, one's 
lover, is likely only to be desired during the short time
of arousal and resolution. In other words, the sexual 'performance of one's partner is much more likely to be 
criticized in episodic sex than in a long-term or marital 
relationship.
Marriage, I am arguing, can provide the framework 
for this most intimate form of relationship. Indeed it 
might be argued contra de Beauvoir, that rather than 
destroying good sex, marriage can provide the best 
context for it.'* In this relationship, the wish for 'good 
sex' can father the act; the couple can work at trying to
-, :: :make sure that their initial exciting sexual activity 
does not fade. Ideally, such on-going sexual intimacies 
take the couple into greater depths of their 
relationship. As Plutarch (1973:3:96) wrote:
In 'a good marriage', sexual intimacy is associated 
with a deep affection and commitment to the other person. 
This is an implication of the idea of 'a good marriage' 
as well as a generally conceded empirical claim. It is 
the level of affection and commitment which helps to 
differentiate this form of sexual experience from casual, 
erotic sexual experiences. In which case, just as the 
love a married couple have for one another is not likely 
to be the kind they feel for any other persons, so the 
sexual intimacy they experience with each other is not 
likely to be something they could share with anyone else.
.
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account concerns an implication of the claim that to be 
good, sexual intercourse needs to be 'spontaneous' and to 
achieve the latter we require a variety of sexual  ^ipartners. Viewed in this light, de Beauvoir seems to be 
advocating that each partner ought to try to get the 
maximum thrill for themselves. Or to put the point 
differently: one's partner ought to be regarded as being 
no more than a means to an end - one's own pleasure. But 
this seems to contradict her view that 'good sex' needs 
to be more than physical excitement. On the other hand, 
it could be claimed that when sexual intercourse occurs 
in a good marital relationship - where there is love and 
commitment to each other and to the relationship - each 
is likely to consider their spouse's sexual needs and 
satisfaction to be as important as their own; each is 
likely to desire that their partner has the maximum 
thrill from the sexual encounter and will endeavour to 
see that this is achieved.
It might be countered that to suggest that good sex 
is a necessary condition of a good marriage runs counter 
to the fact that no doubt many couples, particularly 
older people, get along perfectly well in their marriage 
without their having a sexual relationship. It is not a 
matter of them counting this aspect of their relationship 
as not good, it is non-existent. But this misses the 
point. I have argued that intimacy (being a soulmate) is 
an important condition of a good marriage. And at any 
age, sexual intercourse is the most obvious manifestation 
of such intimacy.® So my argument is that the marriage of 
a couple who do not have a sexual relationship would be 
more satisfactory if they do share intimacies of this 
kind.
It might be objected that I have overstated the kind 
of sexual activity that most people encounter in 
marriage. In the first place, given de Beauvoir's view 
that sex is always a transcendent act for a male (see
a
■l ■. .
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p.123), while a husband might begin and end by regarding 
his wife as the one he loves, in the heat of his desire, 
he too must see his wife merely as an object that will 
satisfy his desire. So during sexual intercourse, the
attitudes of both husband and casual lover will be the
'f
same.® Even if this is the case - what happens at the
moment of self-absorbed climax is the same in marriage
and in a casual affair - I can see no grounds for
thinking that a loving spouse is less likely than a
causal lover to remain sensitive to his partner's needs,
even at the peak of sexual excitement. On the contrary,
as Kant (1930:162) points out:
If one devotes one's person to another, one devotes not only sex, but the whole person...the two persons become a unity of will. Thus sexuality leads to a union of human beings.
Kant suggests that ideally in the married relationship, 
two persons can surrender their entire person to each 
other. In this way, sexual intimacy becomes a mutually 
altruistic union and not one in which each person uses 
the other for their own benefit. (Kant's view may seem 
unduly optimistic but it is no more extreme than de 
Beauvoir's pessimism about the marital sexual 
relationship.)
Nonetheless the objection that I have overstated the 
kind of sexual activity experienced in most marriages 
might well be pressed. De Beauvoir insists that after a 
number of encounters between husband and wife, the sense 
of adventure and erotic excitement must fade. It is 
logically absurd to think that a married couple will 
provide each other with the same intense excitement for 
the rest of their lives. In support of this, we might 
note that there is considerable empirical evidence which 
shows that frequency in intercourse is highest amongst 
newly married couples and then drops consistently 
throughout the ensuing marriage;’ in short, as a matter of 
fact, the marital sexual relationship has a strong
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tendency to decrease over time.
Another reason why it might be thought that I have 
overstated the case against the general dissatisfaction 
towards sexual activity experienced in marriage (that de 
Beauvoir says must occur) concerns her worry about the 
legal right to sexual intercourse in marriage. In the 
traditional marriage, many husbands appear to think that 
they have a right to regular sexual intercourse and that 
it is a duty of their wife to comply irrespective of her 
own wishes. De Beauvoir maintains that partly as a 
result of this legal right, the husband thinks that 'the 
woman's body is something he buys',® he expects his wife's 
sexuality to be at his disposal, he expects an 'obeisance 
to male domination'.* If he regards her in this light, it 
seems very likely - as de Beauvoir suggests - that in 
their sexual relationship, the husband will be 
overbearing towards his wife. Clearly de Beauvoir thinks 
that this is morally unacceptable. But (as far as I can 
discover) she does not tell us why. Perhaps we can see 
what is wrong with it, if we consider two of the most 
severe forms of oppression in this context, harassment 
and rape. Until recent times the impression was given 
that since the wife's sexuality is thought to be at her 
husband's disposal, such acts were not only very likely 
to occur but that they are morally permissible.^* And, as 
we noted, many writers since de Beauvoir see this as a 
fundamental weakness of marriage.
Sexual harassment
In a marriage in which a sexual relationship is 
firmly established, there seems to be a thin line between 
acceptable sexual behaviour and harassing behaviour. 
What the husband (or wife) calls 'friendly behaviour', 
the wife (or husband) may find offensive. One obvious 
question that arises is; how exactly is the offending 
spouse supposed to know this?®®
Only the most prurient would claim that any touch
Mi 
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between them is a form of harassment. Clearly an 
important component for such behaviour counting as 
'sexual harassment' is that the physical or verbal 
attention is unwanted. Harassment occurs in cases where 
despite being rejected, the man, say, continues with the 
advances or unwelcome conduct. But how is her husband 
supposed to know that his advances are unwelcome? 
Couldn't he always (sincerely) claim that he did not 
realize that his attentions were regarded in this way? 
Furthermore in a marital or other long-term sexual
relationship, there are occasions in which initially 
unwelcome advances become welcome. His wife can become 
a willing partner in the sexual intimacy. So how is a 
husband to know when his sexual advances are not welcome?
There are two problems that this question poses: the
first concerns the recipient, the second concerns the 
perpetrator.
Consider first how we would answer this type of 
question in a quite different and much simpler case. Let 
us suppose a man is sitting in a dentist's waiting room, 
when he sees a woman holding her jaw and grimacing, and 
hears her groaning, etc. Although he cannot directly 
experience her mental state, it seems reasonable for him 
to conclude that she is in pain. For one important 
criterion for the ascription of a mental state to another 
person is the circumstances in which the ascription 
occurs. They are both at the dentist. A second 
condition concerns behaviour; our more obvious mental 
states are accompanied by typical forms of behaviour. In 
the example, he observes the woman holding her jaw, her 
grimaces, or other kinds of pain behaviour. Thirdly, the 
utterances we make play a significant role; a type of 
utterance is typically associated with such-and-such a 
mental state. In our example, he hears her groan or her 
making other noises we associate with pain. In other 
words, the circumstances, the behaviour, and the 
utterances, are criteria we normally use for the
I
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application of an appropriate mental state to another 
per son.
Let us apply these criteria to sexual harassment. 
How does a husband know that his wife finds his sexual 
advances unwelcome? First of all, if the incident takes 
place when she is talking with a neighbour, or in the 
company of strangers, it seems reasonable to believe that 
the predicate '...is unwanted' applies because the 
circumstances are inappropriate. Secondly, there is her 
behaviour; she pushes him away. More obvious than this, 
there are her utterances; if she says 'please do not do 
that' or 'No', this too is clear evidence that the
advance is unwanted. Just on the criteria above, I would 
have thought that a husband with a reasonable level of 
interpersonal sensitivity would pick up clues as to the 
mental state of his wife. She does not welcome his 
sexual advances.
Let us turn to the second question: how does his 
wife know his intentions? How does she recognize the 
friendly touch on the shoulder from the same touch with 
sexual connotations? can't he claim that he did not mean 
anything of a sexual nature by his action? Once again, 
it seems reasonable to suggest that circumstances, 
behaviour and utterances, are the criteria we use.
Obviously if he has cornered his wife, he is touching her
shoulder, and he is making a lewd comment about her 
physical appearance, his behaviour, his utterances and 
the circumstances, are the grounds for her assumption 
that he intends a sexual advance. (I need to emphasize 
that parallel arguments apply to a wife sexually
harassing her husband; by the same criteria, a wife
should realize that her husband does not want a sexual 
encounter and that she intends a sexual advance.)
Something needs to be said now about why we think 
that sexual harassment of this kind is morally wrong. De 
Beauvoir would argue that a person's sense of him or 
herself as a pour-soi - a self-determining agent - is
i
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violated when he or she is subject to persistent 
unwelcome sexual attention.^ The act in question is not 
an expression of their own freely made choice (in such an 
important matter); they are not being allowed to make 
their own decision about how they will behave. But we 
need to ask: why exactly is this morally wrong?
I think that the primary wrong is that by his unwanted 
attentions (and let us for the time being stay with the 
husband's unwanted attention upon his wife) the husband 
is not showing respect,for his wife as a person. If this 
is the case, among the many questions we need to ask is: 
firstly, if we say 'a husband morally ought to show 
respect to his wife' what exactly is he supposed to 
respect? Secondly, why morally should he show respect? 
Thirdly, why is him sexually harassing her evidence of 
his disrespect?
Sexual harassment as a form of disrespect for persons
■ VtI think the correct way to answer the questions 
above is along the lines suggested by Kant, In a 
nutshell the husband should respect his wife (and vice 
versa) because this is how he would want to be treated 
himself. Kant (1948:91) puts the matter in the following 
way:
Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.
Kant claims that the rule above follows from the (purely) 
rational idea that 'I ought never to act except in such 
a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a 
universal law. We should note that this is not
intended to be a moral principle about which we may 
legitimately argue. It is put forward as a rational 
principle which Kant suggests is universally conceded.
So we need to see, briefly, why it is thought to be a 
rational principle.
We may justify the principle - in roughly the way
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Kant justified it - by arguing firstly that this is a 
form of the principle of consistency. For our purposes
this means that if a husband considers his sexual conduct
to be morally acceptable (right, obligatory) for whatever 
reason, to be consistent he must also think that any 
relevantly similar act is morally acceptable (right, 
obligatory) for the same reason. To put the point 
differently: whatever the husband considers to be a good 
reason for him acting in a particular way towards his 
spouse, he must be willing and able to accept it is a 
good reason for anyone else acting in the same way, in 
similar circumstances; including his wife so acting 
towards him in similar circumstances.
In addition to consistency, we need also to add 
something about impartiality; otherwise, merely by the 
condition of consistency, the errant husband might 
believe that any eccentric preference or idiosyncratic 
form of behaviour that he would find acceptable if done
to him, is morally acceptable. The (fairly weak) version
of the principle of impartiality we require is that for 
a judgement, action, or item of behaviour, to be regarded 
as morally acceptable, it must not depend merely upon 
idiosyncrasies or peculiarities of the person making it. 
So that the reasonableness of any practical judgement or 
action of the husband, for example, cannot depend merely 
upon the fact that he thinks it to be reasonable. It 
must be thought to be so from other points of view; 
particularly by the person on the receiving end of the 
action. Again while this applies to moral beliefs and 
actions, it is not intended as a moral requirement but 
rather as a requirement of rationality.
These two conditions - consistency and impartiality 
- taken together, seem to me to be the basis for a 
justification of why a husband should show respect to his 
wife (and vice versa) and apply especially to the 
question of why he morally ought not harass her. 
Speaking very generally, he should respect her because
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this is how he would want to be treated in similar
circumstances and, by the requirement of impartiality, 
even if per impossibile he would not mind her acts of
disrespect towards him - which seems a very strange thing
’to suppose - his wife and most other people would want
respect to be shown to them in the appropriate
.circumstances.
One of the many problems with the claim 'He should 
respect his wife because this is how he (and everyone 
else) would want to be treated' is that even if we were 
to succeed in establishing it as a rational requirement, 
it seems to be a very general one. Apart from a few 
artificial cases, the rule would seem to be pretty 
useless when it comes to the practical problem of
deciding how the husband ought to behave, or why certain
kinds of actions are prima facie evidence of gross 
disrespect. on the argument above, for instance, what 
exactly is he supposed to do to show respect to his wife?
To answer this question, I will argue that there are 
certain beliefs, items of knowledge, abilities, that a 
husband will need if he is to effectively use the 
criteria above in his conduct with his w i f e B u t  they 
are not only the skills and abilities necessary if we are 
to show respect to another person, more to the point, 
when the conditions are absent, as they are in cases of 
sexual harassment, this shows clearly why the latter is 
a form of disrespect.
The kinds of beliefs, knowledge, abilities that we 
need for the practical application of the Kantian rule 
include, firstly, the husband's need to believe that the 
desires and interests of his spouse are of equal 
importance to his own, especially when he does something 
that affects her. This point is more obvious when the 
opposite IS assumed. If he does not believe this (that
Ihis wife's and his own desires and interests are of equalimportance) and at the same time, he would not readily 
accept that his desires or interests need not be taken
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equally into account when she decides to do something 
which directly affects him, then he has double standards 
- he is inconsistent.
To overcome the case of the husband who genuinely 
would find his wife's disrespect to be acceptable, we 
said that if we are to regard our behaviour towards 
others as reasonable, we need at least to see it from 
other points of view as well as from our own. But to be 
able to see a given action from his wife's view as well 
as his own, involves more than merely imagining himself 
in her shoes but still with his own feelings, desires, 
beliefs, and attitudes. For the same event can make 
different people upset, hurt, troubled, pleased, 
thrilled, and so forth. So he will need to understand 
her feelings, emotional states and attitudes as well as 
his own. Once again, this point is more obvious when the 
opposite is assumed. If the husband has no idea about 
what sort of things pleased or displeased his wife, or 
what made her feel upset, furious, jealous, how could he 
say that he is putting himself in her shoes, or of seeing 
what the situation looks like from her point of view? 
However this is more difficult than it appears. In order 
to recognize what another person is feeling, we need to 
have an assortment of skills and knowledge. It involves, 
for instance, noticing her facial expressions or 
gestures, being aware of the circumstances when she 
usually has a particular emotional state, and so on. We 
shall see shortly that knowledge of this kind is required 
if he is going to respect her as a person, when behaving 
in ways which affect them both.
Another practical implication of the Kantian rule 
concerns the knowledge of the facts we need, if we are to 
respect each other. A husband could be trying to show 
respect to his wife in their sexual encounters, but he 
could ruin this, for instance, by his being unaware of 
certain biological facts concerning her anatomy, or the 
more usual expectations of a woman generally vis-a-
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vis sexual relationships in marriage. To show respect, 
in other words, he needs to be adequately informed. 
Another related practical ability he needs is the ability 
to communicate his thoughts and feelings to his wife in 
an appropriate or sensitive manner. If he has trouble in 
communicating with his spouse, the husband's ability - as
someone who intends to show respect - is reduced. 
Although he may respect her, this is to say, he could
spoil things simply by boorishness or by an uncouth 
action, or lack of social graces. He needs, that is, to 
have savoir-faire in order to effectively show her 
respect.
One more item he will need is to have thought 
through what 'respecting her' requires in practical 
situations, like their intimate encounters. The husband 
needs, for instance, to have thought out possible ways of 
dealing with conflicts in sexual contexts before these 
situations occur. So that before such a situation occurs 
say, where his wife is unhappy about his action, the 
husband knows what type of behaviour (or action) which is 
in accordance with showing his wife respect. To show 
respect for others, this is to say, sometimes requires 
that one has thought about the different ways one could 
deal with a situation before it actually happens, 
especially those calling for a difficult response. He 
needs, lastly, to develop the ability to decisively act 
on the principle of 'showing respect'. What this means 
is that he needs to have reasons for behaving in a way 1that corresponds to the idea of showing respect, even when his passions might be aroused, or even if she is 
irksome, unresponsive or disrespectful towards him.
I am claiming that taken together, the knowledge, 
skills and abilities above are a positive practical 
element implied by the Kantian notion of respect for 
persons. The list of conditions could no doubt be 
extended. But the important point for us to notice is 
that the beliefs, skills, abilities adumbrated are
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qualities one would expect to find in the conduct of a 
husband who is concerned to show respect for his wife.
Let us now see how the requirements apply to sexual 
harassment, where I maintain one or more of the 
conditions will be missing. In other words, we can see 
what is wrong with sexual harassment by considering the 
deficiencies in the character of the man who is prepared 
to act in that way. We might ask, for instance: does the 
man who sexually harasses his wife not think that she has 
wants and wishes in their sexual encounters? Or is it 
that he realizes that she has, but he thinks that these 
are unimportant when compared with his own? He does not 
need to consider them. If he does not believe that her 
wants and wishes are on an equal standing with his own, 
he has double standards and this is the basis of the 
disrespect he shows her. Or is it that his failure is 
due to his not understanding the emotional state of his 
wife when she is on the receiving end of this kind of 
abuse? He does not have the ability to 'read' her
emotional state. Is he unable to imagine himself in her 
shoes in such a way to recognize that an action which he
may regard as say, fun, can make his wife feel 
embarrassed, hurt, angry, or humiliated? If he really 
has no idea about what sort of things pleased or 
displeased her, what hurt or humiliated her, how could he 
possibly claim to be putting himself in her shoes? We
- ■; ;need to be cautious here. He does not understand her 
point of view, we noted, if he tries to justify his act 
because 'he likes this kind of thing' and if he were in 
her shoes, he would not mind what he was doing. To know 
what emotional state she is experiencing - to be aware 
that his wife is frightened, embarrassed, or humiliated 
by his unwanted conduct - involves his being able to 
identify the characteristic symptoms which accompany such 
emotions or feelings. As we noted earlier, a person who 
has any sensitivity to the emotional states of other 
people will be aware, for instance, that an embarrassed
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woman 'goes red' or fidgets, or is likely to tense her 
muscles and grimace. Many of the relevant emotional 
states are typically expressed by certain actions; the 
frightened woman cowers or flinches or tries to move away 
from the source of the threatening behaviour. And there 
are many typical circumstances or objects which give rise 
to certain types of emotion; a lascivious object often 
causes mortification; brutish conduct causes fear; an 
inappropriate context for a display of strong emotional 
feelings can cause the recipient great embarrassment. In 
most cases of harassment, however, I doubt that a husband 
lacks the ability to see the action from her point of 
view as well as from his own.
Perhaps there is an empirical fact of which the 
abusive husband is ignorant. Has he no clear idea of the 
kind of conduct that is expected in a male/female 
relationship? Is he unaware of the relevant social 
norms, the typical expectations of women in sexual 
encounters? Perhaps it is that he cannot communicate
■-with his wife sexually in any other way than by harassing 
her. He acts in such a coarse manner due to a lack of 
social graces. Is it that he does not stop to think 
about what he is doing, but acts on impulse? In other 
words, has he not thought about the unacceptability of 
what he is doing in advance of situation? Or is it that 
he knows such behaviour is wrong but due to his selfish 
sexual desire, he lacks the resolution to act in the way 
he morally ought, i.e. in a way that respects her 
wishes? In other words, he has thought about such things 
and realizes that he ought not to do them but he does not 
have the ability to translate his beliefs into action,
I hope the argument above fills in some of the gaps in 
the discussion when de Beauvoir and others object to 
sg^ual harassment in marriage.
It might be objected that the discussion should be 
m^ye even-handed between the sexes. But, of course, it 
fo^ |lows from my account that if a wife sexually harasses
m i
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her husband this shows - for just the same reasons - a 
disrespect for him as a person. To respect him, is to 
recognize that a man is not an object to be used; he has 
feelings and emotions that are just as important as the 
woman's. Different as these may be from hers, given the 
argument above, they (rationally) should nevertheless 
weigh equally with her. For a woman to sexually harass 
her husband, in other words, is to treat him as a means 
to her own ends - the gratification of her own desires; i
but this is not to treat him as she regards herself, as 
a self-determining agent in such contexts.
We need now to consider briefly another gross form 
of sexual oppression in marriage that often is the result 
of the belief that it is a wife's legal and moral duty to 
engage in sexual intercourse even though she does not 
want to do so; i.e. rape.
Rape in marriage
When a wife is not willing to have sexual 
intercourse, her husband may seize by force what is not 
offered willingly. His justification for this (if he 
should try and justify it) might well be that the law 
appears to state that on marrying, a wife gives permanent 
and irrevocable consent to any and all sexual approaches 
by her husband.^®
An essential constituent of any form of rape is the 
fact that the woman is forced or coerced to have sexual 
intercourse; she has to submit to intercourse when she 
does not want this. The coercion in question is usually 
by brute force or threat of such force. However some 
writers claim that rape can occur when the form of 
coercion is psychological.^® This (psychological 
coercion) might be based upon his having the economic 
upperhand; the wife submits to intercourse under threat 
of some financial hardship that will result if she does 
not. Or the intimidation employed Height be a form of 
social coercion: 'It is your duty as a wife.' However I
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think there is a price to be paid if we adopt this 
proposal (that rape occurs where the coercion is 
psychological). For one reason, the class of cases to 
which 'rape' applies has become so attenuated that the 
unequivocal moral condemnation that applies to cases 
where we normally use it (for the use of physical force) 
loses some of its strength.
Secondly, sometimes we do want to make the contrast 
between psychological and physical coercion. While v/e 
would severely censure a husband who ought to be in no 
doubt that his sexual advances are unwanted yet by using 
psychological coercion he continues with them, usually 
the condemnation would not be of the same kind as someone 
who physically forced himself upon his wife. I think we 
would normally describe the former (morally abhorrent) 
case in terms of 'extreme harassment' or 'excessive, 
unfair pressure' and the latter as rape. I suspect that 
most cases in which women in marriage submit to 
intercourse when they do not want it, are the result of 
the former kind of pressure. However some cases of 
unwanted sexual intercourse in marriage are accompanied 
by brute physical force by the husband upon his wife. 
For our purpose it will suffice to refer to these as 
'rape' - a sufficient condition for an act of rape on our 
account, is the fact that sexual access to the woman is 
gained by force or by threats of the use of physical 
force against her.
Rape by definition is not a sexually acceptable 
experience for a w o m a n . S h e  experiences rape as a 
violent act - a violation of her body. No doubt she will 
feel helpless, frightened, tearful, to say nothing of her 
sense of humiliation and degradation at this act. For 
most women expect sexual intercourse to be accompanied by 
feelings of love, shared intimacy, or mutual pleasure and 
excitement, not a battleground for demonstrating male 
physical supremacy or as merely an outlet for his 
unbridled sexual cravings.
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Implicit in any rape is the treatment of the woman 
as an o b j e c t . I t  uses the woman, without her consent, 
to carry out an act of exceptional intimacy, not merely 
irrespective of her wishes but against her wishes/" In 
marriage, moreover, there is a further emotional 
component to be taken into account, namely, a violation 
of trust. Being forced to have intercourse is not an 
impersonal act for a woman, in the way that, say, being 
stabbed by a stranger is impersonal. In the marriage 
relationship, a woman's emotional and physical security 
depends importantly upon the trust she has of her 
husband. By raping his wife, he violates this trust.
Rape is not just a rare or bizarre occurrence in 
marriage.There is evidence which suggests that it is 
a fairly common form of marital abuse." It seems to be 
an integral part of so-called 'violent marriages' in 
which sexual violence occurs as just another aspect of a 
generally violent and abusive relationship." Groth 
distinguishes between 'anger rape' and 'power rape' in 
such marriages." The former, we are told, are committed 
to express hostility toward women, to punish them, to 
retaliate against them or to humiliate them; the latter 
are committed in order to assert male dominance or 
control. (This is not to say the two sets of motives do 
not overlap.") For whatever motive it is committed, 
there is not only a violent act in such cases, there is 
also a sexual component. The act which is usually kept 
for loving, secure relationships is turned into an 
impersonal brutish act."
If an act of sexual harassment is morally wrong 
because by his unwanted attentions the husband is not 
showing respect for his wife as a person, the disrespect 
he shows her is multiplied considerably in an act of 
rape. Following our Kantian argument above we may add 
briefly that the rapist husband rides roughshod over his 
wife's wants, feelings, her sense of autonomy and worth 
as a person, and over the trust that the relationship
t
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depends upon. Treating her as a means to his own ends in 
this particularly intimate act, adds to her humiliation 
and sense of degradation. I will conclude this part of 
the discussion by observing the fact that where a husband 
behaves as if he has a right to sexually force his wife 
to have intercourse with him (or to harass her) this is 
most people's idea not merely of a bad sexual 
relationship but of a bad marriage.
There is a problem however that cannot be 
overlooked. One cannot simply assume that because rape 
and sexual harassment are wrong, there are no duties at 
all concerning sex in m a r r i a g e . O r  to put the point 
more cautiously, even if it may not be exacted by force, 
the question of whether or not there is such a duty 
remains. We have noted that a loving wife may decide it 
is her duty to have sexual intercourse with her husband 
when her behaviour is an expression of her love, not a
matter of her sexual feelings for him. This would fall 
prey to de Beauvoir's claim that sex in marriage is bad.
Or it may be that she no longer loves her spouse yet she 
believes that she should - as a matter of duty - act as 
if she has sexual feelings for him. This would detach 
the appropriate emotions from the sex act; she would be 
feigning the emotions that she displays in her behaviour.
This too would fall prey to de Beauvoir's claim. Good 
sex requires at least that the appropriate feelings and 
desires are present. Or a wife may decide she no longer 
wishes to engage in sexual intimacy, even though she 
believes that she is not doing her duty. After all, it 
was part of the undertaking she made when they married.
In some cases like this, the couple can continue 
untroubled by the absence of sex in their relationship.
However if the husband or wife is seriously upset by the 
prolonged absence of sex then - if as I have argued 
sexual intimacy is a necessary condition for a good 
marriage, and one of them cannot accept this - the 
appropriate thing to do is to end their marriage.
■;I
I247
Let us turn now to an implication of de Beauvoir's 
claim that good sex must be a spontaneous act; namely, 
her view that good sex can only be achieved with a series 
of different sexual partners. This means that to 
experience good sex, a married partner will need to be 
unfaithful.
Infidelity
De Beauvoir condemns marriage as forcing us into 
compromising and hypocritical behaviour. This applies 
particularly to acts of infidelity. She (1988:566) 
contends :
What makes adultery degrading is the compromise of character made necessary by hypocrisy and caution...
Sexual activity outside of one's marriage requires a
network of lies and cheating. However restricting one's
sexual activities to the marriage is equally upsetting.
It is absurd to think that a married couple will provide
each other with sexual satisfaction for the rest of their
lives. No two people, she suggests, are able to meet all
of each other's sexual needs in perpetuity. In the first
flush of love, the lovers will no doubt promise fidelity
to each other for all time. But once the passion cools,
the strength of the commitment they have to one another
must subside, and temptations arise. And even if they
remain committed to each other, it seems unreasonable to
think that at some point in their marital relationship a
normal adult will not have sexual feelings about some
other person. De Beauvoir (1988:568) claims:
...adultery...can be of help in bearing [the] constraints [of marriage]
So why shouldn't one or both of a married couple have an 
extra-marital affair? The extra-marital relationship 
might even be a way of bolstering the marriage.
Let us suppose that following de Beauvoir, an 
unfaithful husband says, 'In order to recapture the 
spontaneous thrill of the sex act, I need to have a
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number of extra-marital affairs.' Following our earlier 
Kantian considerations we might point out that if he is 
to be consistent, he must be able to say that it ought to 
be equally reasonable for any married person, including 
his wife, to behave in the same way. He must be able to 
say: 'For the same reason everyone, including my wife,
ought to have affairs.' But I doubt that this view could 
be consistently advocated.
First of all, it is unlikely that the adulterous 
husband would advocate this if his wife's affairs 
threatened his own interest, for example, by a diminution 
of her love for him, or if, say, his wife falls in love 
with her paramour and decides go off with him. For one 
reason, given this course of action he might no longer 
have a wife and thereby he would not be in a position to 
have affairs of this kind. In which case, to preserve 
his own interest he would need to say 'I accept that a 
general policy of extra-marital affairs is a good thing 
but think that if by having an affair this conflicts with 
my interests, my wife should not have one,' The trouble 
is that this justification is put forward as a paradigm 
of rationality. He suggests that it is reasonable for 
any married person to have an affair and at the same 
time, he suggests that where this threatens his own 
interests, his wife ought to act to the contrary. But if 
he thinks that she ought not have an affair (if this 
conflicts with his interests) then presumably, he is 
suggesting that she should act in an irrational way. In 
other words, someone cannot consistently advocate extra­
marital affairs as a general policy and at the same time 
resist the policy when this endangers his own self- 
interest, So the unfaithful spouse would need to keep 
his own counsel. And if this is the case then the 
proposal is inadequate as a moral justification of 
infidelity, for it cannot be consistently advocated.
The thrust of this argument might be denied. It 
might be countered that the unfaithful partner does not
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have to go to the length of positively wanting his spouse 
to have an affair. All that he is required to do is to 
concede that if she does, this would be morally 
unobjectionable, (no matter that he may intensely dislike 
it) In other words, to justify his own adultery, he 
can consistently maintain that his wife ought to have 
extra-marital affairs without encouraging her to do so. 
We can strengthen the argument by drawing an analogy with 
a competitive game. I may see how by moving his knight, 
my chess opponent can take my queen. This is how he 
rationally ought to move. However believing that he 
ought to move his knight and take my queen, does not 
commit me to showing him the move, or to wanting him to 
make it. What I rationally ought to do is to sit 
quietly, keeping my own counsel, hoping that he does not 
move as he ought. A chess player, or for that matter a 
player of any competitive game, can recognize that her 
opponent ought to pursue his own interests, without 
trying to persuade them to do so, or by showing them what 
to do.
The analogy, however, appears to be false. In any 
game we grant our opponent the right to make appropriate 
moves without taking certain preventative actions 
ourselves, like distracting him and then changing the 
position of the pieces on the board (while the opponent 
is distracted). By refraining from such actions, of 
course, we may lose the game. If the analogy were sound, 
the unfaithful husband would be committed to refrain from 
doing certain preventive acts in order to advance his own 
interests, like encouraging his wife not to leave him for 
her lover, a course which may not be in her best 
interest. In other words, by whatever manner or means, 
he would be rational (it is in his best interests) to try 
to get her to refrain from doing what might be in her 
best interests, i.e. if her interests conflict with his, 
he should persuade her to behave irrationally. It is 
logically possible of course that their interests will
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never conflict. However in everyday life, conflict of 
this sort happens all of the time.
What is the rationally self-interested husband going 
to say if his wife's and his own interests do conflict? 
Couldn't the unfaithful husband keep his own counsel? He 
can pretend to be faithful, for instance, while having 
sexual affairs on the side. If his adultery is 
discovered this could jeopardise his marriage." If he 
wants to have an affair, why should he not simply do 
whatever is required to get his wife to believe that he 
is being faithful?"
By engaging in such an affair, however, he will 
inevitably be deceiving his partner - and deception of 
this kind is generally thought to be morally wrong. 
Furthermore, most people who are involved in extra­
marital relationships believe that deception like this is 
wrong; yet few of them would be honest about their 
infidelity, particularly to their spouses. Why is it 
wrong? The deception might involve his telling lies. 
The husband may mislead his wife into believing something 
that is untrue: 'I am working late at the office tonight' 
he may tell her, when really he is having an affair with 
his secretary. This seems to be wrong for at least two 
reasons: it could well undermine his wife's current or 
future projects and it is contrary to the openness and 
trust which is expected to accompany the marital 
relationship.
In defence of the husband, it might be argued that 
although telling lies is wrong, his telling the truth 
would be a greater wrong because of the bad consequences 
that could result - the innocent spouse would feel hurt 
and betrayed if she was made aware of her husband's 
infidelity." Thus he may justify the lie by saying 'I 
didn't tell her because I didn't want to hurt her.' Some 
of us might agree that as a general rule some lies are 
morally justified for such reasons; the deception is 
justified as being the lesser of two evils. Thus a
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benevolent lie, say, to one's host whose cooking is 
dreadful - 'The dinner is delicious' - may be preferable 
to hurting the host's feelings. But the case of marital 
infidelity is quite unlike this. The aggrieved spouse's 
feelings are not spared due to something she has done 
(badly) but something about which she is (very likely to 
be) quite innocent. Furthermore, she believes something 
that is untrue - that her husband is faithful to her - 
and so she may well act in a way which is quite different 
from how she is likely to behave if she had been told the 
truth.
Of course it might be the case that no specific lies 
have to be told for the faithful spouse to remain 
ignorant of the affair. If adultery is wrong because it 
usually involves lying then might we say that when no 
lies are involved, no immorality occurs? I think the 
answer is that there is, nonetheless, deception of a 
different kind. Even if everyone but those having the 
affair are ignorant of it, the deceit will probably 
result in his wife suffering in a small way by a decrease 
in his attentions to her, or by his not wishing to engage 
in sexual intimacy with her. If his liaison develops 
into a more regular affair, presumably he has to make 
sure that it is conducted well away from his wife and 
family, or their joint friends. This requires a 
considerable degree of deception, as well as planning and 
precision in its execution. (Incidentally, this seems to 
make the extra-marital affair something more than 'a 
spontaneous thrilling event'; perhaps the 'spontaneity' 
to which de Beauvoir refers only occurs at the start of 
the affair.)
This brings us to a different, more elusive kind of 
deception. We saw in Chapter Three how there is an 
important connection between sexual intimacy and love. 
It is generally thought that one of the main ways that we 
demonstrate our love for another person is by having 
sexual intercourse with them. Since in western culture
i
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there is this correlation (between sexual intimacy and 
love), the person with whom the unfaithful spouse is 
having an affair (his 'mistress') may be deceived into 
thinking that he has deep feelings for her, and perhaps 
that their relationship will become a permanent one. On 
the other hand, if the unfaithful spouse does have such 
feelings for his mistress but not for his wife, then the 
latter will be deceived if she assumes that he has these 
feelings for her. Either way, someone is deceived!
It might be countered that an unfaithful spouse can 
have one or two relationships outside of the marriage 
without this affecting the quality of his feelings for 
his wife. We have established that we can sexually 
desire more than one person at a time (see p.27). Thus 
the unfaithful spouse does not have to deceive either his 
spouse or his mistress about his sexual feelings - he can 
desire them both. To put the point differently: as we 
have asked before, why shouldn't sex be treated like any 
other activity? It is possible to want to have sex with 
someone you do not even like very much. Why should we 
consider it moral to, say, talk or play tennis with 
someone to whom we are not married but immoral to have 
sex with them? What is so different about sex that it 
requires special rules? Alternatively, it might be that 
sex is an expression of love only with his spouse and not 
with his mistress.
Against this view it could be insisted acts of 
infidelity are prima facie immoral for quite different 
reasons. In the first place, they entail one or other of 
the spouses breaking the marital vow they made - the 
promise of sexual exclusivity. It is a binding promise 
they wittingly made to one another? the expectation is 
that both of them will always abide by that promise. In 
virtue of this, a mutual trust builds between them, based 
on the belief that each is keeping the vow. If one or 
other of them then breaks it, it usually results in a 
deep hurt for the innocent partner? more so than other
;i
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promises that one or other may make and then break. 
Added to this is the fact that keeping promises of this 
kind is a matter of self-fidelity. Even if it does not 
harm any other person, it harms oneself. We normally 
feel a sense of guilt or unworthiness when we fail to 
keep an important promise of this sort. Keeping one's 
vows is a matter of personal integrity."
In addition to the above, there is the prima facie 
wrong due to the hurt caused to the innocent spouse. 
Because of the correlation between sexual intimacy and 
love, (no matter if he says he loves her as much as 
before) the aggrieved spouse usually regards the breaking 
of the promise as a sign of indifference, a lack of love 
and affection by the unfaithful spouse. When they 
married they publicly acknowledged each other as the 
unique individual with whom they stood in a special 
loving relationship. By her mate committing an act of 
infidelity, she may see this as evidence that her spouse 
no longer views her in this way or that he no longer 
regards their relationship as unique. In other words, 
the faithful spouse might be hurt because she regards her 
husband's infidelity as a sign that he has grown 
indifferent to her or that the affection she feels for 
him is not reciprocated in such a complete way as her 
love for him.
Further as we noted, breaking this promise usually 
involves a web of deception, lying, and the infliction of 
other kinds of hurt on the faithful partner. This 
suggests that the unfaithful partner does not take the 
feelings of his spouse sufficiently into account. Or the 
hurt experienced might be simply a matter of resentment, 
due to the fact she has kept her side of the bargain. 
The innocent partner may have been tempted to have an 
affair but she determined to keep her promise (of 
fidelity) out of duty or love for her spouse. She might 
think (quite reasonably) that there is an injustice in 
having refrained from such behaviour herself only to find
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out that the restraint was not reciprocal. Lastly, the 
admixture of hurt feelings she experiences may include 
also uncertainty or worry. The illicit affair has placed 
the faithful spouse in a sexually competitive situation 
with another woman. Her errant husband has formed a 
liaison with someone else who has the potential to
:replace her altogether and who is likely to have already 
done so sexually. The hurt she feels might be coupled 
with her anxiety that her husband might leave her.
A further reason why the innocent party may be hurt 
is that if and when it is discovered, infidelity usually 
has a harmful effect on the couple's marriage. It 
destabilises most marriages." However even if we were 
able to show it destabilises all marriages it is not 
clear that this alone entails that infidelity is immoral.
By a parallel argument, if it were to be shown that the 
financial independence of women destabilises marriage, we 
would not seriously countenance the claim that it is 
immoral for women to work (in order to be financially 
independent). This point can be seen in another way. We 
noted earlier that when we choose to marry we usually do 
so in the strong hope that our partner will be our close 
friend. Presumably we would all agree that each of the 
couple also can have other close friends. Yet a close 
friend could be equally threatening to a marriage. It 
might be that in such a friendship there is, say, a 
developing sense of joint identity? this feature can 
occur in a relationship without there being a sexual 
component. But if this should occur, such an emotional 
interdependence could be more threatening to the marriage 
than a passing sexual interlude. Are we to say that it 
is wrong for a married person to have other close friends 
just in case this threatens their marriage? Or is it not 
more reasonable to argue that the close friendship we 
seek in marriage needs to be seen in terms of having the 
primary role, but not an exclusive one?
In keeping with de Beauvoir's views of sexual
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permissiveness, we might try to infer from this that 
sexual fidelity, like closeness in friendship in 
marriage, could be understood in terms of the 
relationship's primacy, rather than its exclusivity. In 
other words, if we relate the spirit of her proposal to 
marriage, the promise 'to forsake all others' could be 
interpreted to mean only that each spouse has the primary 
right to sexual intercourse with the other. In the 
envisaged relationship there should be no prohibition on 
extra-marital relationships as long as they do not 
threaten the primary relationship. The former could be 
marked by a fairly low level of commitment and would be 
expected to be transitory. As long as one loves, 
cherishes and comforts one's spouse, one is being 
faithful to the marriage vow. In response to the above, 
however, it might be countered that it is difficult to 
see how such an affair would not threaten the marriage 
or impinge upon the best interests of the faithful 
partner. In the traditional marriage an extra-marital 
relationship usually deprives the faithful spouse 
emotionally, sexually, financially, and so on.
But all of the above arguments are predicated on the 
assumption that the non-adulterous partner will be hurt. 
What if she does not suffer at all? Let us suppose that 
the husband is put under considerable sexual pressure by 
trying to keep the vow, so much so that his wife releases 
him from it. She tells him: 'Don't worry. Forget about 
the wedding vow. Have an affair.' Although their wedding 
vows involved the pledge of fidelity, husbands and wives 
are free, surely, to release each other from this vow, 
just as we are free to release each other from any other 
promise. Or the couple might agree at some stage after 
they have married, that the vows they made of exclusivity 
are no longer binding on them; or they might decide to 
have the phrase 'to forsake all others' deleted from 
their wedding vows. If they agree that one or both 
partners would be happier if they could have extra-
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marital affairs then - provided they do not keep their 
marriage a secret from their new sexual partners, who may 
not wish to have affairs with a married person - why 
should it be morally wrong for them to do so? If in the 
adulterous act neither of them is looking for any more 
than a satisfying sexual experience, and if neither holds 
back any important information to their new sex partner 
and if neither resorts to any coercion, deceit, or breaks 
any promise, then why is the extra-marital affair morally 
wrong?
It could be added that in these circumstances the 
decision to have an affair is a private matter - it has 
nothing to do with anyone but the consenting parties. To 
paraphrase Mill (1975:94) they should be free from the 
constraints of moral censure (or laws) with respect to 
such actions, where these do not harm others. Mill 
supports this claim by recognizing that each person is 
the best judge of his or her own interests in this 
regard. So long as their behaviour does not harm others, 
just because traditionally it has been regarded as wrong 
to behave in this way, this is not a compelling reason 
for thinking that in the circumstances outlined, they 
morally ought not nowadays.
One problem to the proposal above is that it needs to
be stressed that infidelity is seldom a private matter.
There are usually other family members affected by such
a decision (particularly if the extra-marital affair is
with another married person). What other people think
about a couple's extra-marital sexual conduct usually
does matter; if their interests are harmed by it, it
certainly matters to them. For instance, the couple may
have dependents that rely on them. And Mill too admits
to having reservations when he (1975:100) observes:
If, for example, a man...having undertaken the moral responsibility of a family, becomes from the same cause incapable of supporting them or educating them, he is deservedly reprobated, and might be justly punished...
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So it seems that certain roles or responsibilities carry 
with them other-regarding responsibilities.
This brings me to a last point that needs to be 
considered. If extra-marital sex is freely available and 
without moral stigma, if sexual variety and adventure are 
prized at least as much as monogamy - or if commitment 
and love are no longer the usual accompaniments of sex - 
then no doubt de Beauvoir's hopes will be met and marital 
ties inevitably weaken. For once marital fidelity goes, 
an important bond between a husband and wife is lost. 
And even if some kind of bond remains, how can their 
relationship stand up to the constant temptations the 
couple will face, or the constant jealousies or 
insecurities they will experience? However a couple 
might think that all of this would be a risk worth 
running.
But what would the situation be like if every 
married couple were to commit acts of adultery, which is 
presumably what is being advocated? Let us suppose, for 
instance, that there was an 'epidemic' of infidelity 
throughout British society. The stability of the 
institution of marriage would be threatened (see pp.66- 
67). Now if something threatens the stability of a 
particular marriage this may not be a reason to pronounce 
the thing to be morally undesirable or wrong. However if 
adultery became the general practice - if it were 
generally thought to be acceptable - not only would the 
marital relationship need to be very different from the 
traditional one that we know, but society itself would 
need to change. Seen from this light, if adultery 
concerned only the individuals involved in a particular 
sex act, then we might treat sex as a private matter. 
But if we advocate infidelity as the general practice - 
it is not.
I want to conclude this part of the discussion by 
saying something more about the advantages of the value 
of sexual exclusivity which should not be overlooked.
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Firstly, in a good marriage, sexual intercourse is a
mutual intersubjective experience, involving the couple
in a reciprocal generosity in their bodily actions, their
emotions, and in the consideration they show towards each
other. Secondly, as a result of the vow of sexual
exclusivity, the couple are forced into providing an
important source of pleasure for each other which they
have agreed will be unavailable to them elsewhere. If
sexual intimacy is limited to marriage, then the love
that is expressed in the sexual act between the spouses
remains limited to each other. This is likely to
strengthen the bonds between them. A third reason why
the vow of fidelity is helpful to marriage is that, as we
saw, it keeps the partners together through hard times.
As Midgley (1979:303) says:
We want deep and lasting relationships. And because these are often difficult, we 'bind ourselves'...to go through with whatever we have started...
Because of the importance of the promise to be faithful, 
even in difficult patches in their relationship, where 
each partner is determined to behave in conformity with 
it, their mutual fidelity may serve to strengthen the 
bond between them. Regarded in this way, sexual fidelity 
provides a cornerstone for 'a good marriage'.
Conclusion
We began this chapter by questioning de Beauvoir's 
claim that good sex must be a 'spontaneous and thrilling 
urge'. We then explored the implications of the legal 
entitlement to sex in marriage, i.e. harassment and rape. 
Finally we examined a case that could be made for 
infidelity. It was argued that in a good marriage, the 
sex act is a means by which the couple confirm that they 
have special feelings only for one another; feelings of 
friendship, intimacy, the sharing of a joint identity, 
love, and the like. To put the point in a different way: 
sex with love means something more than mere pleasure.
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In a good marriage, a husband and wife will provide each 
other with sexual satisfaction for the rest of their 
lives. But what exactly is 'a good marriage'? It is to 
this question that we now turn.
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Chapter Eight
The idea of a good marriage
At first blush, there seems to be a contradiction in 
some of the fundamental things which it is claimed that 
human beings need. As part of our nature we need to form 
a long-term pair bond not only to satisfy our natural drive 
to transmit our genes but to meet our need for a loving 
relationship with a close friend and soulmate. We believe 
further that we can best satisfy these different needs by 
the kind of commitment to be found in a legal relationship 
like marriage. At the same time, however, we naturally 
desire autonomy, transcendence and a good sexual 
relationship. We have discussed the claim of de Beauvoir 
and many others that these latter important desiderata 
cannot be met within marriage. However 1 have argued that 
there is no contradiction - although there may be a tension 
- between the needs for a long-term pair bond, soulmate, 
etc., within the framework of a good marriage and those of 
autonomy, transcendence and good sex. I will begin this 
chapter by recapping these results.
But I will argue also that a good marriage requires 
something more. The relationship should make a difference 
to the lives that both of the partners lead, the way they 
understand and organize their everyday concerns. This is 
not merely a matter of them both freeing themselves from 
other ties that would prevent them from devoting their time 
and energy to the marriage, or of renouncing sex with 
others. It requires a transformation of many other aspects 
of their lives. I will go on to argue that provided this 
and all of the other conditions are met, 'getting married' 
and 'remaining married' are perfectly rational and moral 
choices for a person to make. However I will also point 
out that on my account of the matter many people do not 
have a good marriage. For some, their marriage will be 
good enough all-things-considered. But for many others,
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their marriage is bad and the rational thing for them to do 
is to discontinue with it.
The idea of a good marriage
I argued earlier that normally when a couple get 
married, it is thought that they have done something that 
is good and worthwhile and it is generally believed that as 
a result of it, their lives should be changed for the 
better. Similarly we think that those who have a long and 
happy marriage have something really worth having. We have 
also seen some of the necessary conditions which might be 
cited to justify the worthwhile nature of a good marriage; 
the kind of conditions that we hope our marriage will 
satisfy when we decide to marry. In Chapter Three I 
suggested that for a marriage to be good, the couple must 
love each other; they must have strong affactional bonds, 
where by this we mean they must regard each other as best 
friends, uniquely valuable individuals with whom they are 
open, intimate and supporting and with whom they want to 
share important segments of their lives. To secure these 
ends, they will want to make a commitment to each other and 
to demonstrate their commitment publicly in legally binding 
vows which they make when marrying.
We have seen that these conditions are not sufficient 
to determine whether a marriage is good or not, since there 
are other basic conditions that need to be met if a 
person's life is to be thought to be satisfactory - whether 
or not they are married - and they are conditions which 
have important ramifications for our views on marriage. 
One such condition is autonomy: a person - whether or not 
he or she is married - needs to make his or her own 
decisions and feel responsible for the decisions they make 
especially in the important areas of their lives. They 
must be able to decide for themselves among alternative 
lifestyles, policies, beliefs, actions. Thus a woman must 
make her own decisions concerning the career she follows, 
the creative projects she undertakes, her political
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allegiances or religious viewpoint, and whether or not to 
satisfy her very many more mundane preferences. A 
corollary of this is she is not a fully responsible human 
being (poursol) unless she is self-determining.
We then discussed de Beauvoir's contention that an 
irremediable defect of marriage is that married women 
forfeit their autonomy on most important matters in their 
life. This will happen (power relationships between 
persons being what they are) when their husband assumes the 
role of head of the house. For in this role, he can 
override his wife's choices or interests. However I 
suggested that if a woman cannot be self-determining due to 
her husband's dominating her, this is a strong reason for 
thinking that their marriage is not a good one. By a 
parallel argument, if she dominates him, we would regard 
this also as a serious defect in their relationship. More 
importantly, I argued also that while as a matter of fact 
'having a head of the household' is a contingent feature of 
many marriages, it is not a necessary one. In a 
democratically run relationship there is nothing in 
principle which prevents each of the partners retaining 
their own - and respecting the other's - autonomy. 
Furthermore in a good marriage one's commitment to one's 
spouse and children is so deep-rooted that when one devotes 
one's time and energy to them, one's overriding experience 
is not of sacrificing one's autonomy but of fulfilling it; 
there is unlikely to be a feeling of having sacrificed 
oneself if one chooses to commit oneself to this 
relationship.
We noted that another condition necessary for any life 
to be regarded as satisfactory (whether or not the 
individual is married) is that of transcendence or personal 
growth. I argued that the possibility of a married woman 
experiencing transcendence depends upon her not regarding 
herself exclusively (or mainly) in the role of housewife 
and mother (or a married man regarding himself exclusively 
as a househusband). If she thinks or behaves in this way,
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this undermines her possibilities for transcendence. At 
the same time, I argued that while certain of the 
biologically based roles of a mother are inevitable, the 
usual domestic stereotypes we find in the traditional 
marriage go well beyond the few biologically or 
psychologically justified differences. They are unfair to 
women (vis-a-vis their personal growth) and have no place 
in a good marriage. Where housework and mothering have to 
be done, they ought to be the responsibility of both 
husband and wife alike. I suggested also that in a good 
marriage, the couple will help each other grow. In such a 
relationship, a husband will want to encourage his wife to 
realize her potential for becoming an artist, author, or 
whatever, and she will encourage him in his creative 
projects.
Good sexual experiences for both partners are also a 
necessary condition of a good marriage. Sexual intimacy in 
this context we associated with a deep affection and 
commitment to the other person; just as the love a married 
couple have for one another is not supposed to be of the 
kind they feel for any other persons, so the sexual 
intimacy they experience with each other is supposed to be 
something they could share with no one else. The level of 
affection especially differentiates this from merely 
casual, erotic sexual experiences. Concerning the alleged 
heightened sexual excitement associated with the latter, I 
suggested that a long-term marital sexual relationship need 
not mean that sex is lacklustre or boring; a married couple 
can work at making sure that their initial exciting sexual 
activity does not fade. Life-long fidelity is also an 
important factor in the idea of a good marriage. The 
couple's exclusive sex life is supposed to provide the glue 
for their marital relationship as well as forming a base 
for the complex familial relationships that grow around it. 
I argued that one harmful factor to the marital 
relationship is the damage done to it, if it is discovered 
that one's partner has been unfaithful. This is usually
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very painful to the innocent spouse and in turn, it can be 
disruptive to the marriage. On the other hand, I argued 
that exclusive sex is likely to strengthen a marriage by 
restricting yet providing an outlet for each of the 
partner's sexual desire.
Let us grant that I have established that a sense of 
autonomy, growth and agreeable sex for both partners are 
necessary conditions for a good marriage. 1 mentioned 
earlier (p.106) that we need to say something more at this 
point about the idea of commitment. In a good marriage 
both partners will want to secure their relationship, fully 
understanding what this commitment involves. However I 
want to argue now that a further necessary condition of 'a 
good marriage' is that the commitment marriage requires 
demands a transformation in the outlook of the couple 
involved.
We need to be transformed
It is not enough that married persons possess the 
sorts of attitudes and engage in the sorts of activities 
that I have outlined so far, their outlook is expected to 
be transformed by the fact that they are married. The 
necessary conditions outlined above are expected to
transform their view so that each of them comes to see
things from 'a married perspective'. By this I mean that 
they not only need to understand such conditions, the kind 
of understanding they have must be active in the sense that 
it informs and changes their everyday outlook and their 
everyday way of going-on. In particular, it must change 
the way each relates to other people. Let me make the
point in a different way. An important difference between
a close friendship (even if this is with someone with whom 
one cohabits) and marriage is that in the latter case, our 
outlook is supposed to change from, so to speak, that of a 
single person to that of 'a couple'. This new viewpoint is 
supposed to make a difference to our lives and the way in 
which we lead them. Many of our everyday actions and other
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relationships are supposed to conform with this changed 
perspective.
The expected transformation is due to a number of 
reasons. It is due, firstly, to the kind of commitments we 
give in marriage. When we marry, we noted, we publicly 
commit ourselves to an exclusive, permanent and legally 
binding relationship with our partner. This kind of 
commitment is one way in which our relationship to our 
spouse is different to others that we might have with 
friends. Although friends may have an exclusive and 
permanent bond, this is not a publicly declared legal bond. 
I argued earlier that if public promises of this sort were 
made between non-married friends, I think we would take it 
as a sign that the friends lacked confidence in the 
permanence of their friendship. We can see the general 
point in another way. In our earlier discussion of 
'merging' I argued that lovers typically want important 
segments of their lives to be shared and as a result they 
hope to develop a shared identity. To 'transform their 
outlook' in the required way entails that both of them 
endorse this shared identity through the institution of 
marriage (in a way that merely merging does not),
A second related reason for the expected 
transformation is due to the nature of the relationship 
itself. Marriage (itself) is an instrument in the 
development of this outlook; the act of getting married and 
the fact that one has the status of 'a married person' is 
expected to transform each of the couple's outlook.^ This 
is not surprising when we realize that when we marry, we 
publicly resolve to want to be with one another, to 
unburden intimacies to each other, to be willing to 
reciprocate services, to show a high level of care and 
concern, to recognize and respect their worth as a person, 
and so on. But there is more to the matter than this. We 
are expected to take on the perspective that comes from 
being on the inside of this institution. And a person does 
not do this - or understand what this involves - unless
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they care about the institution, or at least they care 
about their own particular instance of it, i.e. their own 
marriage. The continuance and flourishing of their own 
relationship is expected to matter to them. In other 
words, marriage is instrumental in the change of outlook 
due to the desire we have for our own marriage to be 
successful. This in turn requires that our behaviour and 
outlook is transformed in the appropriate ways.
A third way marriage is supposed to transform one's 
outlook is due to the sense of unity, or overall shape, 
that it should give to the lives of each partner. It is a 
fact of human nature, Midgley (1979:303) claims (I think 
correctly) that we need
...a continuous central life that lasts throughgenuine, but passing, changes of mood...
If Midgley is correct, this need for unity can be found (to 
an important extent) in one's relationship with one's 
spouse. If it gives a unity or shape to one's life, it is 
not surprising that a transformed outlook results from it. 
This claim might be supported also by observing how 
devastated people can be when their spouse dies or 
unexpectedly leaves them. When this happens, they 
typically complain that their life has become meaningless, 
or that it lacks any point, or that the point of doing any 
one thing rather than another at this juncture in their 
lives, seems to have been lost.
In response to the above, let us suppose somebody 
says; 'When my spouse died I did not feel devastated by 
this. I carried on with my life in much the same way as 
before.' I must emphasize that the relevant sense of unity 
applies to a good marriage (i.e. a relationship with 
someone whom one desires to be with, with whom one shares 
intimacies, etc.). Bearing this in mind, to say 'she was 
not devastated' does seem logically odd; for it suggests 
that someone she really cared about, she did not really 
care about! Of course, she might add 'My suffering was 
short-lived. I am now remarried. On balance, my life was
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not really devastated.' However the fact that she is 
remarried does not rebut the claim that her former marriage 
gave a unity to her life; if anything it strengthens this 
claim.
A fourth reason why a transformation is expected is 
due to the change marriage brings to one's sense of one's 
own identity. As Bradley (1927:172) writes, the concept of 
'my self'
...the object of (one's) self-consciousness, is penetrated, infected, characterized by the existence of others.
To understand who one is as an individual, one needs to 
understand the relationships in which one stands to other 
people; the role one occupies within a family (as well as 
in one's work, or in one's community) and the commitments 
that this relationship carries with it. If this is 
correct, my husband, my children and the rest of my family, 
contribute in varying degrees to my sense of who I am. My 
marriage commitments are (and are expected to be) an 
important component in my sense of my own identity. 
Through our marriage relationships we are expected, at 
least partly, to define ourselves. However this is not 
merely an empirical point but also a conceptual one. I am 
my husband's wife, my children's mother, his parent's 
daughter-in-law, and so on. I stand in a special 
relationship to these particular persons. And the nature 
of my relationships with them is the reason for them 
weighing importantly in my sense of who I am. Once again, 
it is not surprising that a transformed outlook - of one's 
sense of who one is - normally results from being married.
A fifth aspect of the expected transformation concerns 
the change in moral outlook. The justification of many of 
our moral beliefs depends upon individuals being looked 
upon not as asocial beings but as persons having real ties 
that in fact bind them in relationships with others. We 
will find, this is to say, that some of our moral beliefs 
and many of our value-attitudes can be justified only by 
reference to the fact that we are married. Let me give
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just one example. A wife's unshaken loyalty for her 
husband who has behaved badly may not be a response to any 
merit of the husband (he may have none), or to any of his 
qualities (he may be loathsome). 'He is my husband after 
all' might be said to explain to others a moral stand that 
might otherwise seem wholly unintelligible. This does not 
state the ground for her loyalty so much as indicate that 
it is otherwise groundless (but not that it is irrational 
or mysterious); being married to him is her ultimate 
justification for her loyalty. We are generally not 
puzzled by the fact that a wife can be loyal to her husband 
in a groundless way, because we assume that normal human 
beings are equipped by their marriage with the dispositions 
to react in just that way.= We think that spouses just 
should be loyal to one another. Thus if a husband repeats 
confidences that his wife has shared with him to other 
people, we would morally censure him since (on the face of 
things) he is lacking in loyalty; or if a wife allowed 
others to say unpleasant things about her husband without 
defending him, this too would indicate disloyalty and call 
for moral disapproval. We think also that each must be 
constant in their loyalty to each other. When the husband 
is in difficult circumstances we expect his wife to remain 
steadfast in their relationship, and vice versa. This is 
one of the many values that are expected to become part of 
a married person's ethical outlook.
It may be objected that we expect best friends to be 
loyal to each other in much the same ways. But the 
expectation in the case of married couples is based upon 
slightly different (firmer) ground. Such loyalty is 
underscored by the public commitment they made to one 
another when they made their wedding vows; the commitment 
is formally declared as well as tacitly expected. It is 
expected that their moral outlook will be transformed by 
the appropriate values and obligations towards each other 
within marriage.
The conditions above combine to yield another aspect
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of the transformed outlook expected in marriage, namely an 
abiding commitment to this relationship through changing 
moods and circumstances. We noted how long-term
relationships are difficult to maintain. Each partner may 
have a different set of expectations about how married 
people behave; they may have quite different desires about 
their future within the marriage. As a result, there may 
be major discrepancies in a couple's notion of how their 
marriage is going. One may be dissatisfied with it, or 
aspects of it, while the other is not. The point is: when 
two people decide to live together there is bound to be 
discord from time to time. At the same time, by choosing 
to marry, we choose a long and lasting relationship. 
Marriage is supposed to transform our outlook in such a 
way that in times of conflict one does not walk out on 
one's spouse. It acts as a sort of brake; it stops one 
leaving the other on a whim, or because of short-term 
misunderstandings or even over long-term unimportant 
differences. One sees oneself, so to speak, connected in 
a permanent way to the other.
I am claiming that a transformation is expected in 
many of the cognitive states and behaviour of a married 
person and that this is due to such things as the couple 
caring that their marriage flourishes, the new sense of 
unity and of identity that marriage is expected to give to 
their lives, to the type of moral commitments they 
undertake in marriage, and so on. But the difference in 
the way we are expected to look at things and how we are 
supposed to conduct our lives is due, most obviously, to 
the public pledge we make to have an exclusive relationship 
with our spouse. Non-married best friends do not publicly 
commit themselves in this way. If the latter relationships 
becomes strained or tedious, we do not think they need to 
go on with it and (usually) there is nothing legally to 
prevent this. And if the relationship does breakdown, the 
effects (legal or social) are not of the same consequence.
It might be objected that the required transformation
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must result once again in a diminution of a married 
person's autonomy. How can they be autonomous if, due to 
marriage, they are required to transform their moral 
outlook and adopt the perspective of a married person? 
How can an autonomous agent devolve her responsibilities 
for choice to an institutional provider of moral 
principles? However, there is an ambiguity in the claim 
that an autonomous person cannot devolve her 
responsibilities for moral choice. It rules out, for 
instance, the unquestioning acceptance of the conventional 
marital code of behaviour. We would fault such a woman for 
being morally complaisant or of merely conforming to the 
marital mores. If one conforms with a general moral 
practice qua autonomous agent, this is because one sees the 
reasonableness of it and chooses to conform, not simply 
because it is 'the done thing'. This points to a sense in 
which an autonomous person can choose to follow a received 
code of behaviour or moral practice. She can
(autonomously) choose to adopt some or all of the 
prevailing marital values yet remain autonomous to the 
extent that she is the judge of what she will do and think. 
She accepts the prevailing values because she understands 
them and accepts that we have them for good reasons. (And 
if and when she thinks that good reasons require her to 
change, she does just that.) Her choices include the 
decision to appropriately transform her outlook and 
behaviour from a single to a married woman. If she did not 
choose to do this in marriage, it could, as de Beauvoir 
argues, involve the surrender of herself as an autonomous 
agent.
I argued earlier that there is a related way in which 
this need not be regarded as sacrificing one's autonomy. 
Someone who is committed to this kind of life may, when 
making decisions, regard her marriage (and what is best for 
the relationship) as the best reason for her autonomous 
choices; she can want to choose in such a way that this 
commitment overrides her own different preferences and
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interests. Moreover, it should be stressed that her 
commitment to her relationship may be such that when she 
decides in favour of her marriage, her overriding 
experience is not of sacrificing her autonomy but rather of 
fulfilling it.
Of course married men and women very often do 
sacrifice themselves in unfulfilling ways. They often act 
in opposition to their own autonomous inclinations and 
interests simply because they have been socialized into 
thinking that it is their marital duty to do so. We have 
seen, following de Beauvoir, how this subordinate and 
alienating outlook can come into being and we have found it 
can be an irrational response. But this sort of attitude, 
I have argued, is not present in a good marriage.
A good marriage requires that the couple have strong 
affectional supportive and cooperative relations, that they 
have a sense of their own autonomy, they grow within the 
marriage, etc., while at the same time both are transformed 
by their relationship. I have claimed also that the 
conditions are necessary. What grounds are there for 
claiming the latter? A plausible empirical basis for doing 
so - in the spirit of de Beauvoir's earlier claims - is 
that each individual (psychologically) needs such 
conditions to be met, in order to live with another person 
without experiencing debilitating mental conflicts. But 
this is a bare minimum. More importantly, someone who did 
not understand this (i.e. the above conditions to be 
necessary) would have failed to understand what 'a good 
marriage' involves. If such conditions are not understood 
as necessary then neither is the idea of a good marriage.
I am not claiming of course that when any of us do get 
married or remain married this is because our marriage 
meets the conditions in the way suggested. People are 
different and the differences between them makes them 
relate to one another in different ways, and lead quite 
different kinds of married lives. What I have tried to 
identify is a core of conditions that need to be met for a
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marriage to be described as worthwhile; in order to be a 
good marriage some of these conditions - and a substantial 
set of them at that - need to be realized. Let me make 
this point in another way: in Chapter Two we noted, 'When 
a couple get married they think that they are doing 
something worthwhile'; to argue why (rationally) it is 
worthwhile, is to argue for a relationship of the kind we 
have discussed. But it does not follow from a good 
marriage being worthwhile, of course, that simply being 
married is; saying that a good marriage is thought to be 
worth having is not the same as saying marriage in general 
is
I have three further points to make. They concern 
certain limitations to the analysis above. Firstly, the 
notion of 'a good marriage' may still be somewhat vague. 
Clearly, no account that is given will have the force of an 
a priori demonstration. There are some general conditions 
- distinctive emotional and affective ties, distinctive 
attitudes and behaviour - which everyone who thinks about 
the relationship would accept as important and necessary. 
I am sure they are not the only features of a good 
marriage; however they are, I believe, some of the more 
important ones. Of course someone might say that they have 
a good marriage although one, some, or all of the
conditions - which I have argued are necessary - are
lacking. But I do not think that they could cogently argue
for this.
It should be noted, secondly, that since a good 
marriage is, so to speak, an integrated whole of different 
feelings, attitudes, states, the conditions that I have 
identified are obviously connected and combined with each 
other. The way in which I have divided them up and
categorized them is somewhat arbitrary. Since our idea of 
'a good marriage' admits of degrees, other accounts of this 
notion might put a lot of weight on one condition and less 
on others, hence we should allow that the dividing line 
between those marriages which we regard as good and those
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which do not, will be quite a vague one.
Thirdly, on my account, the standards for what 
constitutes a good marriage are demanding and given that 
this is so, most couples do not have a good marriage. A 
few might be fortunate and meet all of the conditions all 
of the time. But it seems likely that many more couples at 
different stages of their married lives, sometimes satisfy 
the conditions, sometimes do not; they move in and out (so 
to speak) of a good marriage. Sometimes over a period of 
time, a marriage will be good in one way but bad in 
another. No doubt couples survive well enough even where 
they are fully aware that something important in their 
relationship is missing. Some people are willing to 
continue with their marriage even when this means forgoing 
their career, even though sex is never agreeable, and so 
on. Perhaps one or both of them get along in the belief 
that their marriage is, if not good, good enough. But many 
marriages on my account are obviously a mistake. They are 
not satisfactory because the couple do not have the 
necessary affectional bonds, or any vestige of autonomy, 
transcendence or good sex. If the rational course of 
action is the best to follow, the couple ought not to 
remain married. I will now consider this implication in 
more detail.
A less than good marriage
We noted above that reasons of one kind can support 
the claim that a relationship is good - or good enough - 
and that reasons of another kind will lead us to conclude 
that it is not. For example, some people may have autonomy 
within their marriage but no affectional bonds. Thus their 
marriage could be based simply on pragmatic bonds they have 
with each other; for example, a shared home, a shared 
division of labour, shared finances, housekeeping, 
insurance or other economic concerns. As their marriage 
continues their pragmatic bonds (unlike affectional bonds) 
will almost certainly multiply. Santayana (1980:156)
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captures the substance of this view when he suggests that
in such a relationship
. . .man and wife are bound together by a common dwelling, common friends, common affection for children, and, what is of great importance, common financial interests.
Even when there is no love for each other, these bonds 
could (and do) often make for a lasting relationship, it 
seems a reasonably accurate description of many enduring 
marriages; the couple rub along happily even though they do 
not love one another.
It might be asked: without love between the two, what
would be the point of their being married? The answer
might be that they may choose this kind of marriage because
they do not know how to survive on their own (see p.64).
And even if both partners feel competent to deal with every
domestic aspect of living alone, the prospect of dealing
with them all may seem overwhelming. Alternatively, a man
or a woman might opt for this kind of marriage simply if
they regard the alternatives as less attractive. Such a
marriage we are told (ibid):
...may give a fair promise of happiness since... [such a marriage]...can produce the sympathies it requires.
Ek hypothesi in such a relationship the partners will not 
love each other. It is simply a contract in which each 
partner will gain important advantages. For such reasons, 
this kind of marriage may seem to be 'a good bet' if a 
couple are contented with a 'rubbing along' kind of
relationship.
I suggested that a reason for sustaining such a 
marriage might include the rearing of children. A marriage 
of this kind, for example, might be entered into under the 
pressures of pregnancy. From time immemorial, pregnancy 
has played a role in tying some couples in a loveless
marriage. And as we noted, in the past there were good 
reasons to support this approach to marriage where the
latter was seen as an institution for the protection of
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children. It established a legal obligation concerning the 
financial support of the children? it enabled the children 
to know (on paper at least) who their parents were.
However it could be maintained that irrespective of 
children, there are more advantages to both partners in 
having a marital relationship of this kind than in their 
remaining single. For such a marriage gives each of the 
partners residential and economic advantages as well as 
serving as a kind of guarantee that both will adhere to 
their mutual duties and financial responsibilities. It is 
perfectly rational to remain married in order to meet these 
goals. The choice need not have anything to do with love. 
On the other hand, while the hope may be that some or many 
of the conditions we have discussed will be met, the 
decision to marry (or remain married) may be based on less 
ambitious expectations than that of meeting all of our 
conditions.
For most of us, however, either of the above will be 
quite unappealing. A long-term marital relationship based 
upon quid pro quo kind of bookkeeping, in the first place 
would seem to be dull. It would lack the passionate sex 
and romantic colour of eros. Also the bookkeeping 
arrangement ex hypothesi would lack 'companionate love' 
which usually grows and becomes more satisfying as ordinary 
difficulties and duties are shared by the partners, or as 
each other's qualities of character become more apparent or 
appreciated. And it would lack the mutual valuing and wish 
to benefit each other's welfare. I have said their mutual 
love, in one or more of its forms, is the reason why most 
couples get married. If it begins to dim in the day-to-day 
stress of marital life then, for most of us, this is a good 
reason to think the relationship is failing and the couple 
need to do something about it. If it should cease 
altogether then many couples think that they should 
terminate their relationship.
Furthermore although nowadays we do not have many 
actual examples of individuals marrying for bookkeeping
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reasons, there is a lot of empirical evidence to show that 
a couple in a married relationship which lacks love 
entirely have a less than happy married life.'* Clearly 
( lest the arguments below appear too tendentious) there are 
couples whose relationship is held together merely by 
pragmatic bonds. They can be loyal to their partner and 
they can regard the relationship as 'comfortable', despite 
their lack of mutual love. They might even claim that they 
consider their relationship to be a happy one. And there 
are no a priori reasons that I can give for thinking this 
must be incorrect. But it seems reasonable to maintain 
that in such cases they would not have chosen to marry for 
such reasons. It seems reasonable to suppose, this is to 
say, that they would have decided to marry because they 
loved each other and they desired - more than any other 
thing - that, once married, their love would bring them 
happiness. Or more cautiously, it is reasonable to suppose 
that a loving marriage would have originally figured very 
high on the list of things that they believed would result 
in their being happy within their marriage.
In less extreme cases, where merely pragmatic bonds 
hold a married couple together, the communication between 
them is perfunctory. Their marriage seems to be (for want 
of a better word) 'devitalised'. Often each finds support 
in relationships elsewhere; in their children, their job, 
friends, or more often, a lover. Usually each partner 
remembers a time when they had a good loving relationship 
but it has somehow soured and, as a result, often one or 
both of them may feel resentment or cheated by their 
marriage. This is no doubt the fate of a marriage based 
merely on residential or economic bonds.
In the most extreme cases, where love is lacking in a 
marriage, the couple are constantly quarrelling and 
bickering, there is no positive interaction between them - 
except perhaps for the sake of appearances - resentment and 
mistrust seem to be at the core of the relationship and 
only pragmatic considerations keep the husband and wife
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together. Not all loveless marriages function like this, 
(as I have said) though many do. No doubt couples would be 
far happier if their marriage were to be based upon strong 
affectional bonds, (close friendship, soulmates) and the 
other conditions we have discussed.
This brings us to an important question that needs to 
be asked. I have argued that a good marriage requires that 
each of the partners enjoy a significant level of autonomy, 
they encourage and support each other's intellectual growth 
and creative development and that good sexual experience 
are possible for them both. If to have a good marriage we 
need to satisfy these and other such formidable conditions, 
why would anyone choose to get married?
Morality, rationality and marriage
Our lives are shaped by many forces over which we have 
little or no control. We did not choose and cannot modify 
our genetic make-up (our size, sex) and basic drives. Most 
of us seem to be naturally constituted to pair; we are 
genetically determined to form long-term heterosexual pair 
bonds.
We do not choose the place or time in which we are 
born; we are born and raised in a city or the countryside, 
in war or peace, boom or depression, without any say in the 
matter. We are born also into a society with practices, 
norms, traditions - for example, monogamous marriage - 
which are beyond our choosing. Monogamous marriage is the 
most common setting for the man-woraan relationship in our 
society. It is the kind of relationship in which most of 
us were raised and which we enter into as adults. As a 
result, it plays an enormously important role in our lives.
Nevertheless I do not share the view that we are 
passive products of these genetic and environmental 
factors. Each of us is able to shape important sectors of 
our own lives; resisting this, embracing that, or choosing 
to pursue still other elements. We can choose, 
particularly, our sexual partners, whether to marry them or
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not, to save or end a marriage, to remarry, to have 
children or not, and so on. It is within our power also to 
sustain the marital relationship or to neglect it; to grow 
in the relationship or to smother it with expectations and 
demands; to regard it as a kind of battleground of 
conflicting wills with our partner, or as an autonomous yet 
worthwhile joint venture. I have suggested also that if a 
good marriage is generally regarded as worthwhile, this is 
because it is thought to contribute significantly to the 
overall happiness of our lives.
However we saw de Beauvoir - and many others - claim 
that marriage does not and cannot lead to happiness but 
must bring grief. For in a traditional marriage a married 
woman's freedom is thwarted, it frustrates the development 
of her talents and intellectual growth, and her sexual 
needs. Rather than face their inevitable adversity and 
unhappiness in this relationship, simply as a matter of 
prudence women should reject marriage. Furthermore the 
institution - and those who participate in it - are 
immoral. Women as a class remain exploited because they 
lack the economic and political power necessary to escape 
their oppression and this, to a large extent, is due to 
their choosing to marry; as long as they choose, 
particularly, to be housewives and mothers, they will 
remain oppressed. The moral significance of marriage, we 
saw de Beauvoir claim, depends on our viewing it in this 
social dimension; this is where the putative immorality 
applies. No doubt it is possible for a few women to be 
autonomous and transcendent and so to avoid the oppressions 
of marriage. Nevertheless when they do get married, such 
women reinforce an institution in which most women (in whom 
autonomy and transcendence are not well-developed) are 
bound to be oppressed and unhappy. Seen in this light, 
marriage is an immoral institution and the choice to marry 
is immoral.
In contrast with the claims above I have identified 
some of the conditions that presumably we have in mind (if
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our choice is rational) when we think that getting married 
or remaining married is worthwhile. Some of them rebut de 
Beauvoir's criticisms. A good marriage provides the 
framework for a couple who are best friends to be together, 
to share intimacies and to do things together, it allows 
them to care for, encourage, value and respect each other. 
Their relationship must include also the required 
commitment to their marriage and the relevant 
transformation to their outlook. As a result of the 
former, events and routines within the relationship may be 
found to be more rewarding; as a result of the latter, the 
couple's view of other things outside of their marriage may 
be illuminated. Perhaps it is some or all of these 
features that people have in mind when they claim that 
being in a good marriage is so worthwhile.
By suggesting that an objective basis for claims to 
worth might be found within the framework of a good 
marriage, I am not suggesting that no one will believe they 
lead a worthwhile life unless they are married and 
stretched in these ways. I have no doubt - given the 
genetic, social and other factors we have considered - that 
for some of us this is correct. But obviously, as we 
noted, there are many other things that are central in 
their lives, that different people regard as worthwhile. 
Similarly some married people regard particular activities 
which have priority in their relationship as being very 
worthwhile, like collecting antiques or giving tupperware 
parties, that others would regard as quite pointless and 
mundane. Nonetheless, for all of their differences, I am 
arguing that a couple need strong affectional bonds, to 
respect each other's autonomy and to grow and develop
within their relationship, if they are to have a good
marriage. Furthermore I have argued that being in such a 
marriage can and usually does bring a couple happiness.
One thing that seems odd with de Beauvoir's claims is 
the implication that most of us would choose to do
something which we know will give rise to mainly
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unhappiness in our lives. If we believed this, it would 
rob most of us of the major reason for getting married and 
of remaining married. Nonetheless people commonly choose 
to marry. And one reason they do so, I maintain, is 
because they believe it is possible that theirs will make 
a good marriage and (perhaps more than anything else) a 
good marriage will give them happiness. By the same token, 
those who claim to have led happy lives often say that this 
was due to their having a good marriage. In other words, 
a relevant fact of experience is that a shared life in a 
monogamous marriage - not a life self-enclosed for the sake 
of preserving one's autonomy or one's sense of 
transcendence - but a life that develops and extends 
outwards, with new interests in shared activities with one 
other person, where there is mutual value, recognition and 
support, is thought to be to that extent, richer and 
happier.
There are other ways in which we might show de 
Beauvoir's position to be false. Firstly, on the matter of 
whether or not they are genuinely happy, no one is better 
equipped than the person him or herself to know if he or 
she is happy. Discernment of this kind is part of every 
person's rational equipment. And the fact is that many 
married people claim that this relationship has brought 
them happiness.= We might attempt to show our opponent, 
secondly, that marriage does offer many opportunities for 
happiness. To be desired and valued for one's own sake, to 
have someone wanting to spend their time in one's company, 
to be cared for and respected, etc., seems to provide prima 
facie sources for happiness. Another general reason can be 
found in the fact that on most views of marriage, we are 
thought to have a duty to promote the happiness of our 
partners; we think that we should behave in such a way as 
to promote their happiness. This would be an absurd 
injunction if marriage unavoidably resulted in unhappiness. 
However there is one other more interesting reason for 
equating a good marriage with happiness.
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I suggested earlier that the conditions which have to 
be satisfied for us to be able to say that a marriage is 
good are the same conditions whose fuller satisfaction 
makes for a happy life. The satisfaction of them up to a 
certain level enables each of the partners to cope; for 
them to regard their marriage, if not as being good, as 
being 'good enough' . Yet it seems that the more our 
conditions are satisfied, the more likely they are to be 
happy. As I have said, as far as I can see there is no a 
priori reason why this is so. It could have been 
otherwise. However, it does seem to be a brute fact of 
human experience that a good marriage and happiness are 
directly linked. Most of us would claim that the richest 
enjoyments and satisfactions are to be found in a marital 
relationship that meets our conditions.
I have said that there are no a priori reasons why 
there should be a continuity between fulfilling the 
conditions of a good marriage and happiness. I have 
nonetheless provided a plausible sociobiological 
explanation of why this might be so which is worth my 
recapping. Marriages do not occur in a vacuum. Marital 
practices, styles, and the institution itself, changes over 
time. However they are part of a wider evolutionary 
history in which the happiness or pleasures that results 
from them, is an important motivation for the changes in 
question. As we noted earlier, human beings are keen to 
engage in activities and practices because of the pleasure 
to be obtained from doing so. A relationship that meets 
our sexual drives, our need for a soulmate, as well as 
nowadays our desire for autonomy and the full use of our 
creative capacities, etc., is more likely to be positively 
enjoyable than one that does not. It is not too surprising 
then that we (human beings) are developing the marital 
relationship in such a way that the two coincide.
There is one qualification that needs to be made. To 
be 'happy in their marriage' of course is not a property 
that describes a relationship but more accurately it refers
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to the state-of-mind of one or both of the individuals 
concerned. Marriages may be good or bad but only 
individuals can be happy or unhappy, satisfied or 
dissatisfied with them. Once this is clear, it becomes 
obvious that in any marriage, the husband might be happy 
and the wife unhappy with it (or vice versa). If our 
conditions for a good marriage are met, this would be 
difficult for me to comprehend. However in a less than 
good marriage, the husband could be perfectly content, say, 
with working long hours each day and then coming home to a 
hot meal and to watch television for the rest of the 
evening whereas his wife might be bored by this and 
resentful at how little attention he gives her or how 
little effort he seems to invest in their relationship. 
Thus he may be happy enough with their marriage but she is 
not.
So we now have an answer to our original question: is 
marriage an institution in which a rational person might 
choose to participate? I have argued that it is rational 
to choose in favour of a certain state-of-affairs rather 
than others because we believe it is more likely to bring 
the chooser happiness than the alternatives. The fact that 
something is likely to make us happy is a good reason for 
a decision or choice of that thing. Similarly we often 
judge that certain activities within a relationship ought 
to be tried, like making a home, having children, because 
they are more likely to bring greater happiness than 
others. This is not to suggest that happiness is the only 
end in itself for our choices or judgements in this 
context. A person may choose to get married or to do 
things within marriage which are quite remote from this 
end. She may choose, for instance, to sacrifice what she 
believes is a particular route to her own happiness for the 
sake of her husband or children. Nevertheless we normally 
think that the happiness it brings, if not in the short run 
in the long run, is justification enough for engaging in an 
activity or a practice. Thus as a matter of practical
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rationality 'if X believes that by getting married she will 
have a good marriage and thereby this will make her happy' 
or 'if having a good marriage (realizing the ideal) makes 
Y happy' these are good practical reasons for saying 'X 
ought to get married' and 'Y ought to remain married.' The 
point is: if a couple have reasons to believe that their 
marriage will be/is a good one and therefore they will 
have/have found happiness within it, it is rational for 
them to choose to marry and to remain married. Although 
this is not an invariable reason for choosing marriage, it 
is the reason why many of us believe that a good marriage 
is worth having and with this end in mind, we choose to 
marry and to remain married.
Let me say again that I am not claiming that 'a good 
marriage' is a necessary condition for happiness. It would 
be possible for a couple to meet all of the conditions we 
have discussed but still suffer from a dissatisfaction 
sufficiently grave for them not to be happy. Perhaps they 
are penniless, or crave for children they cannot have, or 
the misery might stem from ill health, or failure in work. 
What this shows is that while the conditions we have 
identified are necessary and important for a good marriage 
they are not sufficient conditions for being happy. This 
in turn suggests that 'a good marriage' is one thing and 
that being happy is another and that one cannot always have 
them both.
Clearly there are a great many gaps in the arguments 
above. Something could be said, for instance, about the 
connection between a good marriage and the general 
happiness. It might be maintained that, say, if having 
such a relationship makes the couple happy, then this is 
likely to make them happy in their dealings with other 
people; thus a good marriage might foster the general 
happiness. But to expand on this point will lead us too 
far away from the point with which I want to conclude this 
essay.
From the account given above, the idea of good
5
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marriage appears formidable; and it is not any easier in 
practice. So I might be asked: 'When deciding whether or 
not to marry a particular person, can we be sure that our 
marriage to them will be a good one?' And 'Is it rational 
to marry on the grounds that marriage will bring happiness, 
if happiness is only one of the possible outcomes?'®
In answer to the second question, I want to point out 
that perhaps in no other area of our lives are we so 
potently the creators of our own happiness. As I have 
argued, it is within our power to sustain or to neglect the 
relationship, to grow in it or to choke it by placing 
unreasonable demands on our partners, to regard it as a 
worthwhile venture or an ordeal. Admittedly a good 
marriage is the work of two. But since each of us chooses 
our partner in this matter, the results are also largely 
within our own control. Choosing well makes all the 
difference. And whether we choose well is not merely a 
matter of luck. It is partly a matter of how well-informed 
we are about ourselves and this other person, how well we 
understand our own and their needs and preferences, how 
accurately we gauge the reasons for and against marrying 
them. To a great extent, as we choose, so our married 
lives will unfold. So the brief answer to our second 
question is a qualified 'yes'. By our choices, together 
with hard work and good will on both sides, a couple can 
make their marriage a happy one.
Also this gives us a quick answer to the first 
question. We can take a lot of positive steps to make sure 
that our marriage is a good one. And then hard work and a 
good will on both sides can make just about any 
relationship work in the required ways; i.e. by making sure 
that strong affactional bonds remain alive, that sex is as 
good as possible, that communication between oneself and 
one's partner is intimate and supportive, that we respect 
each other's autonomy, that each of us is allowed to grow, 
and so on.
But it needs also to be noted that very many people do
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not have a good marriage in terms of the conditions above. 
We are now in a position to provide a plausible explanation 
for the disenchantment with their marriage which too many 
people experience. One of the most unpalatable but best 
established facts about marital relationships is that 
affectional bonds have a strong tendency to decrease in 
vitality and warmth. After a period of time, for instance, 
the lives of the couple are usually quite complicated as a 
result of the relationship; children, career issues, 
financial problems may reduce the companionable activity, 
which in turn may reduce the satisfaction each partner 
feels in the relationship.? The affectional bonds may
decrease or may be lacking completely. There is no a 
priori reason why this should be so. But as a matter of
fact this does happen and when this happens then not
surprisingly it is often accompanied by a gradual 
disenchantment with the marriage.*
It might be asked: when this is so, if the necessary 
conditions we have discussed are lacking completely, should 
one get out of it for the sake of trying to get into 
another good marriage? I have argued also that marriage is 
an economic, social and residential relationship as well as 
loving one. A good reason for remaining in a marriage 
might be the mutual dependence that has grown between the 
two; or the reason might be based upon the mutual 
satisfaction with the domestic arrangements that has
developed over the years. As long as they respect each 
other's autonomy and they each allow the other to develop 
their own talents, pursue their own interests, then on my 
argument this seems still to be a rational, albeit less 
attractive, reason for remaining married.
Finally, many marriages are not only no longer built 
upon an affectional bond, the couple find themselves caught 
in a vicious trap of quarrelling and bickering, contests of 
wills, resentment, mistrust, and sometimes of hatred. 
Their marriage does not bring one or either of them (or 
look like bringing them) happiness. Getting married does
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not seem to them to have been a rational thing to do. 
Verbal abuse or violence at the hands of the other may be 
a major problem for one of them. Or one or other may 
suffer a complete lack of autonomy or growth within the 
relationship. If a couple are intensely unhappy with each 
other, if the woman (or man) regularly suffers physical 
abuse from their spouse, if their sense of autonomy is 
forfeit due to their domineering spouse, or if their 
personality is completely stunted by the relationship, 
although they may stay married - perhaps because no 
acceptable alternatives seem to be open to them - remaining 
married does not seem to be a rational thing to do. For 
they know that an alternative exists. This has some value. 
The idea that marriage can be good or worthwhile throws 
light on their situation for them. It shows them that 
remaining in a bad marriage is a choice which they are 
making.
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23. Millett (1972:26).
■24. See Greer (1971:125).
25. See also Friedan (1965:297) who writes: '...[women] must unequivocally say "no" to [this aspect of] the housewi fe image.'
26. See de Beauvoir (1988:451).
27, See Ruth (1980:255).
28. Added to this, de Beauvoir (1988:482) maintains that the man is usually older, which means that he has more life experience and status, and he more often than not has enjoyed a superior education.
29. Firestone thinks that this is part of a more general male conspiracy. She (1970:166) claims that this episode is nothing other than the 'tool of male power to keep women from knowing their condition'.
30. Millett (1972:38).
31. Firestone (1970:156); see also Morgan (1970:xxx).
32. Numerous childhood fairy tales like 'Cinderella' or films like 'Pretty Woman' reinforce the myth.
33. Firestone (1970:163); see also Greer (1971:19).
34. See de Beauvoir (1988:449-451).
35. Greer (1971:20).
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36. Greer (1971:35); see also Bartky (1982:131-132);Jagger (1983:308); Moi (1994:192) and Firestone (1970:171) who thinks this is why women are 'forcing and mutilating their bodies with diets and beauty programs'.
37. Millett (1972:54).
38. See de Beauvoir (1988:660-661).
39. See de Beauvoir (1972:37).
40. According to Young this applies just as much today. She (1990:154) writes: 'Insofar as we [women] live out our existence in accordance with the definition that patriarchal culture assigns to us, we arephysically inhibited, confined, positioned and objectified.'
41. de Beauvoir (1988:169).
42. de Beauvoir (1988:487).
43. Greer (1971:19).
44. de Beauvoir (1988:168).
45. See Abercrombie et al (1994:213 Table 4.1).
46. See Burgoyne (1990:637).
47. See Friedan (1965:300).
48. See Broderick (1988:5).
49. See Ruth (1980:256).
50. Evans (1995:49).
51. See Firestone (1970:156-157); Greer (1971:120).
52. See, for instance, Burgoyne (1990:642-643); Vogler & Pahl (1994:268-270).
53. See Vogler & Pahl (1994:275-277; 284).
54. See Vogler & Pahl (1994:285).
55. See Radcliffe Richards (1994:381-383).
56. See Hochschild (1990:270-271) for a full account,
57. Friedan (1965:297) makes this assumption. She writesthat a woman '...does not have to choose between marriage and a career that was the mistaken choice of the feminine mystique.' She holds that women can
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do both.
58. Added to this, Evans (1995:49) writes: '...if wethink of the time it takes to "be a woman", and the propaganda on appropriate clothes for career women, "in the office", at leisure, at home...we begin to see a 'triple shift'.
59. See Hunt and Hunt (1982:499-518).
60. See Friedan (1983:93-94).
61. See Jagger (1983:264).
62. See, for instance, de Beauvoir (1965:61-62) whereshe informs us that she experienced the desire for dependence during her first two years with Sartre.
63. Moi (1994:219).
64. See Moi (1994:130).
65. See Sartre (1966:584).
66. de Beauvoir (1988:483),
67. See de Beauvoir (1988:391).
68. See also Friedan (1965:264).
69. As Greer (1971:278) writes, housework delivers 'noresults: it simply has to be done again'.
70. Mitchell (1973:162).
71. See Mitchell (ibid).
72. This is underscored by the sociobiological thesis in which we were told that having children satisfies her most basic natural desire.
73. Jagger (1983:257).
74. Firestone (1970:65).
75. Greer (1971:234).
76. Jagger (1983:257); see also Millett (1972:109).
77. Firestone (1970:65).
78. de Beauvoir (1988:514).
79. Millett (1972:26).
80. de Beauvoir (1988:513).
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81. Millett (1972:109).
82. See Oakley (1980:280).
83. See Ruth (1980:254).
84. Jackson et al (1993:182); see also Beck & Beck-Gernsheim (1995:22).
85. See de Beauvoir (1988:596).
86. See Sartre (1966:300). A housewife and mother is in bad faith, firstly, by unquestioningly accepting her status within the marriage, she has accepted her subordinate position to her husband and children. Secondly, if a woman thinks of herself as 'ahousewife; she underscores her facticity, she avoids having to face her future possibilities as a creative person. She has closed off the possibility of her being self-determining. Thirdly, such a woman is in bad faith because by assuming a social role - that of housewife/mother - and not questioning it,she fails to recognize that she is a freely choosingindividual.
87. See Chesler (1978:271).
88. See, for example, Bernard (1973:17); Durkheim (1951:271); Green (1984:27); Whyte (1956:258-263).
89. This does not apply to third-world countries where most women have little or no control over their biological functions, and (despite what is believed to be the case in first-world countries) have no access to contraception.
90. See de Beauvoir (1988:416-418); Rich (1980:631-660).
91. Firestone (1970:255); see also Dworkin (1992:118- 119) .
92. See, for instance, Rich (1977:15).
93. de Beauvoir (1988:454).
94. See Watkins, Rueda, Rodriguez (1992:136-137).
95. Mitchell (1973:151); see also de Beauvoir (1988:450) .
96. Dworkin (1992:127) calls this 'privatized male ownership'.
97. See Watkins, Rueda, Rodriguez (1992:135).
:>■
98. See de Beauvoir (1988:475-476).
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99. See de Beauvoir (1988:515).
100. Bartlett (1994:450).
101. de Beauvoir (1988:444).
102. Firestone (1970:255).
103. de Beauvoir (ibid).
104. de Beauvoir (ibid).
105. Sartre (1957:29-30) makes a similar claim.
106. de Beauvoir (1988:29).
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Notes - Chapter Five
1. This applies, if at all, to the two parent nuclear family. Nowadays 11% of families with dependentchildren are headed by women; see Annual Abstract of Statistics (1994 : 22-23).
2. See also Genesis (3:16-17); Corinthians 1 (14:34- 40); Ephesians (5:22-23); Timothy 1 (2:11-12).
3. See Hannon (1967:53).
4. See, for instance, Corinthians 1 (7:3-4); Ephesians (5:21).
5. For instance, John Chrysostom (Keane 1988:8)maintained '...the female sex is weak and vain'; and Jerome (ibid) declared 'wretched woman, burdened with sins carried about by every wind of doctrine, always learning and never reaching knowledge of the truth'.
6. It has been suggested to me that God is good ingeneral and because of this we have to trust Him onthis matter. However the kind of discrimination that is expressed in passages like the above suggests that we should doubt His goodness in general. Evidence of His alleged goodness in general would be found in things like His fairness of treatment between the genders.
7. Montesquieu (1977:108) writes: 'It is contrary toreason and nature that women should reign in families...the state of their natural weakness does not permit them to have the pre-eminence...'
8. Schopenhauer (1951:62) writes: 'You need only tolook at the way in which she is formed to see that a woman is not meant to undergo great labour...'
9. Comte (1974:504) claims that a fundamental principle of marriage is 'the natural subordination of the woman'.
10. See also Fichte (1970:419). He (1970:402) thinks that a wife naturally must surrender all of her rights to her husband, otherwise she is acting immorally.
11. Ridley (1994); Wilson (1978); see Midgley (1979:337) who claims that 'Gender nearly always makes a difference.'
12. For instance, Broderick (1988:24/25) claims that the male hormone suppresses the development of the left
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hemisphere of the brain, which is the main centre for speech and language. As a result, little girls tend to be more fluent speakers and to have better verbal memories
13. See Broderick (1988:25): '...at most ages boys arelarger than girls of their own age...and at every age they are more active physiologically...'
14. In contrast, Plato (to his credit) holds (Republic:209) 'natural abilities are similarly distributed in each sex.' Thus Socrates argues that girls ought to have the same nurture (education) as boys.
15. See Archer and Lloyd (1982:32-33); see also Maccoby & Jacklin (1974:65 Table 3.1)
16. Although one recent study showed that men are much more likely than women to interrupt and otherwise dominate conversation involving both sexes; see Kollock, Blumstein & Schwartz (1985:34-46).
17. See Archer and Lloyd (1982:37); see also Maccoby & Jacklin (1974:349-355) who summarize most of the research findings of (relevant) sex differences.
18. See Archer and Lloyd (1982:34); Maccoby & Jacklin (1974:351-352).
19. See Archer and Lloyd (1982:103-4); Maccoby & Jacklin (1974:352).
20. See Maccoby & Jacklin (1974:352-353).
21. This tendency is also reflected in the fact that throughout the world, almost all violent criminals in prisons are male; see Archer and Lloyd (1982:31); Annual Abstract of Statistics (1994:73,84).
22. See Goldberg (1974:103-114) for a full account of the biological basis of male domination.
23. See Morgan (1985:165).
24. See Maccoby & Jacklin (1974:243-247).
25. See Barash (1982:238).
26. See Archer & Lloyd (1982:140-142); Jagger (1983:110).
27. See Archer & Lloyd (1982:112-117); see also BMA Family Health Encyclopedia (1992:73-74); Maccoby & Jacklin (1974:245).
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28. See Scanzoni (1972:69) who points out that since it is husbands who have access to these sources, those in the middle-class, have more power than working class husbands.
29. See Ferree (1990:870).
30. See Maccoby (1967:336).
31. She can put up a shelf or change a plug just as well as her brother; see Social Trends (1994:118).
32. See Annual Abstract of Statistics (1994:193).
33. Why isn't there a corresponding female dominance of professions requiring high verbal ability? For instance, though it is true that there are more women journalists than there are women engineers, female journalists are heavily outnumbered by males in Scotland; see Scottish Abstract of Statistics (1992:109-112).
34. See Radcliffe Richards (1986:191).
35. See Benn & Peters (1959:117-118).
36. If you are a woman you ought to be non-rational (intuitive), empty-headed and concerned with trivia (e.g. enjoy adorning yourself, be interested in clothes, make-up, hairstyles); if you are a man you ought to be rational, interested in ideas and concerned with the world; you ought to enjoy discussing politics, have a view of the world, etc.
37. Similarly, Aristotle, Rousseau, et al, switch from claims about 'what naturally is the case' to claims about 'what ought to be the case' in the belief presumably that the latter can be derived directly from the former.
38. See Hare (1963:51-56); Mackie (1977:64-73); Moore (1930:Ch.l).
39. For more on this view - a man really wants a wife who is dependent - see Mill (1975:444).
40. I suspect these claims reflect the preferences of people like Nietzsche (and incidentally Kierkegaard 1975:577) and their own limited relationships with women.
41. We need to make the distinction between 'female' and 'femininity'. The former refers to having the appropriate biological and physiological make-up; the latter traditionally refers to the associated attitude and behaviour, for instance, wearing
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clothes that enhance the female figure, being gentle, non-aggressive, emotional.
42. Radcliffe Richards (1986:200).
43. See Radcliffe Richards (1986:205-206).
44. See Hare (1981:16-17).
45. See Aaker (1988:113).
46. See also Held (1986:270).
47. De Beauvoir neglects to mention the loss of freedomthat men as well as women suffer in the traditionalmarriage.
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Notes - Chapter Six
1. See Beck & Beck-Gernsheim (1995:21).
2. Beliefs about the tasks in question change somewhat in different class settings. For instance, in working-class settings, the husband ought to go out to work to earn the wage with which to support his family; whereas in middle-class households the emphasis is likely to be put on his career. In both cases, whether or not she works, the wife ought to run the house; see Broderick (1988:190-193).
8. See Davies & Welch (1986:412).
9. See Rossi (1977:4) .
10. See Goldberg (1974:135-137).
3. As a result, the average housewife with youngchildren works a 77 hour week; see Souhami(1986:89).
4. See Fletcher (1988:Table 37).
5. In 1992, the number of working mothers with childrenover 5 years old in England and Wales was 27% full­time and 47% part-time; see General Household Survey 1992 (1994:19).
6. See Jackson et al (1993:182).
7. See Rich (1977:42) for more on this point. Somefeminists - like Collard with Contrucci (1988); Daly (1978); Gilligan (1982); Rich (1977) - emphasize'what it is to be a woman'; they say women possess qualities that are superior to those possessed by men. This has led to their associating women with an 'ethics of care', Gilligan (1982:173).
11. Only 12% of mothers with pre-school children in England and Wales work full-time; see General Household Survey 1992 (1994:19).
12. See Radcliffe Richards (1986:212).
13. See de Beauvoir (1988:428-429).
14. We will let the phrase 'gender role' apply to what is involved in being male or female which cannot be attributed to innate physical or psychological differences - the socially constructed male/female role.
15. See Souhami (1986:116).
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16. See Abercrombie et al (1994:226).
17. See Shafer (1987:314-351).
18. See de Beauvoir (1988:29); Firestone (1970:8-11); Friedan (1965:38).
19. See Firestone (1970:65); Millett (1972:26, 109);Mitchell (1973:162).
20. This could be accomplished by a state allowance or a considerable increase in child benefit, to non­working housewives. Then a wife would not be economically dependent on her husband; see Tong (1989:54-57) for a full discussion of this point.
21. Souhami (1986:89) tells us that if measured in economic terms, housework would represent 39% of the Gross National Product.
22. At the moment, governments provide little in the way of economic support, free childcare facilities, child benefits, or maternity payments.
23. See Beck & Beck-Gernsheim (1995:21).
24. Fullbrook & Fullbrook (1994:108).
25. See Oakley (1986:57).
26. de Beauvoir (1988:711).
27. Oakley (1986:61).
28. Jackson Pollock (and other Abstract Expressionists) of course, viewed their art as amounting to more than this.
29. Unless one is committed to a view of creativity likethe postmodernists, e.g. Duchamp (Appignanesi &Garratt 1995:35) who seems to think that just by exhibiting something in a gallery, one is creative.
30. Peters (1966:56) writes that self-realization is 'limited to the development of the self in activities and modes of conduct that are regarded as desirable.'
31. A variant of this view is fully elaborated, ofcourse, by Marx (1978:76-78).
32. See Beck & Beck-Gernsheim (1995:21) who find that househusbands suffer from the 'housewife syndrome, invisible achievements, lack of recognition...'
33. See Watkins, Rueda & Rodriguez (1992:145).
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Notes - Chapter Seven
1. See, for instance, Bayer (1977:29-40); Sack (1984:168-185); Singh (1980:387-393).
7. See Westoff (1976:54-57).
8. de Beauvoir (1988:450).
9. Rich (1977:182); see also Gatens (1991:129).
10. Many feminists see sexual oppression also in terms of enforced motherhood (unwanted children) due to a lack of reliable contraception, coupled with the legal prohibition of abortion; see de Beauvoir (1988:510-511). Firestone (1970:10-12) maintains that women will only be free from oppression when reproductive technology is sufficiently advanced to avoid biological motherhood completely. Nowadays in first-world countries at least, enforced motherhood is not so much the problem; see Stanworth (1994:228- 229).
11. Sexually harassing behaviour can also be verbal. This may consist of sexist jokes, or his making sexual remarks about his wife's body, or other sexual innuendoes, etc. If he displays sexually suggestive posters or if he deliberately leaves 'girlie' magazines (or other sexually suggestive objects) about the house these too may constitute a form of pestering - when seeing them cannot be avoided - and thus could be regarded as a form of
I2. Most empirical studies find the husband's interest in sexual intimacy greater than their wives; see for instance. Bell and Bell (1972:136-144); see also Radcliffe Richards (1986:206-207) who offers this as a philosophical claim.
3. Given de Beauvoir's (and Sartre's) 'obsession with sex'; see Moi (1994:153).
4. Most empirical research seems to support this view. See Tavris & Sadd (1977) for empirical support in USA. Further, there is a substantial empirical correlation between sexual satisfaction and overall marital satisfaction; see Bell & Bell (1972:136- 144); Edwards & Edwards (1977:187-188).
5. See Broderick (1988:384).
6. I am not convinced that a similar case could not be made against the wife, but de Beauvoir (1988:394- 395, 658) thinks that sex is not a transcendent act for a woman.
■r'-i'fa
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harassment for the wife.
12. See Malcolm (1962:157).
13. However if she does not meet any of our criteria but, say, stiffens and remains motionless, this does not entitle him to interpret this as a positive response to his advances. It is more likely to reflect the unequal power relations between them.
::14. See Moi (1994:166).
15. It is alright, for instance, to use an accountant as a means to my ends because this is something he chooses to do; he is not being used merely to serve my ends but is serving his own ends as well - he is earning his salary. On the other hand, to use someone as a mere means is not to give any consideration to that person's ends.
16. See Kant (1948:67).
17. I adapt here the approach given by J. Wilson and his team, in their various publications on Moral Education when Wilson was Director of the Farmington Trust Research unit at Oxford; see Wilson (1970); Wilson, Williams & Sugarman (1968).
18. At present, a husband cannot normally be legallyprosecuted for rape if he forces his wife to havesexual intercourse (unless they have a separation order); see Haste (1994:300).
19. See, for instance, Finkelhor & Yllo (1982:462).
20. See Sichtermann (1994:272); Finkelhor & Yllo(1982:477).
21. See Hunter College Women's Studies Collective(1983:467).
22. See Midgley & Hughes (1983:129-130).
23. See Frye & Shafer (1977:337).
24. Celles (1979:Ch.7) finds that most wives do not define themselves as having been raped when their husbands force them to have sex even if the rape has been accompanied by physical violence. They seem to view rape as something that happens between strangers.
25. See Finkelher & Yllo (1982:461).
26. Sichtermann (1994:273) writes, rape is '...first andforemost a demonstration of power of a will to
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assert authority and dominate, an attempt to establish male dominance.'
27. Cited in Finkelhor & Yllo (1982:460).
28. See Celles & Straus (1979:549-580).
29. See Scully (1993:234).
30. I owe this consideration to E. Telfer.
31. See Broderick (1988:306).
32. This argument is due to G. Warnock (1971:45-46).
33. The most common reason by far for the irretrievablebreakdown of marriage is infidelity; see Haste (1994:294).
34. Of course, an unfaithful spouse may not think that he is behaving in a morally acceptable manner. If confronted about his affair, he may well acknowledge that what he is doing is wrong. This would count more as a case of backsliding rather than his moral support of infidelity.
35. There is evidence to show that what constitutes damage to a marriage is not the extra-marital affair itself, but the spouse gaining knowledge of it; see, for instance, Kinsey at al (1953:433).
36. See Downie (1985:269).
37. See Haste (1994:294).
311
Notes “ Chapter Eight
1. See Graham (1989:209).
2. Perhaps this is why in the legal system a wife is not allowed to be a hostile witness against her husband; Broderick (1988:183).
3. I owe this point to E. Telfer.
4. See Broderick (1988:233),
5. See Glenn (1975:594-600).
6. I owe this point to E. Telfer.
7. See Munro & Adams (1978:215).
8. See Pineo (1961:3-11).
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